# LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS

# OPERATIONS AND REGULATIONS COMMITTEE OPEN SESSION

Friday, December 13, 1996

10:18 a.m.

Legal Services Corporation 10th Floor Conference Room 750 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C.

#### COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

LaVeeda M. Battle, Chair F. William McCalpin Ernestine P. Watlington

#### BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

Hulett "Bucky" Askew Thomas F. Smegal, Jr. Maria Luisa Mercado

#### STAFF PRESENT:

Suzanne Glasow, Office of General Counsel John Tull, Director of Office of Program Operations Martha Bergmark, Executive Vice President Laurie Tarantowicz, Office of Inspector General

#### OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Linda Perle, Center for Law and Social Policy Alan W. Houseman, Center for Law and Social Policy Rick Teitelman, Legal Services of Eastern Missouri

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MOTIONS: pages 3, 94, 112, 124, 189, 198.

## PROCEEDINGS

MS. BATTLE: I'm going to go ahead and call the meeting to order. We've now been called to order. I'd like to welcome everyone here to this meeting of the Operations and Regulations Committee of the Board of Directors, Legal Services Corporation on this December 13, Friday the 13th, 1996.

We are in a new facility here on the 10th floor, as opposed to the 11th floor. I do know that we've got people that have asked to participate that will be coming in. I hope we have adequate space to accommodate the public here. I understand that we have another room that we'll have the opportunity to use when we meet again, so I'm looking forward to those accommodations when they're available.

You should have before you a copy of the agenda that has been published for this meeting.

Before we approve the agenda, it's my understanding that the minutes of our previous meeting on September 29 have been boxed away because of the move and will be made available to us later. So I'd like to defer that item that is listed as number 2, right after approval

1 of the agenda. APPROVAL OF AGENDA 2 MS. BATTLE: Are there any questions about the 3 I'll entertain a motion to approve the agenda, agenda? 4 as written, with the one exception that I've noted. 5 MOTION 6 MR. McCALPIN: So moved. 7 MS. WATLINGTON: Second. 8 MS. BATTLE: It's been properly moved and 9 seconded that the agenda be approved with the one 1.0 exception mentioned. All in favor? 11 12 (Chorus of ayes.) MS. BATTLE: All opposed? 13 (No response.) 14 15 MS. BATTLE: Motion carries. CONSIDER AND ACT ON DRAFT INTERIM REVISIONS TO 16 45 C.F.R. PART 1612, THE CORPORATION'S REGULATION 17 RESTRICTING LOBBYING AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTIVITIES 18

BY GRANTEES

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MS. BATTLE: We will then take up the first regulation identified in item 3, which is consider and act on draft interim revisions to Part 1612, the

Corporation's regulation restricting lobbying and certain other activities by grantees.

Now, I understand that management has summarized, to some extent, the comments that we have received. We received a binder with comments on interim and proposed regulations which contained the regulations -- the commentary that we had received up through November 8, 1996.

Subsequent thereto, there have been some additional comments that were submitted and today we have received a supplement which contains those additional comments that were submitted to the Corporation after the time frame has passed for our review.

And in addition to the secondary supplemental green binder that you should have before you are some additional faxed comments that we got as late as yesterday that should be in packets that you have before you today.

I think all of the members of the committee and the board have been mailed copies of the comments on interim and proposed regulations, proposed rules,

dated November 8, 1996, so you should have had an opportunity to review those.

The management comments I had a chance to look at last night and I know that the other committee members have not. The proposed changes to the regs are bolded. So to facilitate our discussion today, I would like to begin by having the analysis by management of the comments. Then we can hear from committee members their concerns or perceptions about the comments and then we can undertake the proposed changes, if there are any proposed by management, with any commentary we might have from CLASP or anyone else in the public. Let's take that order as we go through each of them, okay?

Starting with 1612, can we first hear from management? As I understand it, there were principally three issues on 1612 that were identified and you can tell us about those.

MS. GLASOW: On each of these summaries I've mentioned how many comments we received on this particular rule and I put -- for this one it was eight timely comments and when I say "timely," that means the

ones, you got in the big November 8 binder. Everything after that is considered too late to go in that binder and we didn't want to have to keep recounting them, so that's what that means.

The first issue on 1612 is confusion about the use of the term "fund-raising." Comments were concerned that it suggested that recipients could not engage in resource development and indeed, that's not we intended by the use of the term. We intended the term to mean self-interest lobbying where you would go and lobby to get funds from a governmental entity to continue your activities, and which would be legislative or other types of lobbying.

So we wanted to clarify that and we made a change in the rule. We dropped the use of the term under the purpose section to clarify that.

MR. SMEGAL: It appears --

MS. GLASOW: In Section 5(c)(1). It is revised to clarify that the recipient may apply for governmental contracts and grants. So we affirmatively said that this rule would allow that type of activity. That's on page 10 in the package you have, right at the

top.

MS. BATTLE: Now, the purpose section is on page 5 in the materials that you have, 5 and 6, I believe, at the top of the page. Under Section 1612.1, the purpose has been amended and the language should be in bold at the top of page 6.

MS. GLASOW: Crossed out.

MS. BATTLE: The new language then would read,
"The rule also provides guidance on when recipients may
use non-LSC funds to participate in public rulemaking
or in efforts to encourage state or local governments
to make funds available to support recipient
activities." And the remaining portion of that
sentence remains the same -- "and when they may respond
to requests of legislative and administrative
officials." And "using non-LSC funds" has been
stricken and moved to another portion of the sentence.

Does everyone see that?

Any questions about the proposed change to 1612.1?

MR. SMEGAL: I have a question. Maybe I'm just dumb this morning. LSC funds can be used to

obtain other government funds, though, can't they? I mean, you're not making the distinction here that the only way a program can go out and try to get more funding is with non-LSC funds? Is that what you're saying, John? That's what this says. "The rule also provides guidance on when a recipient may use non-LSC funds."

MR. McCALPIN: You've got to go to .5 to answer your question on the bottom of page 9.

MS. GLASOW: Right.

MR. TULL: This relates to interaction with the legislative body around funds, as opposed to seeking funds from a variety of other places that would involve any activity that would be implicated.

MR. SMEGAL: But the language you have there is broader than that because the second part you've added, "or in efforts to encourage state or local governments to make funds available."

MS. GLASOW: This would be an effort to go before a state or a federal or local government to lobby and say, "We want you to pass an appropriation or a law that would allow us to get more funds," as

opposed to responding to an RFP put out by a
governmental entity saying, "We want people in the
public or groups in the public to apply for this grant
or contract." That's where we're making the
distinction.

MR. McCALPIN: You're not saying that they
can't respond to an RFP, are you?

MS. GLASOW: No, we're saying they can. The language on the top of page 6 is only saying you can't lobby to get federal appropriations or state appropriations or local.

MS. BATTLE: The language really says that this rule gives guidance on when you may use the funds in these kinds of efforts. So the purpose section really doesn't give you any clarity on the issue of when you can or cannot.

In order to gain that clarity, you have to go to Section 1612.5(c), which reads, "Nothing in this part is intended to prohibit a recipient from" and then 1 is the change to language: "Seeking funding from a governmental entity in response to a contract solicitation or request for proposal from the agency or

1 | body."

Now, the question becomes does that respond to Tom's concern?

MR. SMEGAL: Well, maybe my concern is not as clear as it might have been. I'm looking at the purpose here and I see two sentences. The first sentence has not been changed and it doesn't talk about LSC funds or non-LSC funds. Then I go to a second sentence and the only thing I see in there is a reference to non-LSC funds.

The first thing that comes to my mind is not the purpose of 1612 to cover -- I mean, it looks like a gap to me in the purpose because you jump from no reference at all to funds to non-LSC funds. What happened to LSC funds? Is the purpose of this that you can't use LSC funds for anything? There seems to be a hole here.

MS. GLASOW: Right.

MR. SMEGAL: Now, maybe I'm just not reading it correctly.

MS. GLASOW: The reason the second sentence is here is because we have an exception in the

appropriations to use non-LSC funds for certain types of self interest lobbying, and maybe we need another sentence in there to deal with something else, with the LSC funds generally.

MR. SMEGAL: See, you've gone from a broad general purpose in the first sentence to non-LSC funds.

MR. HOUSEMAN: Although it was in there before.

MS. PERLE: Except that 1612.5 says "permissible activities using any funds."

MR. SMEGAL: No, I understand that when you get into other sections you get all kinds of things going on, but the purpose -- it would seem to me if I read .1, I would expect to have an overview of what I'm going to read about.

And the first thing that occurs to me is there's no reference to LSC funds. I assume when I read the rest of it there's a prohibition against using LSC funds for anything, the way I read this. There's an exception for non-LSC funds provided in the second sentence of the purpose. Now, maybe it was just a word or two.

ľ	MS. BATTLE: Does the rule provide guidance
	which delineates the use of LSC funds and non-LSC
	funds? And, if so, can we then amend the purpose to
	include both of those?
ļ	MR. HOUSEMAN: Except it would be a fairly
į	lengthy sentence if you get specific.
	MS. BATTLE: Yes. "The rule also provides
	guidance on when recipients may use non-LSC funds or
	LSC funds to participate in."
	MS. PERLE: What if you went back to saying
	"guidance when recipients may participate in public
	rulemaking efforts," because the purpose section is
	just saying "We're giving guidance on when you can do
	it," and then later on it says with LSC funds or any
:	funds or non-LSC funds.
!	MS. GLASOW: I think we'd be better, like
	Linda said, to go back to a more general statement.
ļ	MS. BATTLE: And you're suggesting, Linda,
!	"The rule also provides guidance on when recipients may
	participate in public rulemaking."
	MS. PERLE: Mm-hmm.
	MS. BATTLE: With no reference

1	MS. PERLE: To the funds.
2	MS. BATTLE: to the funds issue in the
3	purpose.
4	MS. PERLE: And then the reference would go
5	later in the rule.
6	MS. BATTLE: Okay. Does that fix your
7	concern?
8	MR. SMEGAL: Yes, I think so, yes.
9	MS. BATTLE: All right, why don't we do that?
10	Are there any other concerns about this? The
11	issue of fund-raising
12	MR. SMEGAL: So what you've done, LaVeeda, is
13	just take out "use non-LSC funds to."
14	MS. BATTLE: Mm-hmm.
15	MR. SMEGAL: So it's "may participate."
16	MS. BATTLE: Mm-hmm.
17	MR. HOUSEMAN: The rule tells you when you can
18	and cannot do that.
19	MR. SMEGAL: Everything is here. It's just
20	that the first couple of sentences didn't seem to
21	track.
22	MS. BATTLE: That's a good point.

Tell me how this change addresses the fund-1 raising issue more clearly. 2 MS. PERLE: It's an issue that I raised. The 3 problem was when you say fund-raising, which you used 4 5 to say in the purpose section, it suggests something other than what the rule was intended to address, which 6 7 is lobbying efforts or administrative advocacy efforts. And it also suggested that there's something wrong with 8 fund-raising from private entities. It's just the 9 10 word. MS. BATTLE: Okay, 11 MS. GLASOW: That is what we meant by fund-12 raising, and now we had to say it more specifically. 13 14 MS. BATTLE: There were two other issues. 15 MR. HOUSEMAN: And then the change on the top 16 of page 10, which was to clarify that this thing doesn't prohibit programs from seeking funding, to 17 respond to an RFP or like the Older Americans Act or it 18 could be local funding, local governmental funding, 19 20 state governmental funding or federal governmental

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funding, where there's already appropriation.

Right.

MS. BATTLE:

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4 MR. HOUSEMAN: They're not lobbying to get the 5 money in the first place. They're responding to after the money is available, the process to get the money. 6 MR. McCALPIN: Are you to the top of page 10 7 8 yet? 9 MS. BATTLE: Yes. MR. McCALPIN: Then I think that the sentence 10 c(1) at the top of 10 is more restrictive than required 11 12 because I do not think it has to be in response to a solicitation or so on, because 509(b) says "Nothing in 13 this act shall be construed to prohibit a recipient 14 from using funds from a source other than the 15 16 Corporation for the purpose of contacting, 17 communicating with or responding to a request." So my question was may a program not use funds 18 to initiate a request for funding to a legislative 19 body? And I think that that would be permitted by 20 21 509(b). 22 MR. HOUSEMAN: Yes, but that's covered later,

And the program is just

MR. HOUSEMAN:

MS. BATTLE:

responding to an effort to get that money.

Okay.

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Bill. 1 MR. McCALPIN: Where? 2 MS. GLASOW: 509 language is dealing with a 3 different type of request. 4 MR. HOUSEMAN: It's covered in the section 5 1612.6, if you look at page 12, at the top of page 12, 6 which is the 509 language. 7 MR. TULL: That's non-LSC. Your question was 8 9 regarding LSC; is that correct? Anything. Yes, a source other MR. McCALPIN: 10 than LSC. It says, in 509(b), and that's what it says 11 at the top of 12. My point is is this sentence at the 12 top of 10 confusing or appear to be somewhat 13 contradictory to the sentence at the top of 12? 14 MR. HOUSEMAN: Well, maybe it is. We are the 15 ones that suggested this. We suggested it as, in part, 16 what Linda said. People said, "Wait a minute. You're 17 saying we can't use LSC funds?" 18 There is nothing in the reg that said you 19 could use LSC funds to respond to a request from a 20

could use LSC funds to respond to a request from a governmental agency or a legislative body or to seek funds from a legislative body or governmental agency

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where there was already an established program, which normally happens in response to a request for something.

So that's why that was put in there, to clarify that this didn't prohibit programs from using LSC funds to seek funding from governmental entities, not to lobby the entity to get the funds available in the first place, but once the funds are available, to have a chance to get those funds.

So there's a distinction between, let's say, the individual activities of a program to seek funds that are already made available, which is what this was trying to make sure everybody understood they could do, and activities of a program that are legislative or administrative rulemaking in nature to create funds in the first place. That, you can only use non-LSC funds for, and only at the state or local level.

MR. McCALPIN: To a certain extent F, at the top of 12, covers the same area.

MR. HOUSEMAN: No, it's --

MS. GLASOW: Perhaps the language on the top of 10 should read something more like "apply for a

1	governmental grant or contract."
2	MS. BATTLE: That's probably clearer.
3	MR. SMEGAL: To distinguish from legislative
4	activities that are different than what Alan is saying.
5	MS. GLASOW: You're being the grantee instead
6	of asking money to be a grantor.
7	MS. BATTLE: Could you repeat that language?
8	MS. GLASOW: Apply for a governmental grant or
9	contract.
10	MR. HOUSEMAN: That's fine.
11	MR. SMEGAL: And then would you leave it in
12	response to contract
13	MS. GLASOW: No, it wouldn't be necessary.
14	And I think that language, which tends to be similar to
15	the other language, is what's confusing the issue.
16	We're trying to clarify something and we almost muddied
17	it up.
18	MS. BATTLE: Okay.
19	MR. HOUSEMAN: I think that's a better
20	solution. I like it better than our proposed language.
21	MS. BATTLE: Apply for a governmental grant or
22	contract is now the language. Does that satisfy the

1	concern that you've raised, Bill, about the scope of
2	what is contained in the non-LSC funds permissible
3	activities provision in .6?
4	MR. McCALPIN: Yes, I guess so. Obviously, I
5	don't know what the comment is going to say. It may be
6	that it's covered by the title to 1612.5, which says
7	"permissible activities using any funds," which, of
8	course, would include LSC funds. And then, top of page
9	12, it's specifically non-LSC funds.
10	MS. BATTLE: That's right.
11	Tom has suggested that the end of that new
12	language that we use in 1 should read "apply for a
13	governmental grant or contract for funding.
14	Is there anything else that we need to address
15	under the issue of clarifying this issue of fund-
16	raising?
17	MR. TULL: Isn't it apply for governmental
18	funding through a grant or contract?
19	MR. SMEGAL: Somewhere funding should appear
20	in there.
21	MR. HOUSEMAN: Apply for funding under a
22	government contract.

MS. BATTLE: Under a governmental grant or contract.

MR. HOUSEMAN: Correct.

MS. BATTLE: All right. Now, we've got two other issues here. One relates to bar association activities, concerns raised about that by comments that we've received.

MR. TULL: We received, with regard to what is now number 1612.5(c)(5), which is participation in bar associations, a number of comments were submitted which raised the concern that it could be read to prohibit participation in a committee if an incidental activity of that committee was something related to a prohibited activity, the principal concern being some bar committees do, as a part of their normal activity, react to, comment on, participate in the legislative process.

The intent of the committee when we discussed this last time and, if you will recall, had a very lengthy conversation about this issue, we understood to be that such incidental involvement would not be prohibited by it and there was an effort to craft

language which would distinguish between where a committee was acting principally or solely with regard to the legislative activity, in which case participation using program resources and participating on the time of the program would be prohibited.

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But where a committee, as a part of its activities, incidentally does touch upon or engage in an activity which itself is prohibited, that the intent was not to say in that circumstance that a person could not do that on program time or that the use of a small amount of program resource, such as faxing notices of meetings if a person were a committee chair or using a telephone to call and set up the committee, that that kind of user resources would not be prohibited where it involves incidental touching upon prohibited activities, not where it's the sole principal purpose.

There was some language suggested to try to accommodate that and our thought, as we wrestled with the language, is that the better way to address the problem was to leave the language as it was because it was the committee's intent not to prohibit such incidental involvement and to clarify in the commentary

that intent by being much clearer than we were in the initial draft.

MS. BATTLE: Let me just react and then I'm going to hear from Bill. There is some real concern because you do move into a grey area, it seems to me, in practicality, in the implementation of this provision, because when you have language that says in the regulation, "No recipient resources can be used to support these prohibited activities" and you have the reality of how bar associations interact, it leaves room for some interpretation and I think what we've got is a situation where our recipients want some clarity as to how they can march through this and stay true to their responsibilities to their bar associations and stay true to the restrictions that now apply.

One concern that I raised this morning about this when we talked was likewise, the issue that intersects with this and what we just covered about lobbying efforts, if you're on a committee of the bar association that does self-policing kinds of things, that issues disciplinary rules or regulations within the association that have the force ultimately of law

1	in that you can ultimately decide if someone violates
2	one of those disciplinary rules, that they get kicked
3	out of the practice of law, whether it was the intent
4	of Congress to prohibit Legal Services lawyers from
5	being able to participate in that kind of activity.
6	MR. McCALPIN: Maria just arrived.
7	MS. BATTLE: Great. Pull in another chair and
8	make room. We have just had another board member to
9	arrive. We are just graced this morning with
10	participation.
11	MR. McCALPIN: I guess we're now subject to
12	the Government in the Sunshine Act. We have a majority
13	of the board.
14	MS. BATTLE: We were subject to sunshine
15	already.
16	MR. McCALPIN: But only committee members can
17	vote.
18	MS. BATTLE: That's right.
19	While Maria is getting ready, we discussed
20	this a little bit this morning and I had some concerns
21	that I raised about that.
22	MR. McCALPIN: Can I raise another aspect of

it? 1 MS. BATTLE: Is it the same issue, so we 2 3 can --MR. McCALPIN: Yes. MS. BATTLE: Okay. 5 MR. McCALPIN: At least one of the comments б raised an issue personified by a recent attendee and 7 that is a person in the program serving as an officer, 8 particularly as president of a bar association, and we 9 have a program director here who was president of the 10 local bar association. 11 Does that mean, for instance, that if a matter 12 13 comes before the governing body of the bar association, that the president may not preside as president? 14 MS. BATTLE: Well, that gets to some of the 15 issues, I think, that I'm raising, as well. 16 17 question becomes whether that can be done while that person is using recipient resources or whether that has 18 to be done while that person is not using recipient 19 20 resources. 21 MR. TULL: I think there are two issues. One 22 is resources, and then time. And the distinction that

I believe the committee strove to frame before was that if a committee is meeting the person as the president of the bar association, for instance, is providing over a discussion of legislation and that is the sole purpose of it, that that person should take time off in order to participate in that and should not use program resources to set up a meeting like that.

As distinguished from if that is, and I recognize we're starting to dance on the head of a pin here but I think we're talking about providing guidance in an area which is complicated but where we do have a clear prohibition, the importance of which is deeply held on the part of Congress, that where a committee or the bar association, as part of a whole array of activities, for instance, presiding over an entire convention which a president of a bar would do if it were the president of a state bar or a full-day meeting, a part of which is a committee which considers legislation or that on the agenda is an item which covers that, that that connection with that prohibited activity is sufficiently incidental or not exclusive that, in that circumstance, that it would be

appropriate to, assuming that the board of directors of the program has agreed that the director should spend his time that way or her time that way, that that person could preside over that particular proceeding on program time without violating this particular provision and without violating --

MS. BATTLE: I think we have to get to what fundamental tenets of our relationship with the private bar will be, as part of how we resolve this issue because I know that in some of our other regulations, we're going to come back to this issue of our relationship with the bar associations, as well as our relationship with Congress.

It seems to me that it's one of our fundamental policy determinations that it is good for our recipients to have good relationships with their local bar association and in many states it is mandatory that they be members of their state bar association, at least the licensing entity, and that we have to breathe into what Congress has given us on this the reality of what it takes for us to stay true to the spirit of what Congress intended, which is to not

utilize a bar association in order to do things that would be prohibited otherwise but, at the same time, to give our lawyers who work for these programs the opportunity to fully participate in the bar association so that they can maintain good relationships with their local bar associations.

Part of our rules require that we have members from local bar associations serve on the boards as part of the responsibility for us to keep a close relationship with the local bar association.

So I think as we look at this and as we try to construct comments around this issue, we have to be mindful of making sure that we're real clear that lawyers cannot use local bar associations to do what would be prohibited in any other forum but, at the same time, be able to protect and honor this relationship that is revered in many of our other regulations between the local bar associations and our lawyers.

And how you do that in language in number 5,

I'm not sure but I just do think that when you start to

split hairs and you've got someone who's the president

of an association sitting there presiding over a

1	meeting who has to think, / "Well, let's see; I need to
2	take about 15 minutes of leave so that we can discuss
3	this issue and then I've got to go back on the clock.
4	So let's take a break so I can go call my office and
5	tell them I'm on leave and then come back and
6	finish"
7	MR. TULL: I think the recommendation that
8	we're putting forward I agree that this language may
9	not do it and that's the struggle but the example that
10	you just gave is one in which I think our position
11	would be a person would not, for that five minutes in
12	which that issue comes up or those 15 minutes
13	MS. BATTLE: It may turn out to be a half
14	hour.
15	MR. TULL: They do not have to take leave for
16	that.
17	MR. McCALPIN: Well, I would point out to you
18	also that 5 only deals with committees and not officers
19	of associations, which is a different level of activity
20	and responsibility.
21	MS. BATTLE: Well, it says participating in

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meetings and serving on committees of bars. So the

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association itself either meets or it has committee 1 2 meetings. 3 MR. McCALPIN: It seems to me one of the comments also raised the question, what about the 4 program employee who is the president of the bar 5 association serving as the spokesperson for the barr 6 7 association, or responding to media requests and that sort of thing? 8 So it's not necessarily only in meetings, and 9 10 I think that's an inadequate way of picking up serving as an officer. 11 MS. BATTLE: Clearly there needs to be some --12 13 I can understand the position that the staff has taken 14 and that I agree with, that fundamentally, what the 15 appropriations act directs us to do, we must do, which 16 is we cannot use our resources to do things through bar 17 associations that we cannot do otherwise. MS. GLASOW: What if we found a way to include 18 19 some language in this --20 MR. McCALPIN: I can't hear you, Suzanne. 21 MS. GLASOW: What if we found a way to include a provision, a clause in this provision that prohibits 22

activities in meetings or whatever when the principal focus is on prohibited activities? We'd have to work it in here but the idea would be if it's incidental, if it's like one workshop in a whole series of three days of a conference or if it's --

MR. McCALPIN: Suppose it's one of the four items on the agenda of the meeting of the governing body?

MS. GLASOW: If one of four items is a very strong advocacy item, that might be a problem.

MS. BATTLE: Clearly, people are going to have to make judgment calls as to whether or not it fundamentally becomes a use of the recipient's resources to get something done that can't be done otherwise. But I think that focussing the way that the language is constructed so that it is real clear that fundamentally Congress has said you cannot use Legal Services funds to do certain things and you can't do it through bar associations either is one way to get at it, with -- I think the commentary should express what I've said at the onset, which is our basic tenet that we should have good relationships with the bar

associations and how that is made clear through various regulations, through things that are in our act, through some of the concerns that we've got about some of the other issues that we're going to deal with, as a premise.

Then get at this fundamental issue when we handle how we give guidance to recipients as to how to cut that because there's no way that we can draw language that's going to cut it clearly for everybody, but we do have to make it clear how it ought to be cut.

Maria?

MS. MERCADO: I think that one way that we can handle the issue, for example, if you have one item on the agenda, is the manner in which board members who generally have a conflict in a particular area on any kind of board, you know, will say I'm recusing myself from this particular issue since it's one that I can't work with, that I have a conflict.

In this case it's recusing yourself as a Legal Services member of that committee or as an officer of the governing body, to not deal with that issue because it is in conflict with what your regulations under LSC

allows you to do or not do.

So you're putting the onus that they're not totally prohibited from participating, but it's no different than if a corporate member has some interest in a particular business or whatever will say, you know, "I can't vote on this issue. I can't really comment on this issue because it would be a conflict of interest" or there's a perceived personal advantage to that particular corporate board member.

And it's true in any other organization. I mean, just like when Nancy, when we deal with law schools or whatever, you know, she doesn't deal with those issues. And I don't see why we couldn't have that sort of advice or at least when we're looking at the comments, that it could just happen to be something that is a prohibition under the regulations, that you don't totally throw out that Legal Services person from the committee, from participating in the bar, but other than when it deals with that particular item, they recuse themselves.

MR. TULL: Although isn't the problem that -- the problem is the amount of resources because if that

person -- there's not a prohibition against the person participating in that discussion. There's a prohibition against a program's resources being used to support a lobbying activity or another prohibited activity.

A president of a bar, for example, may be the person whose responsibility it is to make the presentation or to be the advocate and that person may, in terms of their professional stature, be the best person to make that case.

So I think we are talking about trying to find language which answers your question, provides guidance about the answer to that question. Is it 25 percent of an item? Is it 10 percent? Is it 1 percent? Is it half?

MS. MERCADO: But I'm just saying if that individual is there not clocked on their own time but that they're actually there doing the work and participating in the bar function on the committee, that technically you are using resources in the sense that that person is being paid by Legal Services.

So one way of making that very clear is that

that person recuses themselves from dealing with that particular issue, which is a prohibited activity under the regulations. I'm just looking at that.

MS. BATTLE: Tom?

MR. SMEGAL: Let me just inquire, is "resources" defined somewhere?

MR. TULL: Right.

MR. SMEGAL: It seems to me with respect to Bill's earlier issue, the language "in meetings or serving on committees of" is really not broad enough. We talk, in the ABA, about local and state bar associations and it seems to me what that should be -- it's only a suggestion -- is participating as an active member. That's much broader than going to meetings or serving but I think it covers all these kinds of activities -- "participating as an active member of local and state bar associations."

I think that's what Legal Services lawyers should be permitted to do, as all lawyers, active membership. That covers if you're the president, if you're on a committee, if you're involved in a seminar, whatever you're doing.

1	MR. HOUSEMAN: The only problem with that
2	language is we do have some members who participate on
3	key committees of the ABA. We have Legal Services
4	people on SCLAID, as you know.
5	MR. SMEGAL: Oh, sure. I didn't mean to leave
6	out the ABA.
7	MR. HOUSEMAN: Okay, local and state, though.
8	MR. TULL: Would it do better just to say
9	"participating in bar activities"? Because I think
10	when you say "active member," it immediately raises the
11	question, well, is an officer participating as a
12	member? Your intent is to use the word "member"
13	broadly but in some areas it is as distinguished from
14	officers and it might be better just to say
15	"participating in bar activities."
16	MS. PERLE: There's also a term of art here,
17	for example. You can be an active member or an
18	inactive member.
19	MR. McCALPIN: Right.
20	MS. PERLE: It means something different.
21	MR. SMEGAL: Participating is fine. I can buy
22	into that. But is bar association broad enough? I

1	mean, that is not
2	MS. BATTLE: We've not defined bar
3	associations, have we in this?
4	MR. McCALPIN: Not here. We did someplace.
5	MS. BATTLE: If we have
6	MR. HOUSEMAN: Governing body.
7	MS. BATTLE: Governing body? Is that where
8	we've defined it?
9	MR. SMEGAL: Limited to governing bodies.
10	MS. PERLE: In 1610.
11	MR. McCALPIN: Tom, I think the distinction
12	being made between active member and bar association
13	activities is a valid one because you've got this
14	question, is he an active or inactive member and that
15	sort of thing. What you're really talking about is
16	participating in bar association activities.
17	MR. SMEGAL: That's fine. Maybe that's the
18	answer.
19	MS. BATTLE: So if we use the term
20.	"participating in bar association activities," does
21	that cover everything?
22	MR. HOUSEMAN: Yes, it does.

MR. TULL: It doesn't answer our question. 1 MR. HOUSEMAN: It doesn't answer our question. 2 MR. SMEGAL: But it's the first step in the 3 The second part is how do you define resources? And if you limit resources to expenditure 5 of money, that if somebody shows up and spends some 6 time in a meeting that isn't a resource. I do it on my 7 lunch hour, it's not a resource of a recipient. 8 you've got to define "resource" or you've got to change 9 the word. 10 MS. BATTLE: Can we borrow here, for purposes 11 of breathing some clarity into this concept, from the 12 13 way that we have approached this resource issue in our lobbying reg, which talks about the use of resources 14 for all these things? 15 MR. McCALPIN: This is the lobbying reg. 16 MS. BATTLE: Well, I'm saying in other places. 17 Actually, this issue, I think, I 18 MR. TULL: 19 don't know that it helps us answer the question but the 20 place where resources and time is most directly 21 addressed, I think, is in prohibited activities, where 22 there's all kinds of convoluted requirements around

"while engaged in provision of legal assistance **1** 2 activities" and "while employed as." What about "No funds made MS. BATTLE: 3 available by the Corporation shall be used to pay for 4 any of the prohibited acts as it relates to bar 5 associations," or something that really focusses not as 6 much on an attorney attending a bar association meeting 7 but the Corporation itself funding some activity that 8 is prohibited? 9 What if you travel -- the MR. HOUSEMAN: 10 problem I have is what if you travel -- let's say 11 you're on the state bar of California governing body 1.2 and you live in L.A. and they meet in San Francisco? 13 They don't pay -- I don't know if they do --14 15 MR. SMEGAL: They do pay but let's continue. MR. HOUSEMAN: Well, let's assume they don't 16 pay for the sake of this, because there are some bar 17 associations that don't. They don't pay for your 18 travel and --19 Well, if you're traveling to 20 MS. BATTLE: 21 participate in a restricted activity, then no, LSC 22 should not pay for your travel. If you're traveling

but you're not going to participate in a restricted 1 activity, then I don't think there's a problem if 2 you're traveling. 3 MS. PERLE: What if there's one issue on the 4 5 agenda? That gets us back to the second MR. TULL: 6 7 question.

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MR. HOUSEMAN: There's one issue on the agenda and assuming you took Maria's approach, could you still spend the money?

We're struggling with this. I just want to point out, although somewhat inconsistent with what John and I talked about a while back, but the old rule that we're working from which, in the context of the old rule, was there was an absolute prohibition, I will remind you all, an absolute prohibition on self-help lobbying and an absolute prohibition on legislative activities that would be covered by this.

And the old rule said basically you can, as it said, participate in meetings or serve on committees of bar associations, so long as you didn't engage in grassroots lobbying. That is, you can use that forum

to stir up.

Now, everybody, other than me, everybody was uncomfortable with that on the staff the last time we raised this. Now, that's fairly bright line. Maybe it goes too far.

I was trying to come up, in our comment, with something that didn't go that far but gave enough flexibility so that you didn't have to bounce around in the middle of a meeting and say, "Well, now I'm taking off one hat and I'm putting on my other hat," or get hung up about whether you could travel to a bar association meeting or not if one item on the agenda was --

MS. BATTLE: How does that language do that, though? I'm trying to understand. If you took what you're proposing, how does that provide the bright line distinction?

MR. TULL: I think the bar may be meeting to discuss setting up a campaign to educate people about the difficulties in some proposed legislation involving judicial appointments and the intent is grassroots lobbying of the bar.

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1	So you end up back, I think, at the same
2	conundrum, which is if that's 10 percent of the agenda
3	of a bar meeting, does that mean because there's some
4	engagement that the bar intends not you, not the
5	employee but the bar intends and the person is an
6	officer, does that mean they can't go?
7	MR. HOUSEMAN: No, no, you couldn't
8	participate in that. You couldn't participate in the
9	grassroots activity.
10	MS. BATTLE: It doesn't mean you couldn't go
11	to the meeting.
12	MR. HOUSEMAN: The only thing I'll say is we
13	had that rule in effect in 1986 until 1996 and
14	everybody seemed to know how to work with it and there
15	was a similar prohibition, at least on LSC funds and
16	private.
17	Now, I'm not saying we should go back to that
18	but I'm just saying there was a bright line and
19	everybody sort of understood how to deal with it.
20	MS. BATTLE: I guess the question I'm asking
21	is if we've got 10 years of history, then help illumine
22	us as to how that 10 years might help us in
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constructing an appropriate rule around the issue we've got right here.

MR. HOUSEMAN: Well, the 10 years -- what people did was they didn't become the spokespersons for the bar publicly; that is, they didn't go on TV; they didn't write op-eds; they didn't take lead positions that were efforts to stir the public up. They participated on committees or they were part of a committee but they weren't the spokesperson for that committee. That's how they sort of drew the line.

Now, we never ran into the presidential problem directly. I don't know what Rick did when he was president of the St. Louis bar. He may have used non-LSC funds and, of course, that changes --

MR. McCALPIN: You have Charlie Dorsey, too.

MR. HOUSEMAN: And we have Charlie Dorsey.

MS. BATTLE: Maybe Rick can help us with that because we're really trying to deal with two different levels of involvement, one being a participant and the other being a leader. And I think we really value the ability of a Legal Services employee being to take leadership positions, and we want that to be able to

continue.

So if you've got some light that you could shed on this issue I think, Rick, it'll be real helpful to us, as to how you, given the fact that we did have this grassroots lobbying prohibition in existence during the time that you served on that board, how did you address that?

MR. TEITELMAN: As Alan says, the system worked for 10 years and really worked very effectively. What I did as president of the bar, there was a certain controversial issue before the ABA while I was president of the St. Louis bar and I basically abstained from that discussion.

All our meetings are at lunch. In the local bar, the meetings often are at lunch, so it's not like there's that much -- I usually eat lunch, as you can tell, but most of those meetings are at lunch. So I abstained from the discussion and when it came time for someone to take a position for the St. Louis bar regarding a very controversial issue which everyone knows about in the ABA, I did not take that position for the bar. The president-elect took the position for

the bar.

MS. BATTLE: Okay. I'll tell you where I'm coming out and then I'd like to hear from other board members and this committee.

I tend to think that 10 years of experience on the grassroots lobbying is instructive to us. I think it's important. I think we have to make sure that we send the message to Congress that we're real clear that recipients and their employees cannot engage in anything with bar associations that are one of these prohibited acts, and grassroots lobbying is one of them -- any kind of lobbying; lobbying Congress is one of them.

But at the same time, we truly do value the relationships that our recipients have with local bar associations.

So I'd like to see if there's a way to bring the 10 years of experience with the way that that provision worked in the past and particularly because people already have experience with it, into this new environment where we've got specific appropriations relating to bar dues and to bar membership

participation.

I don't know what language created that environment. We could go back and look at that and see if that will work for finding the right mix for today. It becomes circuitous because it really, truly is going to require significant judgment calls on the part of people involved in bar activities to determine when it's gotten to the point that they can just simply recuse themselves and when it's gotten to the point that they cannot participate at all and don't need to go to a particular meeting, given the various issues that will come up over time.

But I think we need to preserve the opportunity for our employees of programs to be able to take leadership roles and active participation roles and we need to draw this line in such a way that we don't undercut or dissuade people from being able to do that.

MR. McCALPIN: Two things. Alan, can you point me to the old provision that was in effect for 10 years? I have old 1612 in front of me and I'll quickly find it but while you're looking, LaVeeda, I have a

1 pretty strong feeling that the statement you made at the beginning of this discussion, which is kind of an 2 underlying and overriding principle that our intent is 3 that bar associations and bar association activities are not to be used to subvert the restrictions placed 5 by Congress on programs. MS. BATTLE: Right. 7 MR. McCALPIN: I think that needs to be said. 8 MS. BATTLE: Yes, I do, too. I think a couple 9 10

of things about how it's said. I mean, we could say it in the commentary. We could say it in the rule. think if we say that and, at the same time, make some statements about the value of our relationship with bar associations, then we have met the specific concern that Congress has raised with this particular appropriations restriction.

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MR. McCALPIN: We've shown fidelity to their restriction.

MS. BATTLE: Exactly. And once we do that, then the 10 years of history that we have around this issue, because we've had people participating with bar associations but not able to engage in grassroots

lobbying for the last 10 years, will also be instructive to people as to how in this new environment they can act.

Now, if there is something about this new environment that's different from the old, then we need to talk about that now so we can make sure that we take that into account. Suzanne?

MS. GLASOW: The point I'd like to make is that 10 years experience was dealing with a different set of restrictions on lobbying and we're now facing stricter restrictions on lobbying in some areas. I'm not sure that really solves the problem of we're trying to draw this fine line of making sure we're not using bar associations to engage in prohibited activities.

I think what the committee is asking is how can we draft some language that draws that fine line, give better guidance.

MS. BATTLE: There's an underlying intent issue. It seems to me that the standard ought to be can someone look at this person's activities and say, "Aha, the intent of this person's involvement here is to lobby in a way that is restricted by the act"? Or

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1	can that person's involvement be construed as, "This
2	person is just on this committee. There's no way that
3	you can construe their participation in this committee
4	as their actually attempting to subvert the lobbying
5	restrictions."
6	MS. MERCADO: It gets to be real subjective.
7	MR. McCALPIN: Alan, what's the section?
8	MR. HOUSEMAN: Well, the old section, and I'm
9	not suggesting the old section was 1612.5(h)(4),
10	which was right above 1612.6.
11	MR. McCALPIN: I see it.
12	MS. BATTLE: Can you read it for us?
13	MR. HOUSEMAN: This may not go far enough for
14	you. I understand. I wasn't trying to say this is the
15	only approach but maybe if we said something like
16	"provided participation does not include direct or

MS. BATTLE: To support prohibited legislative rulemaking or grassroots lobbying.

grassroots lobbying," or something like that, you'd get

at it. Or "direct or grassroots lobbying on

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rulemaking."

MR. TULL: I think the problem is it still

doesn't answer the question that we're wrestling with because if the dilemma we're facing is the circumstance in which the committee of which the person is a member or the chair is doing that, the question is then what? Then does the person have to take time off or recuse themselves, and what is the point at which that triggers?

I don't have a quarrel with adding the language, but I don't think it solves the problem. I think we're stuck with having, either in the commentary or in the text, and I think there are some risks in putting it in the text but in addressing the issue from the standpoint of either defining the amount of time or defining the amount of resources, and it has to be related to some standard that it is insubstantial.

I think insubstantial is a term or substantial is a term that is used related to lobbying and other circumstances and 25 percent is, in fact --

MR. McCALPIN: We had 10 percent requirements some years ago.

MR. TULL: We may be faced with just simply biting the bullet and actually just saying that and

2	the text. I think the problem with putting it in the
3	text is I think that having a rule in which the board
4	says that it is okay to use insubstantial resources to
5	engage in prohibited activities is not going to read
6	well.
7	MS. BATTLE: No, it's not.
8	MR. TULL: And we don't want to say that.
9	MS. BATTLE: I agree.
10	MR. TULL: That is the practical reality that
11	we're trying to address and it isn't going to go away
12	because we can't talk about it.
13	MS. BATTLE: Tom?
14	MR. SMEGAL: It seems to me that we're trying
15	to dot too many i's and cross too many t's. And this,
16	incidentally, is directed at recipient. Now, I guess
17	if the term "recipient" means individuals who work for
18	a recipient, I guess this is appropriate. But why not
19	have sort of a broader catch-up?
20	For example, "participating in bar association
21	activities other than those prohibited for recipients
22	by these regulations"? Why do we have to get into all

having some actual figure. I think it should not be in

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1	these little details in this particular subsection?
2	There's all kinds of prohibitions in here about
3	lobbying and everything else and just say you can
4	participate in bar association activities other than
5	those prohibited.
6	Then if you want to comment on it
7	MS. GLASOW: Because the comments raise the
8	issue that when we're participating, these things
9	happen and what are we going to do? So we're trying to
10	respond to that.
11	MR. SMEGAL: And if you're on one of those
12	committees and some prohibited activity comes up, you
13	sit down on your hands. What's the problem?
14	MS. MERCADO: This is what every corporate
15	board does.
16	MR. SMEGAL: Yes. You recuse yourself. You
17	do whatever you're going to do. Lawyers know what to
18	do.
19	MR. HOUSEMAN: I think that's a very good way
20	of handling it. I think we've either got to change the
21	language or we've got to spell it out. One of the
22	problems I'm worried about is if you don't have

something in the language and you just have commentary, people forget the commentary and only look at the language. There's that problem.

MS. BATTLE: Okay. I think what Tom is suggesting is setting out a provision in the regulation that speaks directly to what Congress told us to do and then, in the commentary, we can talk about some of these knottier issues.

So if someone, as you've suggested, forgets, there's always the commentary there, which will address some of these more specific things.

I tend to agree with you that the broader we state it, the better we give people the opportunity to use good judgment. And if we give examples of good judgment in our comments, then that gives people guidance as to how to draw that line, rather than getting down to saying 10 percent or 15 percent because when you walk in a meeting, you don't have a clue.

You're putting everybody in a position so that I've got an agenda that says I'm going to be dealing with the issue of legal services in this community and all of a sudden the whole day turns to issues that

could be those that are prohibited. And you've got to determine, "Let's see; was it 10 percent of our discussion today or was it 15 or was it 12 percent and do I have to take leave?"

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I think that that's going to cause greater problems than if it's real clear from the onset what you've got to do and we have examples in the commentary about it.

Rick, I know you had your hand up.

MR. TEITELMAN: We don't want people with bad judgment involved in bar activities anyway. If we have people exercising good judgment it'll increase our good relationship with the bar. So I think that giving the examples and, like we said earlier, basically saying ---like he said earlier -- basically saying some of the cautions but saying the law says you can't do this. So they'll have the context in which they need to deal.

MS. BATTLE: I do have an appreciation for what both John and Suzanne have raised as to the new environment with stricter standards and restrictions that we have to honor in this and I think we have to give some mention in the commentary to how that's going

1	to play out.
2	But set out simply, you can participate in bar
3	activities, other than these prohibited things.
4	MR. TEITELMAN: And you can recuse, you can
5	use your own time. You can give the different ways
6	they can
7	MS. BATTLE: Right, get out of actual
8	participation in these prohibited things.
9	MR. HOUSEMAN: So move away from the notion of
10	resources entirely.
11	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
12	MR. HOUSEMAN: That may be better.
13	MS. BATTLE: And it's an issue of
14	participation, not of resources.
15	All right, does that help to
16	MR. HOUSEMAN: I think we can work on trying
17	to draft something.
18	MR. TULL: And Rick's suggestion was
19	participation by people of good judgment in bar
20	association activities?
21	(Laughter.)
22	MS. BATTLE: Okay. Now, we've got a third

1	issue in 1612, which was a technical issue, as I
2	recall. Was it training programs?
3	MR. SMEGAL: Yes, it is.
4	MS. BATTLE: Tell me what that's all about.
5	MR. McCALPIN: You do have a change at the
6	bottom of page 11.
7	MS. GLASOW: That's just a stylistic change.
8	MR. McCALPIN: Pardon?
9	MS. GLASOW: That's just a stylistic change.
10	MS. BATTLE: It says "using non-LSC funds" at
11	the end of the sentence and it's been moved up, so
12	that's not a major piece.
13	Now, what about the training issue?
14	MS. GLASOW: Okay. The training issue, the
15	language for it is reflected on page 13, at the bottom.
16	And the comments were concerned that they may go to
17	educational programs, CLE courses or whatever, that may
18	incidentally touch on an area that's prohibited to
19	Corporation grantees. For instance, they may be
20	talking about consumer law and part of the CLE course
21	talks about using class actions. We can't use class

actions. It's really incidental to the whole area of

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being educated in that area of law.

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So we added language saying "except that recipient staff may use recipient funds to participate in training programs in which training on prohibited activities is only incidental to the overall training program" and explain in the commentary what we're talking about.

MS. BATTLE: Bill?

MR. McCALPIN: As I recall, there was one comment which raised the situation where the program employee is a presenter on the training program, rather than just a recipient, and suggested that that would be permissible, as long as the program employee did not him or herself present the prohibited portion of the program.

There may be other elements of the program which are prohibited. The program employee participates only in a permitted part of the program. I'm not sure this language gets to that situation.

MR. SMEGAL: But do you even have to get there? This is couched in terms of no funds and I would understand that trainer probably to be there

without having to pay a fee to get there. You can ask 1 somebody to run a seminar; you don't usually charge 2 them to go. 3 No, but he may be there on LSC MR. McCALPIN: 4 . He may be there on LSC expenses. He may pay his 5 time. own way to the training session. I think the NLADA 6 trainers, by and large, pay their own way to the NLADA 7 conferences. 8 MS. BATTLE: Did this new law raise this issue 9 of training as it relates to this? 10 MR. HOUSEMAN: C is an addition. This is not 11 in the law. There's nothing in the law that says you 12 can't do this in the first place. The judgment -- the 13 law says you can't -- everything above C is what the 14 15 law says. MS. BATTLE: Right. 16 Essentially. And then the MR. HOUSEMAN: 17 question was what about if you're asked to train on 18 19 prohibited activities? That issue has come up. So this was an effort by all of us who were 20 21 engaged in this discussion to try to come to some 22 resolution of that question.

MS. BATTLE: I've got a certain level of not being at ease with this incidental language, particularly when in all other instances we're saying either you can or cannot. And I think potentially this issue, particularly since the law does not require it, can be handled in the commentary, from the standpoint of saying, "Now, we understand that people do training."

For example, if someone has handled the last class action in housing in a particular state, we can't do it any more but other people are saying, "But we'd like to learn how to do it. We've got to pick up on how to do this and you're the only one with any expertise on how to do this. Will you do a seminar so that private bar can now take over this responsibility of doing class actions in this area?"

If the law itself does not prohibit it, I have some concern about first of all, you're going to cover housing, you're going to cover all the basic issues, and at some point you're going to talk about those Rule 23 -- or whatever the number -- certification requirements are for a class and how you handle some of

Are we talking the prospect that that might 2 happen and giving it now some legal consequence here, 3 whereas we could give guidance in the commentary and 4 cover it? 5 MS. MERCADO: Is it really the intent of 6 Congress to keep you from saying anything like that 7 when you're not going to be using your resources to do 8 9 class actions? I mean, their intent was that they didn't want class actions being done. I don't know 10 that --11 MS. BATTLE: If they're saying I can't tell 12 13 you how to do class actions. In other words, I guess what Congress is saying is we cannot handle class 14 actions. Is Congress also saying, "And now that you 15 can't and you're the only one who's done it, you can't 16 tell other people how to do it so that they can go do 17 it." 18 19 MS. MERCADO: I think we're going much further 20 than the law. I wonder whether we can handle 21 MS. BATTLE: 22 this particular issue, particularly since we're talking

those other issues in that presentation.

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1	about incidental stuff, in a commentary, rather than in
2	our rule.
3	MS. PERLE: Are you suggesting taking out the
4	whole section?
5	MS. BATTLE: The "except" piece, and put it in
6	the commentary itself.
7	MR. HOUSEMAN: Oh, the "except" piece. I
8	thought you were talking about taking out the whole
9	thing.
10	MR. SMEGAL: I'm talking about taking out the
11	whole thing. I hadn't said anything yet.
12	MS. GLASOW: The training restriction doesn't
13	reach paragraph C. That is something the board put in
14	some years ago.
15	MR. SMEGAL: Which board?
16	MR. HOUSEMAN: Your first board.
17	MR. SMEGAL: I move it be taken out.
18	MR. McCALPIN: Were you on the prevailing
19	side?
20	MR. SMEGAL: I voted against it. I can't move
21	to reconsider.
22	MS. GLASOW: Because the training restriction

particular public policies or encourage or facilitate 2 political activities, et cetera. 3 MR. HOUSEMAN: It doesn't address this issue. 4 Nothing else in the appropriation rider addresses this 5 6 issue. 7 MS. MERCADO: You're giving them more restrictions than they need to have. Congress did not 8 address this. 9 MR. HOUSEMAN: This really comes out of some 10 history of some of the rules, which is why it's in 11 here. It wasn't put the same way in the other rules. 12 In other words, if you struck C and then had 13 some discussion about this issue in the commentary, you 14 might be able to accomplish what we're all trying to do 15 here. 16 MS. PERLE: There really is an argument in the 17 situation you discussed where you're sending cases to 18 other people and you've got to teach them how to do it 19 and you may have some professional responsibility to do 20 that, when you're turning a case over to somebody else. 21 22 MS. BATTLE: Yes, that's a specific instance

says you cannot support training programs that advocate

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but also there may be a broader issue of whether or not, since you're no longer doing this and you're the only one who's done it, it may not be a specific case but just the private bar, in general, that will be receiving these --

MR. HOUSEMAN: That's exactly how this came up in the first place. Some Legal Services attorneys were asked by a bar association CLE program run by the bar, not by the program, and the bar asked them to come and train people on how to do class actions and a bunch of other things. The other things weren't prohibited.

Part of the training was on class actions and they wanted those lawyers to participate because they had a training program in federal practice, is what it was, and they wanted the lawyers to participate in the program because they were experts and they had done a lot of federal practice and they had trained before and they got high marks.

So then the question was under the new regime, could they go and do that? That's how it came up in the first place.

MR. McCALPIN: What was the answer?

1	MR. HOUSEMAN: Well, we didn't have, until
2	this this was before this.
3	MS. BATTLE: The incidental issue. And I
4	guess what I'm suggesting
5	MR. HOUSEMAN: It basically said if it's just
6	a little tiny our advice was if it's just a little,
7	tiny part, it's okay.
8	MS. BATTLE: I've got some concern about us,
9	even though I know this was your previous board, Tom,
10	taking out something that's been in there for a long
11	time.
12	MR. HOUSEMAN: It didn't look like this. This
13	is a much different
14	MS. BATTLE: I prefer let's go look at the
15	language that was there before.
16	MR. HOUSEMAN: That's worse.
17	MR. TULL: It's 1612.9
18	MR. SMEGAL: What was the basis for the
19	Durant-Wallace-Smegal board putting this in?
20	MR. HOUSEMAN: They wanted to make sure you
21	didn't get around prohibited activities by training.
22	MR. SMEGAL: So there wasn't any specific

mandate from Congress to do this.

MR. HOUSEMAN: No, no, there wasn't any mandate ever. This language hasn't changed, as a practical matter.

MS. MERCADO: But we've had other regulations where Congress has not spoken to a particular issue and we're adding something and we've decided that that's --

MS. BATTLE: Well, we're paring back. That was one of the things, when I became chair, in my very first piece that I wrote that Alan and I talked about was fundamentally what we wanted to do. And if there is not a specific requirement that we do that in our act or any other appropriations law or anything else, we're really taking a hard look at it.

My concern is because of the nature of this particular issue, I'm not certain that we should pull out what was there before. I just don't think that we ought to clarify it with incidental language in the rule, whatever was there before. We can do that in the commentary.

Okay, this is 1612.9, training. The language previously was in I think it's (a)(1).

MR. McCALPIN: 9(a), yes.

MS. BATTLE: 9(a). "No funds made available by the Corporation or by private entities may be used for the purpose of supporting or conducting training programs that advocate particular public policies or encourage or facilitate political activities or disseminate information about such policies."

MR. HOUSEMAN: Go to C, is the one you want.

MR. SMEGAL: Yes, all of that is still here. What you just read is 1612.8(a).

MR. TULL: C is the one.

MS. BATTLE: C is the one. "No funds made available by the Corporation or by private entities may be used to pay for participation by any person or organization in training with regard to political or legislative activities, except for adjudicatory proceedings or with regard to areas in which the program involvement is prohibited pursuant to the provisions of the act, of other applicable federal law or of Corporation regulations, guidelines or instructions."

MR. TULL: So the middle piece was taken out

and what remains intact is the second part, what comes 1 after the "or." 2 MR. SMEGAL: Let me suggest to you that that same board you're talking about prohibited the redistricting cases and Lowell Jenson, a federal court 5 judge in California, then overturned that regulation. So what's to say this particular regulation is 7 8 just like that, that Jenson never got to it? 9 MS. BATTLE: If we take out the "except" language and just leave in the "No funds of a recipient 10 shall be used to train participants to engage in 11 activities prohibited by the act, " and left that first 12 part, and dealt with the incidental issue in the 13 commentary, would that get us where we need to go? 14 MR. SMEGAL: Well, apparently not because 15 1.6 that's why the exception is there. 17 MR. HOUSEMAN: Maybe it would. I have concerns about the commentary. Here's what my concerns 18 We had some things in the last commentary that 19 20 got knocked out and my concerns about the commentary are that somebody will come in who's not sitting in 21

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this room and say that we can't say that and it'll get

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knocked out, to be as blunt as I can be.

My only problem with trying to figure out a way to address this in the commentary, if that's where the board is --

MR. McCALPIN: Who knocks it out?

MR. HOUSEMAN: Well, there are objections made by IG and other people.

MR. McCALPIN: But the board is the one that decides whether it's in or out.

MR. HOUSEMAN: I understand. So as long as we're going to have some -- as long as it's clear we're going to write something in the commentary that addresses this issue, I think I would be probably more comfortable than not but, in the end, prefer it not be here at all. But if that's the choice, if you want something here and you're worried about this, then the question seems to me let's try to address this concern in the commentary.

MR. TULL: I think that's right and I think if you read the language of what is there before you get to the "except," it says, "No funds of a recipient shall be used to train participants." It's active. It

1	implies the recipient training someone to engage in
2	prohibited activities and I think if the commentary
3	makes it clear that this does not mean to allow someone
4	to attend the training where that's discussed if a
5	staff member goes to a training that's about how to
6	lobby, they're not going to do the lobby. If it just
7	happens that that's on the agenda, they're not
8	MS. BATTLE: If the bar association is
9	sponsoring it, then it seems to me the recipient is not
10	funding it.
11	MR. TULL: Correct.
12	MS. PERLE: But they're paying for them to go.
13	MR. HOUSEMAN: But what John just said means
14	we're taking the position that a Legal Services
15	attorney can't train private lawyers to do something a
16	Legal Services attorney can no longer do.
17	MR. TULL: Using the funds of the recipient.
18	I think that's correct. The person can go and
19	MR. HOUSEMAN: They can't be a trainer. So
20	their expertise is not going to be available.
21	MR. TULL: They can be a trainer. The program
22	cannot pay them to be a trainer to train someone to

do --1 MS. MERCADO: So therefore you're saying that 2 person has to take leave time? 3 MS. BATTLE: Fifteen minutes worth of leave 4 5 time to discuss what --MS. MERCADO: They're in a seminar. They may 6 be there half a day or whatever. 7 MR. HOUSEMAN: That's what you are saying. 8 MS. MERCADO: I think that's more restrictive. 9 10 MR. HOUSEMAN: I think that's the wrong policy, myself. My argument would be nothing in the 11 act prohibits Legal Services lawyers from training 1.2 other people, who do it all the time and it's been done 13 all the time. We don't want to discourage Legal 14 Services lawyers, who have particular expertise, from 15 being trainers in CLE and bar association training 16 activities, which is exactly what this does. 17 MR. TULL: No, I don't think that's correct. 18 What this does, it says you cannot use program 19

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resources for that person to be a trainer. It doesn't say they can't be a trainer.

MR. HOUSEMAN: Well, as a practical matter,

you're going to spend program -- well, most people are 1 going to spend program money --2 MS. MERCADO: So you're telling them they have 3 to go on leave. 4 That individual who is the 5 MR. TULL: trainer -- we're talking about the trainer. 6 7 MR. HOUSEMAN: Let me make it concrete. trainer goes to a CLE program, is asked to come and 8 They're not paid a salary and they're not paid 9 train. transportation, which most CLE programs that I'm aware 10 of don't pay. They're asked to be the lead trainer in 11 a federal practice training. 12 13 They sit down with the other trainers and 14 they're the ones that know class actions and the other 15 trainers don't but they say, "I can't do that; sorry." 16 I think that's ridiculous. 17 No, they say "The program cannot MR. TULL: 18 pay my way here and the program cannot pay for my time 19 here." 20 MS. WATLINGTON: As a practical matter in looking at this --21 MR. HOUSEMAN: 22 That means I'm not going to be

MS. MERCADO: So you're saying that Legal Services lawyers are not going to be able to participate because the bar doesn't have the money to pay them to go to the training and they don't -- since LSC can't pay, then if an LSC attorney really wants to do the training and they're going to do it out of their own pocket to go do the training, basically is what you're saying.

MR. TULL: To be the trainer.

MR. HOUSEMAN: There are two different positions on this and you need to decide. I think it's a mistake. I don't think anything in the act prohibits this and it's a mistake to say that Legal Services lawyers can't train, in the course of a training event, using program resources, on activities that may involve some prohibited activities.

MS. BATTLE: Well, let me test this. My view is that the original reg was there to assure that recipients didn't train people in how to incite riots,

how to boycott, how to do grassroots lobbying. Why don't we, for the purposes of this provision, put those original things in and leave the rest of it out? Why don't we put the list of things that were part of the original reg in here and leave out those things that might come up as issues relating to this transfer of what we can now do and what we used to do?

Because it seems to me, particularly if the law doesn't prohibit it, that all we're trying to do here is to preserve what was there before and to not expand it. And because we now have new things that are prohibited, the concern is how do we handle those new things when this is a reg put together by an old board that everybody's already aware of?

Let's figure out a way to say what used to be the prohibition and leave just that in and nothing more and not add any new restrictions that pertain to this new appropriation. I think that's the -- if there's a way to come up with and construct language that does that, I think that makes sense.

MS. WATLINGTON: I agree. The more you're trying to explain more what you can do and how you can

do it, the more confusing you're getting it to be.

You're highlighting things and it gets more confusing,
especially in that training. All that explaining what
you can do and how you do it, you're just making it
more confusing.

MR. TULL: I think the previous prohibition in 1612.9(c) isn't just in the area that you describe. It has language about political or legislative activities, which was, I'm sure, taken out in this because it's really surplusage.

The full scope of the prohibition was participating in training, and this has now been changed, I think appropriately, to say "used to train participants," which I think does narrow it down to the particular concern that Alan has raised, but it is with regard to areas in which program involvement is prohibited pursuant to the provisions of the act or other applicable federal law.

So the old rule, as well as the new, would both prohibit training of others in prohibited activities, including class actions and a variety of other things.

I think the problem with trying to narrow it is that there is significant sensitivity on the part of the Congress and others that recipients of the Corporation may be seeking to help others do the work they cannot do. There's enormous focus on that issue and while I think Alan speaks to a narrow circumstances of CLE and you don't want to discourage people from being able to participate in that, that the framing of the exception to allow a person to participate and be paid by recipient funds results in a much broader doorway than is intended by the concern that Alan raised and it is a doorway which will be misread by others as allowing an activity about which there legitimate concern on Congress's part.

I think that the cost of keeping it a restriction on use of federal funds, that will affect a very narrow set of circumstances, which Alan describes, but I think it's a very small cost to pay to avoid what would be a much greater and much more significant cost by trying to expand it.

MS. GLASOW: Part of the idea, I think, behind this provision originally was the idea that Congress

gives us money to do a particular job and part of that job shall not include the following activities; for instance, abortion litigation, redistricting, whatever.

So why are you spending the funds we give you to do a job that shouldn't include those activities to train people in those activities? So it was all tied to that idea. As John said, it will be perceived as an attempt to get around the restrictions by training others to do the job we can no longer do.

MS. BATTLE: So incidentally -- this is my question. Under the previous law, how did we handle these incidental issues? In other words, you had this no funds restriction. You go to a bar convention. You sit in on CLEs. They do touch on these issues that were incidental. How were they handled in the past?

MR. TULL: The prohibition is on training others to do it. It's not a prohibition on being present at a training where those things are discussed. That's an important distinction because that's the concern, that recipient funds be used as an activator of those activities, as opposed to someone else providing --

MS. BATTLE: Yes, which is what this is. 1 it only has to do with trainers. I mean, C only has to 2 do with trainers. 3 MR. TULL: Trainers or paying to create a 4 training or to set it up and hire others to do the 5 6 training. MS. BATTLE: So if you attend someone else's, 7 C doesn't get involved. 8 MR. TULL: It's not invoked by this language. 9 MR. HOUSEMAN: Let me just say, first of all, 10 the old provision only covered LSC funds in the end, 11 even though it says private funds here but there was an 12 exception in 1612.13 for private funds. So the old 13 provision only covered LSC funds. Here we're talking 14 about all funds. That's number one. 15 And secondly, obviously, we had much fewer 16 restrictions on the kinds of issues that would normally 17 come up in training programs than we do now. 18 MS. BATTLE: Now, how do you say that the old 19 20 one only covered LSC funds when it says "made available 21 by the Corporation or by private entities"? MR. HOUSEMAN: Because then you've got to look 22

ij	at 1612.13(e).
2	MS. BATTLE: 1612.13(e).
3	MS. GLASOW: It was a very complicated rule.
4	MR. TULL: We don't know who wrote it.
5	MS. BATTLE: You're saying you weren't here
6	then, right?
7	MR. SMEGAL: I voted against it. I lost every
8	vote.
9	MS. BATTLE: It says private funds.
10	MR. HOUSEMAN: I don't think we should look to
11	the past to resolve this issue.
12	MS. MERCADO: You can't because you had the
13	distinction of private funds versus the LSC funds.
14	MS. BATTLE: When you read it you don't see
15	it. It says "Corporation funds and private funds."
16	MR. HOUSEMAN: We had all kinds of problems
17	with that.
18	MS. BATTLE: Okay. Now at least I understand
19	now, because I think we're going to need to wrap up
20	this issue and come to some conclusion from the board's
21	perspective.
22	MR. HOUSEMAN: Let me say one thing before

1	you
2	MS. BATTLE: Don't let me lose my thought,
3	now, Alan.
4	MR. HOUSEMAN: My proposed language is
5	different from the proposed language that they put in.
6	My proposed language would limit it to continuing legal
7	education or bar association training programs.
8	MR. McCALPIN: Where is your language?
9	MR. HOUSEMAN: Go to our comment.
10	MR. McCALPIN: Page 40 in the big, thick book.
11	MR. HOUSEMAN: I don't know what page it is.
12	You've got to go to the actual language we proposed.
1.3	MR. McCALPIN: "Recipient staff may use
14	recipient funds to participate in CLE or bar
15	association activities in which training on prohibited
16	activities"
17	MS. GLASOW: We have a suggestion.
18	MR. McCALPIN: I would not agree to that.
19	MS. BATTLE: Okay. Suzanne, what's your
20	suggestion?
21	MS. GLASOW: Instead of making a new paragraph
22	C, under A, put "A recipient may not support or conduct

1	training programs that," and after 3 put 4, "to train
2	participants to engage in activities prohibited by the
3	act or federal law, regulations, guidelines or
4	instructions," period.
5	MS. BATTLE: To provide what now?
6	MR. SMEGAL: I have that here.
7	MS. BATTLE: He had just done the same thing.
8	Go ahead. I'm serious. Tell me what your number 4 is.
9	MS. GLASOW: Okay. Number 4 would be "train
10	participants to engage in activities prohibited by the
11	act, other applicable federal law or Corporation
12	regulations, guidelines or instructions."
13	MS. BATTLE: That's it.
14	MS. PERLE: In the commentary you can see it
15	says participation in CLE or other things that are not
16	run by the recipient. Does that help?
17	MS. BATTLE: I think that does because that
18	means you're not a major mover on these prohibited
19	things.
20	MR. TULL: You get a raise.
21	MS. BATTLE: C is stricken, then.
22	MR. HOUSEMAN: It's a different way of doing
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1	it, actually.
2	MS. BATTLE: How does everybody feel about
3	that? Does that work? That meets what Ernestine
4	raised. It's clear without being confusing.
5	MR. SMEGAL: I have a question. The stuff
6	that was there, activities prohibited by the act, et
7	cetera, that's different than what we see in 1, 2 and
8	3?
9	MR. HOUSEMAN: Yes.
10	MR. SMEGAL: So then that's consistent with
11	MR. HOUSEMAN: There's some of it that's
12	incorporated within 1, 2 and 3 but it's not
13	MR. SMEGAL: So a recipient may not support 1,
14	2 and 3 and, in addition, may not provide funding to do
15	these prohibited acts, like training.
16	MS. GLASOW: Advocate, encourage, disseminate
17	or train.
18	MS. BATTLE: Okay. That does it. C is now
19	stricken and we have a number 4. So the language that
20	Suzanne has just read will come under 1612.8, training,
21	8(a)(4). Good.
22	Okay, there were some technical changes. Are

we ready or are we on break? 1 We have some technical changes. Have we 2 3 covered those? On 1612 there was a technical change, the last statement, 1612.7(a), recipient resources. I 4 think we talked about that already. It's stylistic. 5 MR. McCALPIN: Yes, you put the word 6 7 "recipient" in. MS. BATTLE: That's fine. We need to make 8 sure that the references back and forth are correct. 9 MR. McCALPIN: If you say "or while using 10 recipient resources provided by the Corporation or by 11 private entities," are you intending to say all 12 resources? Are you trying to exclude public resources 13 14 other than from the Corporation? 15 MR. HOUSEMAN: Because this is not a restriction required by the appropriation rider; this 16 comes out of the LSC act, this restriction, and only 17 applies to LSC and private funds. 18 MS. BATTLE: So we need to parrot that here. 19

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MR. HOUSEMAN: This doesn't come from the

It comes from the act. The act does not

restrict these activities with non-LSC public funds.

1	MS. PERLE: Only the ones in A.
2	MR. McCALPIN: I can't hear.
3	MS. PERLE: B covers everything.
4	MS. BATTLE: Go ahead. Let's finish with
5	this.
6	MR. HOUSEMAN: Do you want to look at the act
7	section?
8	MR. McCALPIN: Alan, what about 509(a)(12)?
9	MS. BATTLE: Could you read it into the record
10	so we know what you're referencing?
11	MR. McCALPIN: Well, 509(a) says that you
12	can't fund an entity, 12, "that supports or conducts a
13	training program for the purpose of advocating a
14	particular public policy or encouraging political
15	activity, labor or anti-labor activity, boycott,
16	picketing, strike, demonstration, including the
17	dissemination of information about such a policy or
18	activity, except this paragraph shall not be construed
19	to prohibit the provision of training to an attorney
20	providing assistance and advice to an eligible client."
21	MR. HOUSEMAN: This is training. That's
22	training. The lead-in is you can't run a training

1	program that does that. You're not interpreting that
2	section here. You're interpreting a section of the LSC
3	act, this provision.
4	MR. McCALPIN: Well, basically you're saying
5	you can't train them to do it but you can do it.
6	MS. PERLE: With public funds.
7	MR. HOUSEMAN: With non-LSC funds. That's the
8	way the law stands now. This activity is not a
9	prohibited activity with non-LSC public funds, under
10	anything. We don't need the word "recipient."
11	MS. PERLE: I think the only purpose is that
12	we wanted to make sure that a person was paid by a
13	private entity, not the recipient, to make it clear
14	that if an individual who worked part-time for a
15	recipient got a grant from some foundation that allowed
16	them to participate in public demonstrations
17	MR. McCALPIN: Basically you're saying you can
18	do this with IOLTA funds.
19	MR. HOUSEMAN: Oh, yes, governmental funds if
20	there's not a restriction.
21	MS. PERLE: There's not a restriction in those
22	funds.

1	MS. BATTLE: Okay. Any other questions about
2	this section? I had a suggested change that now that
3	we've talked about it, I don't know if I want to make
4	the suggestion. In A, to 1612.9, organizing, I know
5	that the language that we have in 1612.9 in organizing
6	under A is the same language that we had in this
7	particular reg. I had a suggestion that we change it
8	to read "Recipients may not use LSC funds or private
9	funds to initiate the formation," da-da-da-da.
10	MS. GLASOW: Which means basically the same
11	thing.
12	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
13	MR. TULL: It's a style change.
14	MS. BATTLE: Yes, it's a style change because
15	no funds, to me, was broader than it needed to be.
16	MR. HOUSEMAN: It's probably not a problem.
17	
	I'll just point out that this language in 1612.1 tracks
18	I'll just point out that this language in 1612.1 tracks the statute, which is the appropriation act again.
18	
	the statute, which is the appropriation act again.
19	the statute, which is the appropriation act again.  MS. BATTLE: Tell me what page. I've got the

an organizer of any, " blah, blah, blah. 2 MS. BATTLE: That's which one under B? 3 MR. HOUSEMAN: You've got to start with B. MS. BATTLE: Right. 5 Go down to 7. It's the "no MR. HOUSEMAN: 6 7 funds" part. So all that's done here is tracking the statutory language. 8 MS. BATTLE: It's not so strong that --9 MS. PERLE: But it reads better the way you 10 did it and I don't think there's a substantive change. 11 MS. BATTLE: It reads better because when you 12 read this straight, the way it's written -- no funds --13 if I give you funds, then is that a restriction on what 14 15 you can do with those funds? By using "recipient" 16 first, that makes it clear what we're talking about. Anybody else have any thoughts about that? 17 MS. BERGMARK: I would leave it the way it is 18 because we're in the situation where there's great 19 sensitivity. There's no change intended, in fact, and 20 I don't think there has been confusion for people about 21 22 the application of this section.

be used, " and then "to initiate the formation or act as

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1	So simply to change the language "Well, why
2	did you change the language, then?"
3	MS. BATTLE: Fine. I'm not real strong on it.
4	I agree, Linda. It does read better and make more
5	sense.
6	MR. HOUSEMAN: I think we're better leaving
7	this one alone.
8	MS. BATTLE: Okay, that's fine.
9	Anything else in 1612?
10	We're now coming up on 12:00 and we have done
11	all of one. We're going to finish all the rest this
12	afternoon so that tomorrow we can dedicate to one or
13	two.
14	MR. McCALPIN: How are we going to tie this
15	up? We usually pass a resolution recommending what we
16	have done to the board for adoption as a final
17	regulation. Are we prepared to do that at this point
18	with this regulation?
19	MS. BATTLE: I think that we will, at our next
20	meeting, revisit this one. What we have done is to
21	give the staff guidance as to how to prepare the final
22	rule. I think at that time, the staff should present

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1.	to us the final rule and our committee can say this is
2	what we want to present to the board.
3	MS. GLASOW: Is the committee meeting in
4	January?
5	MS. BATTLE: Yes. Will we have time to do
6	that?
7	MR. McCALPIN: Well, the board will not have
8	had an opportunity to see it until the day of the
9	meeting.
10	MS. BATTLE: Well, we will get this before the
11	meeting. Shouldn't we and all the board members get a
12	copy of this before
13	MR. McCALPIN: The fifth of January.
14	MS. BATTLE: Yes, before the fifth of January.
15	MS. GLASOW: We can have a new text relatively
16	quickly.
17	MS. BATTLE: Yes, we're agreeing on specific
18	text changes at this meeting.
19	Now, to make it easier what Bill is suggesting
20	is that we now say "so moved" based on what it is that
21	we have recommended today and that you provide us with
22	what it is we've recommended today so that when you get

1	it to the board, we don't have to revisit this. We can
2	only revisit those that we still have problems, and
3	we're saying, "Bring this back; we're not ready to
4	recommend it."
5	MR. McCALPIN: Well, I don't know. I'm not so
6	sure we don't want to revisit this on the fifth of
7	January when we see because I'm a little unclear
8	precisely how some of these issues that we've talked
9	about today are ultimately going to be handled.
10	MS. BATTLE: Okay. Then why don't we do this?
11	To the extent that members of the committee still want
12	to see the language before we take that motion, we'll
13	do that. There may be some that we cover today that we
14	finalize and for those, we'll go ahead and move today
15	and get them finalized.
16	MR. McCALPIN: Right.
17	MS. BATTLE: Do I hear a motion now on this
18	first reg, 1612?
19	MR. SMEGAL: Couldn't you approve it, subject
20	to confirmation of that approval at your next meeting?
21	I think that's what Bill is asking for.
22	MR. McCALPIN: I'm not sure what that

accomplishes.

MR. SMEGAL: It takes it off the table.

MR. TULL: I think the actual language, and maybe I'm wrong but --

(Simultaneous conversation.)

MR. McCALPIN: The bar association area is a little fuzzy in my mind -- what we're going to do, how we're going to handle it. One of the problems is, as LaVeeda says, we may very well not have commentary by the fifth of January and I think the commentary is going to be significant in this one.

MS. BATTLE: Why don't we reserve?

MS. BATTLE: They are yeomen and women but not quite yo-yo. That's too much to require. We will probably, at the end of this meeting, revisit the issue as to whether there's a need for us to get back together or how we're going to handle the commentary, but I'm not expecting, in large measure, that we'll have commentary by the fifth and sixth.

MR. McCALPIN: And I'm a little reluctant to recommend it to the board in the absence of knowing what's in the commentary.

MS. BATTLE: Well, we have, in the past, done 1 the rule to the board and we have to look at this from 2 a resource standpoint, too. It may be because the 3 commentary does not have to be passed off on by the 4 board that we could recommend the finality of a rule 5 and, if need be, either meet or review as a committee 6 the commentary and pass on the commentary ourselves. 7 MR. McCALPIN: Before publication? 8 Before publication, yes. 9 MS. BATTLE: The board did not vote on MS. GLASOW: 10 commentary for the last four rules. They only adopted 11 the text because the commentary wasn't prepared. 12 MR. McCALPIN: In some areas I won't have the 13 same concern about the commentary but this one, it 14

same concern about the commentary but this one, it seems to me we've shifted some things from the rule to the commentary and we've talked about putting something in the commentary that isn't in the rule or wasn't there before, so I'm a little more concerned about the commentary on this one than I will be on many of the others today.

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MS. BATTLE: Well, if I don't hear a motion, I'm going to consider this one tabled for

reconsideration by the staff to make the changes that 1 have been proposed at this meeting and we will revisit 2 this particular reg at our next meeting, just prior to 3 the board meeting. 4 But I do hope that the staff will make this 5 available to all board members in a package prior to 7 the board meeting. Okay now, do we have lunch on-site? Is it a 8 12:00 lunch? 9 MS. BERGMARK: It's going to be just around 10 the corner. 11 MS. BATTLE: Do we have the minutes? 12 everyone has the minutes, while we're waiting for 13 14 Martha to get back, let's take a look at those joint 15 committee minutes that have been passed out to all the 16 members and review them to determine whether or not they're to be approved. 17 APPROVAL FOR THE COMMITTEE OF MINUTES OF 18 SEPTEMBER 29, 1996 JOINT OPERATIONS AND REGULATIONS 19 COMMITTEE AND PROVISION FOR THE 20 DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE MEETING 21 MS. BATTLE: These are joint committee meeting 22

1	minutes for September 29, 1996, a joint meeting of the
2	Operations and Regulations Committee and the Provisions
3	Committee. Did we get a final?
4	We don't have Joan here. On this frequent
5	flier policy, did we ever get a final on that?
6	MS. MERCADO: Yes.
7	MS. BATTLE: We made a decision. I just
8	didn't see the final reg.
9	MS. MERCADO: I know I got it in the mail. It
10	was in the inspector general's report, also.
11	MR. McCALPIN: LaVeeda, look at, and I may be
12	reading this too fast, but there's a page that looks
13	like this. In terms of consideration 4, interim rules,
14	32, 33, 17 and 10, recommended oh, I see. The
15	motion at the bottom is just 32. Then I moved 33.
16	Somewhere along the line did we move the
17	others?
18	MR. SMEGAL: 10 and 17.
19	MS. BATTLE: I thought we did. There's 10.
20	We go on down and 17 it's two pages later, after the
21	IG report.
22	MR. McCALPIN: I see. Okay, later on.

corrections, additions, deletions to the minutes?  (No response.)  MS. BATTLE: If not, I'll entertain a motion.  MOTION  MS. WATLINGTON: I so move.  MR. McCALPIN: Second.  MS. BATTLE: It's been properly moved and seconded. All in favor?  (Chorus of ayes.)  MS. BATTLE: All opposed?  (No response.)  MS. BATTLE: The motion carries.  Okay, we've got some more time before lunch and what I would propose that we do is to move on to the next regulation, priorities in the use of resources.  MR. HOUSEMAN: Can I ask one thing off the	1	MR. SMEGAL: You get credit every time. You
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15 (No response.)  16 MS. BATTLE: The motion carries.  17 Okay, we've got some more time before lunch  18 and what I would propose that we do is to move on to  19 the next regulation, priorities in the use of  20 resources.  21 MR. HOUSEMAN: Can I ask one thing off the	13	(Chorus of ayes.)
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	20	resources.
22 record?	21	MR. HOUSEMAN: Can I ask one thing off the
	22	record?

MS. BATTLE: Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

CONSIDER AND ACT ON DRAFT INTERIM REVISIONS TO

45 C.F.R. PART 1620, THE CORPORATION'S REGULATION
ON PRIORITIES IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

MS. BATTLE: We have 15 minutes. We have approved the minutes. Let's move on to 1620, priorities in the use of resources. We have gotten in some comments on this particular reg and management has some recommendations along certain lines pertaining to this.

There were several issues. Not all of the issues, as I understand it based on the management recommendation, not everything about this can be handled now but we need to finalize what we do have before us. Is that right, on 1620, priorities in use of resources?

There were, I guess, three or four major issues that you gleaned from the comments and there may have been others that came in with the commentary that we just recently received, but if you could give us just a summary of your view of the critical issues that

you gleaned from the commentary, I think that would help to set the stage for our discussion of 1620.

MS. GLASOW: The issue on entitlement to representation, comments were concerned that an applicant could come into an office and say, "This area of law is in your priorities; therefore I have an entitlement to representation because my case falls into that area."

We're not inclined to change the rule to deal with that. Legal Services has never been an entitlement program and we don't see there's really an issue. All this rule is telling the recipients to do -- it's a management tool to establish priorities and determine how best to use their resources by determining what the needs are in the area, where their expertise is -- it's a variety of factors that they look at and then determine that but nothing in the rule establishes an entitlement to any particular person for legal services.

MS. BATTLE: So there really are no changes. This was an issue raised.

MS. GLASOW: Correct.

1 MS. BATTLE: And the example that I shared with you this morning was, for example, if a program 2 decides to do divorces. Someone comes in, they qualify 3 for the services but you still don't choose to do that 4 5 particular person's divorce. Can that person come back and say, "Wait a minute; I'm the next person out the 6 hopper asking for this. Why aren't you doing it?" 7 And we're saying the program still has the 8 discretion, even among those things that they consider 9 to be priorities, to choose which cases within that 1.0 priority to take. 11 12

MR. TULL: And we would propose saying that in the commentary.

MS. BATTLE: Okay.

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MR. TULL: That it was raised as a concern but rather than state it in the rule, where adding language about whether this is an entitlement or not and that sort of thing, which is a term of art in many other areas, that it really is not necessary to do it and may cause problems.

MS. GLASOW: Linda just raised a fix that doesn't have to get into the entitlement issue but may

clarify it. It's on page 5, Section 3, paragraph A,

last line of that paragraph says, "which are to be

undertaken by the recipient," and she would change that

to "which may be undertaken by the recipient." I don't

have any problem with that.

MS. BATTLE: Okay. Maria?

MS. MERCADO: I would assume, Suzanne, I would

MS. MERCADO: I would assume, Suzanne, I would assume that in the commentary on the entitlement issue that the client community at some point has to deal with the issue that even though that may be a priority case, even though it may be an emergency case or whatever, resource-wise -- meaning, if you only have three lawyers in that office and you've got hundreds of cases come in, they can only take so much without committing malpractice or not being able to handle the work.

So even though it's a case, is there any language that deals with the fact that it's also in line with the resources and the capabilities of that office?

MS. BATTLE: So you want resources considered.

MS. MERCADO: I'm just wondering if it's in

there somewhere. I don't remember.

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MS. BATTLE: The resources of the recipient is number 4. That's really C, factors in considering, in establishing the priorities, but that's in the establishment, not the selection of cases.

MR. McCALPIN: Where are you?

MS. BATTLE: I am on page 6, which continues subsection C under 1620.3, establishing priorities, and sets out the resources as number 4. You've got the resources of the recipient as one of the things you can consider as a factor in setting up the resources, your priorities.

MS. MERCADO: What I was thinking of, LaVeeda, was that lately there have been a lot of complaints by client communities, either to the state bar or judges or whatever, "Well, I want legal services to do my divorce" and it was an emergency and yet when people were downsized, to have the lawyer they had or whatever, they just can't handle it. They're trying to handle all those other cases that they were doing with the lawyers that were terminated.

I'm just saying that there has to be some way

of at least having on there -- I mean, obviously the client community is not going to read it but if they get some attorney that decides that they're entitled to that and they ought to do something, that that's a factor that ought to be considered, that resources of the recipient is one of the other factors as to why the case may not be taken, aside from the fact that it is within the priorities.

MS. WATLINGTON: Number 6 addresses that, too, the availability of resources in the community.

MR. McCALPIN: Did I understand you to say that you're going to take up the entitlement issue in the commentary?

MR. TULL: Well, addressing this issue, that the fact of adopting priorities does not entitle a client to representation in that area, that they may be turned away.

MR. McCALPIN: I think it's important to deal with that issue for two reasons. Remember, during the years we were in the wilderness, there was a consistent theme stated at meetings of this board and others that legal services ought to be on a first come/fist served

basis, so as long as you had resources and somebody showed up, you ought to serve that person. That was the philosophy of many of the people on the board and who appeared before the board at the time, and I think it may be important to negate that.

Secondly, I think it may be important to understand that if you set out a list of priorities, you don't have to exhaust everything in the first priority before you go to the second. In other words, the priorities are not mutually exclusive but they're co-extensive. They can all exist together.

As Maria says, the availability of resources depends on which priority you go into at what particular time. I think it may be important to lay some of this out in the commentary.

MS. BATTLE: You may have, for example, a program where housing is your number one priority but you can quickly do divorces or something else. So the number of cases you have that are divorces may exceed the number of cases that you actually have that are housing cases, even though housing is your number one priority.

1 MR. TULL: This is probably an appropriate
2 time to let the committee know that one of the things
3 that we anticipate coming back to the committee and the
4 board with is a complete relook at what is now in
5 1620.3 and 5. Because this was adopted as an interim

7 appropriation that cases only be taken within

regulation to put into effect the requirement in the

8 priorities, we did not look at the entire regulation.

We're now in a system of competition where the setting of priorities and how we look in competition at the question of how a program determines how to use its resources, which is one of the principal criteria we use in deciding among competitors, to make certain that the various factors that we need to look at there and the various factors that are expressed in the procedures that are described about how to go about setting priorities are consistent with each other, that we have -- one of the projects that we've taken on at the staff level is to step back and take a serious look at all of the issues that are involved in that in order to come back to you all with a set of possible proposed changes in those two areas.

That will provide a vehicle for addressing in 1 full the questions that you raised, Bill. 2 MS. BATTLE: Okay, Bill. 3 MR. McCALPIN: If you look at on page 30 of 4 the thick book and the paragraph that says emergencies, 5 number 2, there's a suggestion there that if you take an emergency, you don't have to require the statement 7 of facts or a retainer agreement. When I looked at 8 that I was rather struck by that because I didn't think 9 I had seen that anyplace else and it seemed to me that 10 at least the statement of facts and the identity and so 11 on was a statutory requirement elsewhere and I wasn't 12 sure it could be waived in an emergency situation. 13 MR. TULL: When we get to that regulation, I 14 think it's not waived. I think it is --15 MS. BATTLE: This is a recommendation from 16 NLADA. 17 MR. McCALPIN: No, it's from CLASP. 18 MS. PERLE: It's not waived. It says that if 19 20 you need to take action before you can get it, then you 21 can do that but then you get it as soon as possible

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thereafter.

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1	MR. TULL: It's 1636.2(c) and it's as Linda
2	describes it. It means you can proceed, but it ends
3	with "provided the statement is signed as soon as
4	possible thereafter." So it means you're not
5	proscribed from providing assistance if you have to
6	move but it doesn't waive the provision.
7	MS. BATTLE: That's what I recall about the
8	way that's written.
9	MS. GLASOW: That comment was basically trying
10	to distinguish between emergencies and that kind of
11	particular situation versus what we're talking about in
12	Part 1620.
13	MS. BATTLE: Am I hearing from you, John, that
14	1620.3 has a listing that at some point the staff wants
15	to go back and see if that mirrors the expectation
16	we're giving to people who are developing their grant
17	proposals and to existing programs, so that we're
18	making the same assessment as to how you go about
19	establishing priorities in all of those various areas?
20	MR. TULL: That's a significant part of it,
21	yes.
22	MS. BATTLE: Okay.

MS. GLASOW: We are not, however, suggesting 1 that we not go forward with finalizing this interim 2 rule because of the new statutory law we're trying to 3 implement. We would come back to you with a new 4 proposed rule at that point, with changes to those 5 sections. 6 MS. BATTLE: There are no inconsistencies, are 7 8

there, in what we've got before us today? That's the only question I've got. I know that you may want to fine-tune it. I just want to make sure that what we're putting in the reg is not inconsistent with our communications on other fronts.

MR. TULL: That's correct. I thought for a minute you were going to ask for an assertion that there are no inconsistencies anywhere in this regulation.

MS. BATTLE: No.

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MR. McCALPIN: LaVeeda, I think we need to be sensitive to the comment that we heard from the OIG earlier on, and that is the difficulty of engaging in compliance monitoring if you change the rules during the period to be monitored.

I wonder, are you thinking about changing this during the course of 1997 so that there would be two different rules that would have to be monitored? Or are you talking about perhaps bringing this to us a year from now?

with the inspector general's office and the procedure -- the sections that we're wanting to take another look at are ones which provide guidance to programs as to the processes that they should be engaged in to set priorities. They involve processes and time frames which are two and three and four years long and will not -- won't, because of their particular nature, won't involve the problem that the inspector general has raised in other areas, which is will an auditor go in and have different rules apply to different sections of the year?

The actual impact of changing these, and we haven't gone through the process of thinking what we might recommend, but the impact of the change is not something that would show up for a year or two years or three years because it has to do with now what is

1	required is a needs assessment and then treatment of
2	that needs assessment and reports to us. The
3	creation the design, implementation and follow-up of
4	a needs assessment is something which is a very long
5	process. It is not required annually already.
6	MR. McCALPIN: Laurie, is the OIG satisfied
7	with that?
8	MS. TARANTOWICZ: Yes, that's fine.
9	MS. BATTLE: Is there anything else on this
10	initial issue or can we move on now to some of the
11	other issues that have been raised by the commentary?
12	We've got applicability to transfer recipient
13	funds as another major issue. There's some interplay
14	between Part 1627 and this part. Suzanne, can you
15	illumine where we are on that?
16	MS. GLASOW: Part 1610 talked about use of
17	funds in establishing priorities when we were talking
18	about transfers of funds. We suggest not dealing
19	with basically, the comment was asking that this
20	rule refer to 1610.
21	However, we are planning to come before the
22	committee in the near future with revisions to Part

Ţ	1/2/ subgrant sections that will deal with transfers of
2	funds, and at that point we may be also suggesting that
3	we transfer the provisions in 1610 that deal with
4	transfers of funds to 1627. We haven't made that
5	decision but we're working on it, which would make any
6	citation in this rule to that obsolete almost
7	immediately.
8	MS. BATTLE: But what you're proposing to do
9	to 1627 is not with what we've got today; is that
10	right? You don't have that done just yet.
11	MS. GLASOW: That's correct.
12	MS. BATTLE: What you're proposing to do, in
13	terms of the changes to 1627, are not part of to
14	package today.
15	MS. GLASOW: It's not necessary. It would be
16	a helpful reference but because we foresee in the near
17	future that that reference will become obsolete, we
18	don't recommend doing that.
19	MR. McCALPIN: Are you talking about making
20	recommendations other than the next item on our agenda?
21	MS. BATTLE: Later, yes.
22	MR. McCALPIN: 1627 is the next thing we're

1	going to take up.
2	MS. GLASOW: It's the whole section on
3	subgrants. We only change the section on fees in 1627.
4	MS. PERLE: Fees and dues.
5	MS. BATTLE: Fees and dues. Remember there
6	are only specific changes. There is an entire section
7	that has not been touched by this review. And I think
8	what I'm hearing Suzanne say is the rest that has not
9	been touched will be touched later. And when we touch
10	it, it will have an impact on this.
11	Now, tell me this. Will it then require us to
12	revisit what we're doing now in 1620 at all, to make
13	any changes or any references in 1620?
14	MS. GLASOW: No.
15	MS. BATTLE: So when we finish our work on
16	this, we can put it aside. The concerns that were
17	raised by that comment will be addressed when we
18	revisit sections of 1627 that we do not have on the
19	table now.
20	MS. GLASOW: That's correct.
21	MS. BATTLE: Any other questions about that?
22	All right, so that addresses the transfer of

recipient, funds. What about emergencies? 1 MS. GLASOW: We already briefly touched on 2 that in response to Bill's question. Basically, the 3 comment was concerned that dealing with emergencies in 4 5 this rule would be confused with dealing with emergencies in a recipient's priorities that are inside 6 their priorities area, and we don't suggest dealing 7 with that in this rule. 8 Oh, I'm sorry. Clarifying language in 1625(a) 9 10 and (b)(4). Sorry. MS. BATTLE: It says nonpriority. There's a 11 change in A. 1620.5 annual review, A, the last portion 12 has been changed so that it now reads, "Priorities 13 shall be set periodically and shall be reviewed by the 14 governing body of the recipient annually or more 15 frequently if the recipient has accepted a significant 16 number of emergency cases outside of its priorities." 17 Okay, the second change pertains to the 18 19 language in (b)(4). 20 MS. GLASOW: The volume of nonpriority emergency cases. 21

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MS. PERLE: These changes respond to the

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concern that was raised, just to make it clear that if 1 it's an emergency cases within your priorities, this 2 3 doesn't apply. MS. BATTLE: Okay. So that just gives further 4 clarity based on the comment. 5 Were there any other comments that any other 6 members of the committee or the board observed that we 7 need to consider in reviewing this particular reg? 8 9 Bill? MR. McCALPIN: We say that the priorities set 10 and reviewed if the recipient has accepted a 11 significant number of emergency cases outside of its 12 priorities but we don't, in the next section, list that 13 as a consideration to be taken account of in the 14 15 review. Isn't that what 4 is? 16 MR. TULL: MR. McCALPIN: 17 Oh, yes, I see. "Outside of its priorities." Since you added the "outside of its 18 priorities," okay. 19 MS. BATTLE: Okay, anything else? We have 20 then, it seems to me, made it through 1620. 21 22 (Discussion off the record.)

MOTION

MR. McCALPIN: On the record, I would move

that the committee approve 1620 in the form before us

and as modified here today, recommended to the board

MS. WATLINGTON: Second.

MS. BATTLE: It's been properly moved and seconded that we recommend the adoption of 1620 to the board. All in favor?

(Chorus of ayes.)

MS. BATTLE: All opposed?

(No response.)

for adoption as a final rule.

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MS. BATTLE: The motion carries. 1620 is done.

We are right at 12:30. I think lunch is ready. I am real happy that we finished at least two out of our ten this morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee recessed for lunch.)

## AFTERNOON SESSION

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(1:22 p.m.)2 MS. BATTLE: I'd like for us to go back on the 3 We're five minutes shy of a one-hour lunch 5 recess. I think it was helpful to us. My goal for 6 this afternoon is for us to complete the next five 7 regulations if we can. We do have scheduled time to 8 continue this agenda on tomorrow. We do have some 9 weighty regulations where we expect that we will have 10 commentary from the public on some of them tomorrow. 11 So to the extent that we can get through our schedule 12 today, that would be good. 13 So that's one of the reasons I wanted us to 14 get back together, to get started. 15 CONSIDER AND ACT ON DRAFT INTERIM REVISIONS 16 TO 45 C.F.R. PART 1627, THE CORPORATION'S 17 18 REGULATION ON SUBGRANTS, FEES AND DUES 19 MS. BATTLE: The next reg that we have to address on our agenda today is 1627, subgrants and 20 21 dues.

As I understand it, there are no changes that

are being proposed to the portions of 1627 that we have before us. There were some concerns that were raised by the commentary and I'd like to just hear from the staff about those concerns and how they recommend we should address them.

MS. GLASOW: 1627?

MS. BATTLE: Right.

MS. GLASOW: Okay. We received four timely comments on this rule and I will again reiterate that the provisions we changed in this rule were the ones that dealt with fees and dues and we changed it to just dues. We made the revisions to implement Section 505 of the Appropriations Act on the use of funds for dues.

The first issue raised in the comments was on the subgrant provisions. These comments urged the Corporation to make revisions to the sections dealing with subgrants, especially in light of the recent revisions we did on the transfer of funds in Part 1610.

As I mentioned on an earlier rule, we're currently working on those revisions and plan to present a new rule, a draft proposed rule to the Corporation on to subgrant issue in the near future.

We don't recommend waiting for those revisions for the 1 ones we present to you today, in essence. 2 Okay, bar associations? 3 MS. BATTLE: 4 MS. GLASOW: The comments on the interim rule 5 were generally favorable on the provisions dealing with bar associations. One LSC recipient was pleased 6 because of some conflicts it would have raised with his 7 union contracts. Other bars noted, however, that 8 because their bars do not require membership in order 9 to practice their profession in that state, they 10 11 wouldn't be able to take advantage of that provision. However, we feel that we can't change -- I 12 1.3 mean, the committee made the decision that it would 1.4 only apply to a bar association acting in a governmental capacity and we didn't suggest any changes 15 16 to that. MS. BATTLE: Do we know how many bar 17 18 associations there are out there that are the statewide 19 bars that do not have a mandatory association dues in 20 order to maintain their practice? MS. PERLE: 21 I used to know that number but I'm

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not sure. I think it's somewhat over half are

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mandatory bars but not the vast majority.

MS. GLASOW: Actually, the comment pretty much recognized that and just urged the Corporation to seek a legislative change.

MS. BATTLE: All right. Pre-1996 funds; this really gets to an accounting issue of what should occur, particularly in this first year that audits are going to be done on compliance. Can you address that?

MS. GLASOW: The rule states that Corporation funds may not be used. Of course, the provision was passed in the Corporation's fiscal year 1996 appropriations and was included in the '97 appropriations by reference.

Some of the programs had used '95 funds to pay dues prior to passage of the law and implementation of the rule and they were concerned that they would be sanctioned for noncompliance because the rule itself says no funds.

We don't feel we need to treat it in the rule but we will not treat it as an issue of noncompliance because the law was not in effect at that time and it simply wouldn't be fair to treat it as an issue of

noncompliance.

MS. BATTLE: Okay. Are there any other issues that spring from this accounting concern that we at least have here as it relates to the payment of dues?

In other words, are there any other activities for which we need to make some comment on audit treatment?

Linda?

MS. PERLE: I've been asked by Harrison McIver from PAG to just raise the issue about whether the board would be willing to change the rule. Clearly, the appropriations bill applies to the '96 appropriation and now the '97 appropriation.

So arguably, the rule as it's stated here, which says "Corporation funds," which includes all Corporation funds, goes beyond what's required in the appropriations act.

I was asked to raise the question about whether the board would be willing to change 1627.4 to say "Corporation funds under the FY '96 and subsequent appropriations may not be used." In other words, to say that if you still have carryover funds from prior years, that they could be used to pay dues.

MR. McCALPIN: Isn't that what they're going 1 to do in the commentary? 2 MS. PERLE: No. What the commentary says 3 is -- since the rule says -- the rule was put into 4 effect on August 29 and the rule says "Corporation 5 funds." So it covers all funds that came from the 6 7 Corporation, regardless of when they were received. What they're saying is if you pay dues with 8 '95 carryover funds before August 29 it's okay, but not 9 after August 29. In other words, there are programs 10 11 that still have '95 carryover funds. MR. McCALPIN: Aren't we going to say in the 12 13 commentary that you can use '95 funds any time to pay 14 dues? MS. PERLE: Well, that's what Harrison would 15 like to have done but if you do that, you also have to 16 change the language of the reg itself. 17 18 MS. BATTLE: I think that Bill raises a point, 19 at least regarding the retroactivity effect of an appropriation of funds from Congress for specific 20 21 purposes and then a subsequent appropriation that puts 22 restrictions on the use of the funds and whether or not

1	that restriction from a subsequent appropriation ought
2	to have any impact on the previous appropriation.
3	MS. PERLE: That's the issue.
4	MR. McCALPIN: Why should it?
5	MR. TULL: It does now.
6	MR. McCALPIN: What?
7	MR. TULL: It does now for virtually every
8	other prohibition because all other prohibitions are
9	"no funds may be used to engage in any activity." So
10	no '95 carryover funds can be used for any of the
11	504
12	MS. PERLE: But it doesn't talk about funds.
13	They talk about entities that engage in activities but
14	the language of this rule is different.
15	MS. BATTLE: What does 504 say on the specific
16	issue of bar dues, so that we can be clear about we
17	need to carefully draft this provision?
18	MS. PERLE: It says "None of the funds
19	appropriated in this act to the Legal Services
20	Corporation or provided by the Corporation to any
21	entity or person may be used to pay membership dues to
22	any private or nonprivate organization."

And I would read that "None of the funds appropriated in this act provided by the Corporation to any entity or person may be used to pay membership dues to any private or nonprivate organization."

So you could certainly read it to say it only covers funds appropriated in the '96 and '97 appropriation acts.

MR. TULL: We're talking about two distinctions as to how this would apply. I think staff's recommendation is different from and we would not recommend adopting what was proposed on behalf of PAG by Linda and I'll explain why in a moment.

The difference is the regulation as it now reads does say "no funds" and would include carryover funds. It was not effective until August 29 and the language which Linda just read, which is from 505, could be read -- I think the first blush reading of it sounds like it means all funds -- it could be read to mean just funds appropriated in 1996.

The board, in the interim rule and what we're proposing now, prohibited the use of all funds, including carryover funds. So the initial concern

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raised with us was in light of the fact that before

August 29 some programs may have used, may have been

led to use '95 carryover funds, would we make it clear

and ask the OIG to make it clear to auditors that for

expenditures during that time period, that would not be
a violation of the act itself.

The audit guide -- we're talking about actually a very minor difference in reality because the audit guide requires, I believe, and we're just checking that this is true, that LSC funds -- current Corporation policy is that funds have to be spent on a first in/first out basis.

So a program can't legally hold out for five, ten years its 1995 in order to pay dues for the bar association. They've got to have expended those funds first, as an accounting matter, so that we're talking about only funds which are used this year. So we're talking about a fairly narrow period of time that will be affected by this.

In terms of whether it is useful to change the regulation to refer to the funds appropriated in this act, the risk of that is, in terms of appearances, that

the fine distinctions between funds from prior years 1 has been a concern -- it was a concern of Congress; it 2 was a concern of the prior board when it adopted the 3 first in/first out restriction, and it really puts the 4 board on record as embracing that, even though the 5 impact of it is only probably a two-month difference. 6 And we believe we can, in the commentary, 7 address the --8 MS. PERLE: I just want to make it clear that 9 I was very pleased with what the staff indicated they 10 would do in the commentary. I'm raising this because I 11 was asked specifically by Harrison to raise it. 12 If the board decides to adopt what the staff 13 has done, I'm not going to have any objections to that. 14 MS. BATTLE: Ernestine? 15 16 MS. WATLINGTON: We're so close to '97; I'm 17 aware of that based on being chairman of a legal services program. This has always been a problem with 18 those carryover funds. It's always been a concern how 19 those are looked at. So I think we should leave it. 20 I really do understand what John 21 MS. BATTLE:

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has explained to me from a number of standpoints. One,

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I think it does make sense that we be consistent in expressing to the programs once this appropriations act was entered and everybody's on notice, this is the way things are, but not to tag them for what they could not have known was going to be a requirement prior to that specific date.

I think what we've done is to split it in a way that's fair to the programs, which allows them not to be penalized for having taken an action that was consistent with the law as it was at that time, and, at the same time, not split hairs on the language in the actual appropriations act in such a way that it doesn't meet the spirit. And the spirit is from this point forward, you can't use LSC funds to pay dues, in the context of this rule.

So if I've heard from -- Bill, do you have anything else to offer on this?

MR. McCALPIN: No.

MS. BATTLE: Then I think there's no further problem with that.

Are there any other issues relating to dues?
(No response.)

1	MS. BATTLE: Now, if we can do them all in 15
2	minutes
3	(Laughter.)
4	MS. BATTLE: I'm willing to entertain a motion
5	to the effect that particularly since there are no
6	changes being proposed to 1627, that we recommend to
7	the board at its next meeting the adoption of this
8	rule.
9	MOTION
10	MS. WATLINGTON: I so move.
11	MR. McCALPIN: Second.
12	MS. BATTLE: It's been properly moved and
13	seconded. All in favor?
14	(Chorus of ayes.)
15	MS. BATTLE: All opposed?
16	(No response.)
17	MS. BATTLE: The motion carries.
18	CONSIDER AND ACT ON A DRAFT INTERIM REGULATION
19	(TO BE CODIFIED AS 45 C.F.R. PART 1636) ON
20	DISCLOSURE OF PLAINTIFF IDENTITY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
21	MS. BATTLE: We're now on to 1636, client
22	identity and statement of facts. There were some

significant comments that we received on this in a number of various areas and I think the staff has reviewed the comments and come up with some issue areas for our discussion today.

The first area has to do with notice of the identity of the plaintiffs and to whom notice goes. I think that some of the comments pointed out some real concerns about the potential overbreadth of the way we had constructed the original provision relating to this notice requirement.

Suzanne and John, can you enlighten the committee on that?

MS. GLASOW: On the first issue, the notice of identity of plaintiffs, comments pointed out that there are types of cases and situations where the identities of plaintiffs should not be disclosed to the public at large because either state law, court rules would preclude that or public disclosure would just cause great embarrassment and humiliation. They gave a lot of examples in the comments.

The comments also interpreted that the section we gave for getting a court order on probable serious

1	harm would not meet those situations.
2	We looked at the legislative restriction and
3	determined that what Congress was really trying to
4	reach there is that the defendant in the cases would be
5	able to defend against the charges and know the
6	identity of the plaintiff and the person bringing the
7	charges.
8	So we recommend revising the rule to be
9	consistent with the purpose of that statute and
10	MS. BATTLE: Can you tell us specifically
11	where that amendment is?
12	MS. GLASOW: It's 1636(2)(a).
13	MS. WATLINGTON: Before we go any further
14	there, on the commentary, instead of investigating, is
15	it instigating?
16	MS. MERCADO: Instigating.
17	MS. GLASOW: Actually it appears first in the
18	purpose section. The last line of the purpose section,
19	we added the words "to the defendant."
20	MS. BATTLE: Does everyone see that? 1636.1,
21	the purpose section, the last sentence has been revised
22	to read "represents to the defendant."

1	MS. GLASOW: And we suggest changing "assures"
2	to "insures," not for that reason but as a stylistic
3	change.
4	MS. BATTLE: This is still page 5 in the
5	purpose section, 1636.1.
6	MS. GLASOW: Then in Section 2(a), the third
7	line, we added the words "with a prospective
8	defendant." And in 2(a)(1) the bolding starts at the
9	end of page 5 "or in a separate notice provided to the
10	defendant against whom the complaint is filed where
11	disclosure in the complaint would be contrary to state
12	law or local court rules or would unduly prejudice the
13	client." We added those words.
14	MS. BATTLE: Now, by adding this language, are
15	we putting in additional restrictions on how an
16	attorney makes a determination as to whether to
17	disclose the names of the plaintiffs or are we
18	attempting to embody our view of what state law is with
19	regard to the disclosure of plaintiffs?
20	In other words, you say you've got to provide
21	this to the defendant if the name is not in the
22	complaint for these particular reasons. I'm wondering

if all we need to do is to say you have to provide it if the name is not in the complaint, period, without saying the name is not in the complaint because it's contrary to state law, local court rules or would be prejudicial.

Are we giving further definition to the reason why it's in the complaint, unnecessarily?

MR. TULL: The restriction itself is framed in terms of naming the plaintiff in the complaint. I think this answers your question. So our view was we do have a potential conflict here where a state law or a local rule, in order to protect someone because of age or whatever, itself makes it improper to name that person in the complaint, that in those circumstances we've carved out what is an exception to the expressed language of the appropriation in order to not require a person to violate state law to do that.

We've created a separate procedure they can then use but the intent is that it should be used only in very narrow circumstances where it, in fact, under state law they can't do it.

MS. BATTLE: It also adds a standard that a

1	plaintiff the unduly prejudice to the client piece
2	is a requirement that goes beyond state law.
3	MR. TULL: I think that's right.
4	MS. PERLE: Where are we?
5	MS. GLASOW: We're not sure we're happy with
6	the "unduly prejudice the client" language.
7	MR. TULL: I think the "unduly prejudice"
8	language is addressed in the exception of getting a
9	court order in the event that disclosure would unduly
10	prejudice the client, isn't it?
11	MS. PERLE: Well, I think it's also probably
12	maybe to address the situation where there's nothing in
13	state law or local court rules that requires you to
14	keep the name of the plaintiff secret but both parties
15	have agreed. You know, if both parties have agreed,
16	you don't have to name the plaintiff, right?
17	MR. TULL: Right.
18	MS. GLASOW: That's much broader than that,
19	though.
20	MS. PERLE: I think that maybe was
21	MR. TULL: We know
22	MS. BATTLE: We need to have a trigger beyond

1	state law because state law may not cover everything.
2	MS. PERLE: Right.
3	MS. BATTLE: We're trying to figure out what
4	kind of handle do you put on that additional trigger to
5	make it appropriate for
6	MS. PERLE: Maybe where the parties have
7	agreed. There is the other process, you know, that's
8	in the law.
9	MR. TULL: Right.
10	MR. McCALPIN: You know, may I suggest that
11	you look at the amendment proposed at the bottom of
12	page 110 by the Northwest Justice people in the thick
13	comments?
14	MS. PERLE: I don't think that that really
15	deals with it, either, Bill. It says it's expressly
16	required by law or practice in the jurisdiction and
17	we're talking about situations where it's not expressly
18	required by law or practice, right?
19	MR. McCALPIN: Well, but then you're in the
20	prejudice where it requires a court order.
21	MS. PERLE: No, what I'm saying is that there
22	may be situations where both the plaintiffs and the

defendants -- the defendant knows who the plaintiff is but they've both agreed, for a variety of reasons of privacy or whatever, that they're not going to reveal publicly the name of the plaintiff.

MR. McCALPIN: What you're suggesting is that counsel, by agreement, can avoid the requirement of the statute.

MS. PERLE: No, no. What we're saying is that what we think the requirement in the statute is is that you reveal the identity to the defendant.

MR. TULL: But it says in the complaint. I think the problem we have is I think we believe we understand what Congress intended here and that is defendants know who is suing them.

MS. PERLE: Right.

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MR. TULL: They use language which proscribes how that is to be said and it creates a problem where using that particular device, which is naming the person, may itself be violative of the law. I'm not sure, the undue prejudice, I'm not sure what the basis for an undue prejudice exception would be. It's not prejudice as to --

1	MS. BATTLE: Legally permissible grounds?
2	MR. TULL: I think it's other legally required
3	grounds.
4	MS. PERLE: Couldn't the defendant, by
5	agreeing not to reveal it in the complaint, evade the
6	requirement?
7	MR. TULL: I don't believe it's
8	MS. GLASOW: The requirement is not put on
9	it's not a discretionary thing for the defendant.
10	MS. PERLE: But the purpose of it is to
11	protect the defendant.
12	MR. McCALPIN: The provision is for the
13	benefit
14	MS. PERLE: For the benefit of the defendant.
15	If the defendant agrees that they're not harmed by not
16	putting it in the complaint, because they know who the
17	plaintiff is, no harm, no foul.
18	MR. McCALPIN: What would Jennifer say to
19	that?
20	MS. BATTLE: Other legal grounds when you
21	say legal grounds, you're really talking about law.
22	MR. TULL: I think any time that we, in the

we run the risk of having to explain why. 2 MS. PERLE: But I don't think this is a 3 difficult thing to explain. 4 MR. TULL: Well, the statute says what it says 5 and I think it is true that it's not likely that 6 someone is going to complain if they've agreed that 7 they don't need to have it in the complaint but in terms of others looking at our rules and saying what is 9 the basis for this particular exception, unless we have 1.0 a very clear case that --11 MS. PERLE: What if we say specifically, 12 instead of "unduly prejudice," why don't we say "if the 13 defendant agrees"? 14 MR. McCALPIN: I'm just sitting here thinking. 15 16 Is this statutory provision possibly intended for the benefit of a wider class than just the defendant? 17 the Congress say, "We wanted that in there not just for 18 the defendant but so that the other people in the 19 community and other people who hear about this may know 20 21 what you're doing and take counsel as a result"? 22 I'm just not 100 percent sure that this

rule, add exceptions that are not absolutely mandated,

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the action. 2 MS. MERCADO: Since we're not doing class 3 actions, it doesn't matter. It's not like we're going 4 to be benefitting a whole bunch of other people. 5 Look at the history of where this 6 MS. PERLE: Where this emerges is clearly from the 7 situation with migrant farmworker cases where the 8 accusation is that programs will contact a farmer and 9 say, "You didn't pay your farmworkers and I'm not going 10 to tell you who they are because of retaliation. 11 12 won't sue you if you pay us \$5,000." MR. McCALPIN: Well, there isn't any question 13 that that's what we hear most about as a basis for this 14 15 and it's probably McCollum's proposal. MS. PERLE: His original proposal, this was 16 only with regard to farmworkers. 17 MR. McCALPIN: For that very reason. 18 19 we start to create an exception allowing a plaintiff 20 and a defendant to avoid the statute, I'm not sure that 21 we have satisfied everything that the Congress may 22 want.

provision is solely for the benefit of the defendant in

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1	MS. GLASOW: It wsw not a strong legislative
2	history on this point. We're dealing with our
3	knowledge of what's happened over the years and what
4	triggered this, but the legislative history, the formal
5	legislative history, doesn't help a whole lot.
6	We can justify the one, "contrary to state law
7	or court rules," because we're trying to make it
8	consistent with other law.
9	MS. PERLE: What about local practice? There
10	may be, in certain jurisdictions, it's a practice
11	rather than something that's stated in a particular
12	to not publicize the names of juveniles, maybe by
13	practice, or battered women or cases of sexual
1.4	harassment.
15	MS. MERCADO: There are children that have
16	been sexually abused.
17	MS. PERLE: Right, but that's probably by
18	statute.
19	MS. GLASOW: That's usually in law.
20	MS. BATTLE: But battered women is one
21	example.
22	MS. MERCADO: Protective orders. They don't
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2	want to let the perpetrator-defendant know.
3	MS. PERLE: That's a situation that you've
4	covered by the second you know, where it's sort of a
5	practice not to reveal the name of
6	MS. BATTLE: Would that be local court rules?
7	MS. PERLE: There might be court rules but it
8	may not be stated.
9	MS. MERCADO: Maybe say "rules or practices."
10	MS. PERLE: That would help.
11	MS. BATTLE: Or other legal grounds.
12	MS. MERCADO: There's a lot of local
13	practices.
14	MS. PERLE: I, for one, feel very comfortable
15	that this was really intended to benefit only the
16	defendant. I don't think there's really anything to
17	suggest anyplace in the legislative history that it was
18	intended to do anything beyond that.
19	MR. TULL: But I think we've run flat into the
20	problem that the language of the statute is absolutely
21	crystal clear. There's no ambiguity that makes us look
22	behind for what the legislative intent is. And I think
	]

want to give a lot of information because they don't

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2	history on this is not very full, for many of the
3	reasons that Linda disclosed, but there's not the range
4	of things that Congress may have had in mind as to why
5	they should be here; it's not clear.
6	MR. McCALPIN: Let me tell you, I don't know
7	what the conference report says but I have sat through
8	a number of congressional hearings where this subject
9	was discussed at very great length, largely in the
10	farmworker context. I remember when what was her name,
11	the tall woman from Florida who got up there with her
12	bag that she used to pick oranges?
13	MS. PERLE: Hazel Florentine.
14	MR. McCALPIN: Yes, Hazel Florentine. Boy,
15	she was incredible.
16	MS. GLASOW: Well, legislative history,
17	December conference report had nothing. The House
18	report had nothing. We have nothing but a floor
19	statement from Senator Gramm, which really didn't touch
20	the issue very much.
21	MS. BATTLE: What about this proposal, that we
22	delete "would unduly prejudice the client" and we add

Bill is correct that we don't -- the legislative

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"the disclosure of the complaint would be contrary to 1 state law or local court rules or practices, " and leave 2 it at that? 3 4 MR. McCALPIN: Where are you? 5 MS. BATTLE: I'm at the top of page 6, the second line, "contrary to state law." 6 MR. McCALPIN: "Contrary to --7 MS. BATTLE: "Contrary to state law or local 8 court rules or practices," and leave it at that and not 9 go beyond that. So we're tying it only to the legal 10 environment in which the complaint is raised and 11 suggesting that those are the only exceptions. 12 That's a court practice you're 13 MR. ASKEW: talking about? 14 When I say "court rules or 15 MS. BATTLE: practices, " you know, it could be a particular -- I 16 don't know how all states set out their rules of 17 procedure and practice, whether the court rules have 18 19 practices in them, as well as -- just put "or 20 practices, " so that you can construe it to be state law 21 practices or local court rules or practices.

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Okay.

MS. GLASOW:

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Question. You're not putting in

here anything that says explicitly that if both parties 2 agree not to reveal the name --3 MS. BATTLE: It has only to do with the 4 practice. If that is a local practice that is 5 sanctioned by that particular jurisdiction and it's 6 appropriate, then it will be okay. If it is not 7 sanctioned, then it will not be okay. 8 MS. PERLE: So you won't address that 9 10 explicitly in the commentary, either? That this issue will be decided MS. BATTLE: 11 based on what the local practice is in the jurisdiction 12 and that Congress's intent was to make the disclosure 13 so that the defendant would know who they're defending 14 against but also consistent with whatever the practices 15 are in their jurisdiction. 16 I don't have a problem if 17 MS. PERLE: Okay. that's the way it's articulated. What I don't want 18 there to be anything in the comment that says that we 19 20 think that this was intended to be a disclosure broader than to the defendant. 21 22 MR. McCALPIN: I've got two or three other

MS. PERLE:

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1	questions.
2	MS. BATTLE: Do your questions have to do with
3	this initial issue or some of the other issues?
4	MR. McCALPIN: Well, it has to do with this
5	particular section that we're dealing with, 2(a)(1).
6	MS. BATTLE: All right, let's look at 2(a)(1).
7	MR. McCALPIN: Where you just added the words.
8	The Colorado bar, for instance, raises an interesting
9	question of how you get a court of competent
10	jurisdiction to enter an order in anticipation of
11	prefiling conferences. There just isn't any procedure
12	for that sort of thing.
13	MS. BATTLE: That's why local practice, I
14	think, becomes key in this instance because I think
15	you're absolutely right. I think that you have to take
16	this federal statutory requirement and breathe into it
17	what local practices are.
18	MR. TULL: I think you're raising a different
19	issue. You're raising an issue which relates to the
20	second part of that.
21	MR. McCALPIN: That's right.
22	MR. TULL: "And identify each plaintiff it

represents unless a court" --

MR. McCALPIN: "A court of competent jurisdiction has entered an order protecting the client from such disclosure." And I don't see how you can get, in the Colorado example, how can you get such a court order before engaging in pre -- what did we call it -- precomplaint settlement negotiations?

MS. PERLE: I think this actually has an anomalous effect because what it does is that it forces programs to bring suit, rather than negotiate, in the event that they want to withhold the name because if they file suit, then they can get --

MR. McCALPIN: Oh, yes.

MS. PERLE: And it's an anomalous result because the Congress has encouraged, in a variety of ways, the using of negotiation to settle things, and this cuts against that. But I don't think that there's really anything in here that gives you any authority to do something different.

MS. BATTLE: Why not "contrary to state law, local court rules or practices or a court order"?

MR. McCALPIN: Well, we've got that. That's

the "unless."

MS. PERLE: But you won't be the court order. The point is that in this situation you won't get the court order unless you have a case filed.

MR. TULL: The section that Bill's referring to goes to prelitigation settlement negotiations, as opposed to the first, which has to do with whether you can not name the person in a complaint. They're really two different --

MS. MERCADO: They're two separate provisions.

One is after you've already decided to litigate and there's been a TRO of some form or fashion, because there has to be a show-cause hearing before the court.

MS. BATTLE: I've got a problem because when you read A in 504(a)(1)(a), it doesn't distinguish between precomplaint settlement negotiations and the complaint that you file in litigation.

It seems to me that because you don't have a complaint if you're negotiating something, that is it possible for us to read that as two separate things?

When you look at 8, which says that "files a complaint or otherwise initiates or participates in

litigation against the defendant or engages in precomplaint settlement negotiations with the defendants unless a plaintiff has been specifically named in a complaint filed for the purposes of such litigation," and that goes back to the first part of A, or "prior to the precomplaint settlement negotiation."

That second part seems to me to hang out there with no tie to what's realistic in precomplaint settlement negotiations. It seems to me what we're trying to do is to figure out how to do the correct mix of disclosure that relates to precomplaint issues, when it's real clear what you do when you've got a complaint. You either put the name in there, in the complaint, or you meet whatever the local law requires you to do.

But for precomplaint --

MR. McCALPIN: Or get a get order.

MS. BATTLE: Or get a court order. But when you're talking precomplaint, the way that A is written as a modifier to 8, it's an either/or. It says you either identify the person or what? What do you do prior to the precomplaint settlement negotiation?

MS. MERCADO: In the second part of that -MS. PERLE: They expect you to get a court
reporter because they don't understand that that's not
a reality. The people that wrote this weren't lawyers
and they didn't understand that that's just not going
to happen.

MS. MERCADO: You're not going to get a court reporter until you actually have a complaint filed.

MS. PERLE: Right.

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MS. MERCADO: This way it doesn't make sense because the introductory paragraph on A and the first half of 1, where it goes up to where we've cut out the court practices, that makes sense. It's the other part that doesn't make sense because there is no way that you could get those orders unless someone filed a complaint. The court has to have that matter before it.

MS. BATTLE: What I'm saying is that it seems to me that the language in the appropriations law is confusing us in terms of how we must interpret it because it tells you what to do if you're filing a complaint and it really doesn't clearly address what

you do when you're not filing a complaint.

MR. TULL: I think we have presumed what it means is identify to the defendant, which is not said in A. It is said -- there's a reference in 8 to negotiation with a prospective defendant. I think we have read that as that logically they're carrying over, so that --

MS. BATTLE: Oh, this is what you do. A is each plaintiff has been specifically identified in a complaint or prior to the precomplaint settlement negotiations. It just says -- if you read that sentence that way, it then makes sense.

The question becomes if you're engaging in precomplaint settlement negotiations with a prospective defendant, then each plaintiff has to be identified prior to the precomplaint settlement negotiations.

So what's the court order business?

MS. PERLE: The problem is that there's a process -- the proviso provides a process for if you don't want to identify your client, if you're concerned about it, but it says that you have to use the same process whether you want to withhold that identity in a

_	Complaine of in propositionals negociasions.
2	The point is that you don't have the ability
3	to go to court and ask to withhold that because no
4	court is going to listen to that motion if there's no
5	case filed. I know it's confusing. You understand
6	what I'm saying, don't you?
7	MS. MERCADO: Yes. Procedurally, that second
8	part doesn't make sense.
9	MS. PERLE: It just doesn't make sense but
10	it's clearly what they meant. If you look at the
11	proviso it says that "upon establishment of reasonable
12	cause, the court of competent jurisdiction may enjoin
13	the disclosure after notice, pending the outcome of
14	such litigation or negotiations, after notice and
15	opportunity for a hearing is provided."
16	So they clearly contemplated that this hearing
17	would be before you engaged in
18	MS. BATTLE: That's not in the appropriations
19	law.
20	MS. PERLE: Yes, it is. It's in the
21	proviso Section
22	MS. BATTLE: Oh, I see, the proviso upon the

complaint or in presettlement negotiations.

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establishment of reasonable -- I see.

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MR. TULL: I don't think we picked up on this the first time we went through this in July. In the regulation we have tied the order protecting the client's name from disclosure to negotiation. In the appropriations act, it actually refers to both because it says "may enjoin disclosure of the identity of any potential plaintiff pending the outcome of such litigation or negotiations after notice and opportunity for a hearing."

MS. MERCADO: Now, that would make sense.

MR. McCALPIN: John, I was going to raise the question again whether the "unless" clause at the top of page 6 is intended to modify only the prelitigation settlement negotiations or the filing of the complaint. I think the comma means it applies both places.

MR. TULL: It needs to in order to carry out the intent but it doesn't read that way, but you think it does.

MS. GLASOW: We did mean it to apply to both.

MR. TULL: Oh, aren't we smart?

MS. GLASOW: I think the comments recognized

it as such because they were talking about both situations.

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MS. PERLE: You might want to work over this to separate -- this is a very long sentence. You might want to make it a couple of sentences to make it clear what each reference is. But that really doesn't address the issue. I think we all understand what it means.

The question is is there any way that this board can develop some sort of a response to the notion that you have to go to court if you want to withhold the identity? You can't do it in presettlement negotiations. If you can come up with it, I'd be very happy. I think it's one of those situations that Congress just didn't know what it was doing.

MS. GLASOW: I don't know how to get around it at this point. The comments suggested that -- commenters said I'm not sure what would be allowed in the various jurisdictions, whether you could go to court just to get a protective order for a case you haven't filed yet.

So there's a lot of uncertainty on what is

1	available to attorneys, but I don't know how to get
2	around the language of the appropriations act, which
3	clearly seems to apply it to both. It doesn't make
4	sense because
5	MS. BATTLE: The reason for presettlement
6	negotiations is so you do not have litigation. Going
7	to court is just completely contrary to that.
8	MS. PERLE: That's what I meant, that it sort
9	of creates an anomaly.
10	MS. MERCADO: And also an assumption that you
11	could get a protective order without having any
12	complaint on file by anyone. The court cannot, on its
13	own motion, do a protective order. Someone needs to
14	file something.
15	MS. BATTLE: I don't know how you resolve this
16	but this is not I'm not certain that we've resolved
17	it.
18	MS. PERLE: The advice that we've given to
19	programs is if you have a situation where you want to
20	withhold the identity of the plaintiff, you just need
21	to go right to court.
22	MR. TULL: Sue and get the order.

MS. PERLE: |I don't know how you get around 1 I wish there was a way. 2 MS. MERCADO: Just because you sued does not 3 take away the opportunity to mediate or negotiate. 4 MS. PERLE: Right. 5 MS. BATTLE: But it does complicate it a bit. 6 I think so often, one of the things that you have as 7 leverage with the defendant is the ability to negotiate 8 without having any litigation. And once you start to 9 engage in that, the costs go up for the defendants and 10 I think that's one of the things really that Congress 11 was seeking to avoid, and that was increased costs for 12 defendants around these issues. 13 So it is a tough one. It is one that we may 14 need to just see if there's a way to gain some clarity 15 down the line on. I think that as long as this is the 16 17 language that we have in our appropriation, we have to leave it be, as it is. 18 Bill? 19 MR. McCALPIN: I have at least two more 20 21 One, I think it's significant -- I'm not sure 22 whether we need to note it or not but as the Colorado

comments suggest, requiring this violates model rule

1.6(a) of the Colorado model rules of professional
responsibility. And they say the comments acknowledge
that this prohibition may come into conflict with other
law and that "Whenever another provision of law
supersedes 1.6, it is a matter of interpretation beyond
the scope of these rules but a presumption should exist
against such a supersession."

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1.6 says "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation." So it does seem to be squarely in conflict with that. I don't know whether the Colorado rule is exactly the same as the ABA rule or whether they have adopted a somewhat different version, as states do. I don't know whether we need to acknowledge that in the commentary or otherwise, that we may be calling upon lawyers to violate the model rules of responsibility in their state.

And, of course, there is a provision in the LSC act which would prohibit that.

MS. PERLE: 1006(b)(3) of the LSC act says

the state bar over LSC recipient attorneys. 2 If, in fact, that revealing would violate 3 1.6 -- I'm not sure that it necessarily would -- then I 4 think that's a different set of issues and probably the 5 rule goes beyond what it can do and it's not applicable 6 in that situation. 7 MS. BATTLE: Language here that says 8 "consistent with applicable professional responsibility 9 10 rules," does that help? 11 MS. PERLE: Yes. I think it flags it. 12 MS. BATTLE: I think that will help to give some measure, given that we've got that authority in 13 14 our act, to kind of merge what Congress has required 15 here with our other responsibilities. 16 MR. McCALPIN: Okay, let me ask you, a program 17 somewhere in the field calls up the Office of General 18 Counsel and says, "We have this case. We are required 19 by your regulation and 504 whatever to provide a 20 statement of facts and the identity of the client. 21 That is in violation of the model rule of professional 22 responsibility in this state. What do we do?"

that the Corporation can't abrogate the authority of

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MS. PERLE: They have a letter from their ethics counsel in their bar.

MS. BATTLE: So that's a resolution of a conflict between two federal laws. We have one saying you've got to do this and you've got another, in our original act, that says you've got to do that.

MS. PERLE: But the appropriations bill does not abrogate the LSC act except with some very specific provisions on access to records. That specifically says "notwithstanding 1006(b)(3)," but that's not this issue.

MS. BATTLE: So I would suggest that we use this "consistent with applicable rules of professional responsibility" language here so that we take into account state law, local court rules and practices and, at the end, after this provision relating to the court of competent jurisdiction being the way that you go about doing this, also add "consistent with applicable rules of professional responsibility" to take into account the fact that there might be the intersection between our obligations under the LSC act with these obligations under this appropriation.

1	MS. GLASOW: Because we realize that in a
2	state that has a rule like that that says you cannot
3	give the identity of the client without the client's
4	permission, then for every client our recipients take
5	in that state, that's a tremendous undercutting of this
6	restriction in our appropriations act.
7	MS. BATTLE: If clients give their consent,
8	maybe you can take the case. If they don't want to
9	give their consent, that has an impact on whether
10	MR. TULL: Aren't we talking about a fairly
11	small universe of cases?
12	MS. PERLE: Very rare.
13	MR. TULL: It's very difficult to negotiate
14	for a client without identifying who the client is.
15	MS. PERLE: I think the numbers of
16	situations
17	MR. McCALPIN: But we're also talking about
18	the statement of facts.
19	MR. TULL: Now, the statement of facts is not
20	available to the other party.
21	MR. McCALPIN: It is in discovery.
22	MS. PERLE: No, it's not. This specifically

ı	says it's not. I mean, it's only
2	MR. TULL: Unless it would otherwise be
3	available through discovery, it's not.
4	MR. McCALPIN: It says in the course of
5	regular discovery, doesn't it?
6	MS. PERLE: But when you read what the rule
7	says, it says that this doesn't create any access to
8	the document. It says that if you could get it under
9	your rules of discovery
10	MS. BATTLE: That's what you've got to do.
11	You've got to go discover it. We're not giving it to
12	you.
13	MS. PERLE: Right.
14	So you're suggesting, as I understand it, on
15	page 5
16	MS. BATTLE: On page 6, at the end, that we
17	add
18	MS. PERLE: I was thinking you might want to
19	add it, "It shall, consistent with the applicable rules
20	of professional responsibility, 1 and 2."
21	Oh, you're saying it's only applicable to 1?
22	Is that what you're saying?

1 MS. BATTLE: Yes.' My suggestion was since we have the proviso in 1 which relates to state law, local 2 courts rules and practices, that we also in 1 add 3 "consistent with applicable rules of professional 4 responsibility" at the end. 5 MR. McCALPIN: No, but what won't do it. 6 7 think Linda is right because the Colorado rule would really go more to sub 2 than sub 1, the preparation of 8 the written statement, rather than the identification 9 of the plaintiff, if I understand what they're saying.

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So it may make more sense to put it --

Put it at the top. "Consistent MS. BATTLE: with applicable rules of professional responsibility, it shall."

MR. TULL: I'm feeling some discomfort here and I'm not precisely sure why but let me state it. think any time we say -- I think it's presumed that any program operates and its attorneys operate consistent with the rules of professional responsibility and we have an act which, in fact, requires that we ensure that.

So all these regulations have within them a

ghost consistent with the rules of professional responsibility and we have chosen, in some circumstances where that has a particular bite, there's a particular importance or there's a particularly difficult issue, to add that language. But each time we add it, it becomes a flag that says we believe there may be significant exceptions to the way this rule may apply because of the particular way the rules impact on whatever the issue is.

And I commented earlier that I think we're talking about a very small universe of cases where disclosure of the client's name in the course of negotiations would invoke the rules and I think my discomfort is that this may well be seen, first by programs looking at it, as a flag saying we believe that there's a question whether in negotiations you should disclose the name of your client, which I don't think is correct because it's most often implied in the representation, even if not expressly given.

And I think for others, including those who wrote this law, looking at the way we adopt our rules, they will ask the question, "Why did they bother to put

this in there? Is there some door that they are trying 1 to open that we do not want to have opened?" 2 And I don't know that it actually adds that 3 much in terms of what we need to accomplish and I fear --5 Have we decided to keep it out of 6 MS. GLASOW: 7 the prisoners rule, drug addiction, when we did the interim rule, for the reason that we didn't 8 want programs to hook onto it as a broader exception 9 than we intended it to be and just allow us to deal 10 with a case by case basis, on the facts of the case. 11 John, is a program attorney not 12 MR. McCALPIN: entitled to that heads-up, that you ought to have the 13 14 provisions of the model rules of your state in your mind when you do this? 15 MR. TULL: Well, I think --16 MR. McCALPIN: And I'm not sure that the 17 average lawyer --18 MS. BATTLE: Let me tell you the concern I've 19 20 I've got a concern about the intersection between 21 the application of this and a professional rule out 22 there that subjects an attorney to potentially being

disciplined for not having -- you've got a client that says, "I don't know if I want this person to have my name. I don't really want this." And he says, "I'm sorry; because I work at Legal Services, I've got to do it.

So boom, this happens. And that client then comes back and says, "I never told him to tell these people about my name. And he's subject to discipline for that in his state. Doesn't he need to know that and know that we've taken into account local court rules, practices, state law on all other fronts, in terms of how this particular section will operate and that we're aware that there might be some conflicts between the professional rules and this in practice?

MR. TULL: But doesn't that lawyer run into the question about whether she can disclose the client's name well before this rule is invoked? If you come to me as a client and I interview you and I say that I'm in such and such an apartment and the landlord is doing X, Y, Z, if I say I'm going to call him up and have a conversation with your landlord and see what we can work out here --

MR. McCALPIN: And the client says, "Don't 1 reveal my name." 2 If the client says, "Don't reveal MR. TULL: 3 my name," I say, "I can't negotiate for you. I've got 4 5 to tell him what apartment we're talking about. got to talk about the lease. I cannot represent you 6 unless I disclose your name, because I can't." 7 John, what if it's a situation MS. PERLE: 8 where it's a big housing unit and three or four people 9 come and say, "This is unsafe. There's no lighting. 10 There's no locks. There's no maintenance. And the 11 12 whole building is unsafe and there are real security problems and we think that something needs to be done 13 and we'd like you to do it and you can sue him." 14 15 yet they say, "I don't want you to tell him it's me" because they're afraid they'll get evicted. 16 MR. McCALPIN: Retaliation. 17 MS. MERCADO: Right. And the thing is that 18 19 you're assuming that all Legal Services programs have experienced lawyers like you are, that it will 20 21 automatically pop in their mind.

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One hopes, now with the lack of training that

we have with a lot of our lawyers, but maybe young lawyers that are coming out, I mean, to get all these different things as far as ethics and all this other stuff about if you do or you don't.

MS. BERGMARK: This is precisely the

MS. BERGMARK: This is precisely the conversation that we had with the folks who drafted this legislation as to why this wasn't such a good idea, period. But the fact is we have this legislation and we're now talking about housing project tenants, but this is precisely the conversation that was held in terms of the farmworker clients who were the subject and the reason for this restriction in the first place.

So I do worry that -- I think lawyers, our lawyers, our Legal Services lawyers, know that they are governed by the rules of professional responsibility, that that's a fact. We have that in our act, as well.

So in terms of, Bill, the heads-up, I don't think we gain much in terms of a heads-up in this regulation that our lawyers don't know anyway.

This does create -- I think our experience with this restriction so far is that it's not an impossible restriction to live with, that programs are

dealing with it and that we do run the risk of having to explain, "Now, why did you create this potential limiting phrase here when, in fact, this is the requirement that's there?"

A lawyer is simply going to have to find a way to reconcile professional responsibility with this restriction and sometimes that's going to create

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practical problems.

MR. McCALPIN: Martha, I agree with you that they all know they're subject to the model rules but I'll bet you none of them could tell you what's in 1.6.

MS. BERGMARK: Me neither.

MR. TULL: I don't think that's the problem.

I think the problem is that by adding the language, the board is making a statement that it believes that the model rule overrides the restriction. Because the example you gave, as this is now stated, it is not enough that that person is fearful that there will be retaliation.

Congress has said we understand that and we're telling you that if it's a sufficiently grave problem, they've got to go to court and get an order saying that

and that your remedy is you don't have to violate your ethical responsibility. If that person says, "Do not tell them," then you say that "The procedure I have to follow is to sue immediately, to ask for an order not naming you, and do you want to do that?" And if that person says yes, then you do it.

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But I think if we say "consistent with model rules," meaning that if your client doesn't want you to disclose it, that becomes an exception to this requirement, we basically have done away with the restriction.

MS. BATTLE: I'll take this example just one step further. This is what we're saying will happen. Three or four tenants who qualify for services come to a local office and say, "The stairs are in such bad shape people are falling down; they're hurting themselves. We need help."

The lawyer could pick the phone up and say to the landlord, "Look, I've gotten three or four of your tenants to come by. You probably need to do something about those back steps. They're real concerned about it." End of discussion.

164 Now the new scenario. Three or four tenants 1 They're concerned about it. "Please don't 2 come by. tell him. I don't want him to put us out." You say, 3 "Okay, let me go down to the local court, get a 4 restriction and an order that says that I won't say who 5 your names are so I can have this conversation with 6 7 you." I mean, that's exactly how this is going to 8 work. 9 Actually, I think we're getting a MS. PERLE: 10 little carried away and it's probably my fault because 11 of the example. First of all, we have to be talking 12 about precomplaint settlement negotiations. 13 thing to have these people come into your office. 14 15 can pick up the phone and call the landlord. You don't 16 say, "I'm going to sue you." You just say, "I have 17 these complaints. Is there anything you can do?

MR. McCALPIN: Isn't that a settlement negotiation?

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MS. PERLE: Not according to this because this really talks about when it's in anticipation of

we talk about what you can do to remedy the situation?"

litigation.

MS. BERGMARK: I don't think this comes into play until you're really at the point that you're going to sue. I think Linda's right. We are not talking about a situation where you cannot pick up the telephone and talk to a landlord in a very preliminary way that says, "I've got a couple of people who are --

MS. BATTLE: But Martha, let's take it one step further. Once you pick that phone up and say, "Can you fix those steps?" if he says no, then you turn to those three people and say, "You've got to go get a lawyer somewhere else."

MR. TULL: You say, "I've got to disclose your name."

MR. McCALPIN: He picks up the phone. He calls the landlord. He says, "I hear about these steps." The landlord says, "Who's complaining about it?" What does he do then?

MS. PERLE: He says, "I can't reveal that." So he says, "Fine; I'm not going to talk to you anymore."

MR. McCALPIN: Well, if he says, "I can't

2	statute?
3	MS. PERLE: No, because he hasn't given any
4	indication that this is prelitigation.
5	MR. SMEGAL: There's no defendant. The term
6	"defendant" has a specific meaning. It's a party in a
7	lawsuit.
8	MS. BATTLE: The term "prospective defendant"
9	is also used.
10	MR. McCALPIN: This is all prelitigation
11	settlement.
12	MS. PERLE: If you read the commentary to the
13	interim rule, I think it discusses that.
14	MS. BATTLE: Can we put this, "consistent with
15	the applicable rules of professional responsibility" in
16	the comments?
17	MS. PERLE: What I was going to suggest is
18	that first of all, there's nothing in here that
19	responds specifically to the Colorado bar comment. I
20	think when you do the final commentary you do need to
21	kind of respond to that issue.
22	So I think what you should say this is what

reveal that," then isn't he in violation of the

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I would recommend, is that you say one comment -- there 1 may be more but one comment suggested that there would 2 3 be situations that may be inconsistent. Of course, 1006(b) requires that things be done consistent with 4 the professional responsibilities, and that's it. 5 You don't put it in the rule. You put it in the 6 7 commentary. 8 MS. BATTLE: That may be the best way to handle it. That way, that gives clear indication to 9 people that the issue was raised in a comment. 10 a legitimate way to address the issue of the Legal 11 Services Act and its provisions relating to 12 professional responsibility and the intersection on 13 this rule. 14 MS. MERCADO: I like Linda's recommendation 15 16 because it goes back to the act. 17 MR. TULL: Could you repeat it? What I said was when you do the 18 MS. PERLE: commentary you're going to have to address the 19 comments. You'll have to say one comment, or maybe 20 21 there was more than one, raised this issue. We don't

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think it's necessary to change the rule because the LSC

1	act has the provision which says everything has to be
2	done consistent with rules of professional
3	responsibility and, of course, everything in this rule
4	has to be consistent with the rules of professional
5	responsibility, period.
6	So you don't put anything in the rule but do
7	state it in the commentary.
8	MS. BATTLE: That's a good way to do it.
9	MS. MERCADO: As long as you cite them to the
10	provision in the statute.
11	MS. BATTLE: Laurie?
12	MS. TARANTOWICZ: I'm not really comfortable
13	with that because as we go on talking about these rules
14	and we decide what to put in the commentary and what to
15	leave out, it's the interpretative guide to the rule.
16	I don't think anybody sees it as that much different
17	than putting it in the rule. This is what we think it
18	means.
19	So we're trying to avoid the issue of putting
20	it in the rule or not putting it in the rule, by
21	putting it in the commentary, which you hope people
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will look to to interpret the rule.

I think this issue is something that at least needs to be looked into much more carefully.

MR. TULL: Let me say why I felt comfortable with it, which may satisfy you, although it may not satisfy the committee, which is I think -- first of all, let me say this is not a defense of this rule in the sense that I feel as uncomfortable as anybody in this room with the fact that we have to live under this and what it does to the practice, but it is the rule that Congress has imposed on our recipients.

I believe that a lawyer in the scenario which Linda gave can comply with this rule, consistent with the rules of professional responsibility. They have to jump through a hoop in order to do it. They do have to go to court in order to get that order and I understood the chair to state some discomfort with that because there's a much less cost effective way to do it and it does create a higher stake that the client has to be wiling -- a higher risk that the client has to be willing to take on, but that is what Congress has said they intend.

But I think a person can, if their client says

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to them, "I do not want you to tell the possible defendant in this lawsuit who I am," then a person can abide by that requirement. It does mean they've got to jump through some hoops. And I think if we put it in the commentary, we have not deviated from that analysis. I think if we put it in the rule, that by putting it in the rule, we're putting it on an equal level with --

MS. BATTLE: With the statute.

MR. TULL: -- with the statute and you're saying if the two are in conflict, then the model rule prevails, and I don't believe that's -- I mean, prevails in the sense that you don't have to invoke the procedure of getting a court order, and I don't believe that's correct.

MS. BATTLE: Well, the genesis of this really was Bill's having raised this issue from one of our comments. And if we respond to the comment, which is appropriate in the commentary, then I think we've addressed it.

MS. GLASOW: That's consistent with what we did on 1637. When you need to get out of

representation of a prisoner, what we said was whether
the continued representation in such circumstances
would be deemed to violate the regulation would be
determined on a case by case basis. This is where
withdrawal might be refused by a court because of your
professional responsibility to your client.

So we're looking at that but we're not stating

it in such a way in the commentary where it becomes just a big loophole. We're saying we would look at it on a case by case basis. We'll take it into consideration but, as John said, in most cases you're going to still be able to abide by your professional responsibility and still abide by the statutory restriction.

MS. BATTLE: Okay. I think we've had sufficient discussion on this one.

MR. McCALPIN: Can I ask one other question?

MS. BATTLE: Yes.

MR. McCALPIN: The answer to this may be selfevident but is it a fact that if a program transfers, delegates a case to a PAI attorney who receives no compensation from the program -- he does it on a purely

1	pro bono basis that this restriction does not apply
2	for that attorney's representation of the client?
3	MR. TULL: Correct.
4	MS. BATTLE: 1636.4 deals with the PAI
5	exception. Actually, what we did, we're going to
6	propose that we change first the title to 1636.4 to
7	nonapplicability to private attorney involvement.
8	That's not in the applicability section. This part
9	shall not apply to cases undertaken by private
10	attorneys pursuant to a recipient's PAI program."
11	MR. McCALPIN: But suppose the PAI program
12	pays a fee to the attorney?
13	MR. TULL: This is a change to expand the
14	exception to cover what you just described.
15	MR. McCALPIN: Could we do that? Can we say
16	that an attorney representing a client referred by the
17	program who is going to receive some compensation from
18	the program does not have to have this identification
19	and statement of facts?
20	MS. GLASOW: On page 3 of the commentary I
21	gave you, the first full paragraph, I'll read that.
22	Section 504(a)(8), which is the statutory restriction,

"provides that the Corporation may not provide financial assistance to any recipient that does not comply with the client identity and statement of facts requirement set out therein. Clearly, any cases undertaken directly by a recipient would fall under the provisions requirement.

"However, whether this restriction should be extended to private attorneys occasionally providing representation under a program's PAI program is unclear. Because of the unique nature of the PAI program and the difficulty of engaging the private bar in the provision of legal assistance to the poor, the Corporation has, as a matter of policy, made decisions whether to extend restrictions or requirements to PAI work done by private attorneys."

And because we see that the impact of this restriction on a particular attorney taking an occasional case under a PAI program would be very extensive and that basically comments are saying they're losing some of their private attorneys over this, we decided, as a matter of policy, that we wouldn't extend that restriction to PAI.

MR. McCALPIN: That's a matter of policy 1 which, it seems to me, is contrary to the statute. 2 We have said before that -- in the bar association stuff 3 we talk about if the attorney is receiving pay 4 compensation or that sort of thing for bar association 5 work which is antagonistic to the statute, then they 6 7 can't do it. I don't see how -- suppose that you have an 8 adjudicare program being run under the PAI auspices, 9 and God knows we have them all over the State of 10 Missouri, and if the PAI attorney who gets the case 11 from the program and is going to receive a fee from the

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an enormous loophole.

We have whole programs which are adjudicare, Southeast Missouri. That means that nobody in the Southeast program would have to follow 1636.

program doesn't have to follow the 1636, you've created

MR. TULL: That's probably correct. This was in response to --

I'd like to look at -- 504(a)(8) MS. BATTLE: says "Financial assistance to recipients that comply." And as I hear what the staff is saying, it's that the

language in 504(a)(8) pertains to recipients, not PAI programs.

MS. PERLE: PAI attorneys.

MS. BERGMARK: I know this is not what's reflected by this proposed change but upon reflection, I have a higher comfort level with the original draft; that is to say, for compensated lawyers. We also are going to have the situation in competition where private attorneys may be eligible for grants from us.

So I think it does create a loophole that I just don't see a strong basis for arguing why we should try to create. If an adjudicare lawyer is getting compensation from the program to do a particular kind of cases, then the restriction should apply to that attorney, I think.

MS. PERLE: I think that the comments talked about situations that -- in many adjudicare programs, most adjudicare programs, where they're done under PAI, first of all, their fees have to be below 50 percent of the prevailing fees. And most places, the adjudicare program pays attorneys not enough to really say that they're being compensated. They pay them enough to

cover maybe their out-of-pocket expenses.

Now, maybe that's not true in Southeastern

Missouri; I don't know. But I think that at least in

those places where adjudicare programs are just sort of

add-ons to the regular program and part of PAI --

MR. McCALPIN: No funds provided to a recipient. If the recipient is paying \$30 an hour to an adjudicare attorney, you know, whether you consider that to be a fee above cost or not, it's using recipient funds. And I think when you use LSC funds to a recipient, then you've got to follow the statute and have the statement of facts and the identity of the client.

Now, I appreciate that it may inhibit your recruiting PAI attorneys, but that's a policy matter, which the statute, I think, overrides.

MS. MERCADO: I think part of the comments, I think that the reasoning behind some of these is that, at least with a couple of the comments that I read, the PAI -- there's the concern that the ones that were doing pro bono cases PAI, that we referred them, that Legal Services screens and sends out, as part of our

involvement. Maybe they get the filing fees or the 1 costs for the client that might get paid from the 2 3 program but the lawyers themselves don't get any fees at all. 4 So you're saying you couldn't use any of those 5 funds to do --6 MR. McCALPIN: No, I'm not particularly 7 concerned if the program pays filing fees, witness 8 fees, expenses of litigation and that sort of thing. 9 I'm talking about where they just pay a sum to a lawyer 10 and he pays everything. 11 MS. MERCADO: Well, see, I think there is a 12 distinction. I think there's different levels. 13 There's adjudicare level. There's a PAI attorney 14 that's actually getting \$30 an hour or whatever and 15 16 then there's a PAI attorney that's doing it totally pro 17 bono and may be getting the fees and stuff paid by the 18 grantee. 19 So there are different categories and which category is it that we're talking about that has the 20 21 exception?

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MS. BATTLE: I think the previous language

took what Maria is suggesting on the issue of private 1 attorneys actually themselves being compensated. 2 3 private attorneys themselves are compensated, then it kicks in. For those cases where the attorney is not 4 being compensated and where it's either completely pro 5 bono or just the costs are being covered, then it 6 7 doesn't kick in. I think the point that was made by MS. PERLE: 8 the comments was that in the situation where it's 9 10 called an adjudicare program, the attorney is getting \$20, \$25 an hour, that that's not really compensation. 11 They're not being paid for their time. They're just 12 being paid for -- basically they're being paid to pay 13 their secretary for their time. 14 MR. McCALPIN: That's compensation. 15 MR. TULL: But the language isn't 16

compensation. It's financial assistance. 504 language isn't "compensated." It's "used to provide financial assistance to any person that," blah, blah, blah.

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There is a definition, I think, of MS. PERLE: financial assistance in the LSC act. Do you know what that is?

MR. TULL: It's maybe ironic that the comment upon which this change was based, the change would go just to the middle group that you've identified, a PAI attorney, and it raises a question which is not really resolved here as to whether a pure adjudicare program, whether 12.5 percent of those cases are deemed to be PAI or whether all of them are and that's really not been resolved because there's not been a reason to resolve it.

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We were thinking, I think, in making the recommendation, of the 12.5 percent. It happened to be that the comment came from an adjudicare program, who said it was seeing all of its adjudicare lawyers, across its service areas, starting to withdraw because they didn't want to be bothered with this level of paperwork.

But I think Bill's correct that it is difficult to see a basis other than the practical effect is one which is negative and detrimental, but that was true of what we just discussed with regard to --

MR. McCALPIN: There are all kinds of things

that impede the effectiveness of the program.

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MR. TULL: If the standard were inconvenience or difficulty, we would probably have --

MS. BATTLE: I just recognize that nobody heard you, Rick.

MR. TEITELMAN: We run an adjudicare program in Northeast Missouri, in Hannibal, and it is a dedicated group, a pro bono group. But frankly, I can't hardly remember that long ago when I was a young lawyer. You get 50 percent of your fee. It's guaranteed. It's work in progress. You get the money while the case is going on and it's a good bread and butter area for young attorneys starting out in practice.

Many of the adjudicare lawyers are young attorneys starting out in practice. Fifty percent of your fee -- the average fee in Hannibal, Missouri is \$80 an hour so we pay, I think, \$35 or \$37 an hour. For a young lawyer who gets 100 cases -- you say it pays the secretary. Well, they may not have a secretary otherwise. This is what helps.

MR. TULL: They're learning to be good lawyers

and good bureaucrats at the same time. 1 2 MS. PERLE: This is clearly something I think that's up to the board to decide. 3 This is policy. MS. BATTLE:

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It's a policy issue. MS. PERLE:

If this is a policy issue and it MS. BATTLE: really is going to be up to this board, I'm willing to entertain some thoughts -- Ernestine, any of the board members -- about this and I think we need to make a decision and move on.

Initially, my view was with the real push to encourage the relationship between the legal services program recipients and the private bar, that it made sense on this one to show some flexibility. I do have some concern, based on what Bill raised, that the minute you begin to distinguish and breathe flexibility in here, you've got to have justification for it here, as well as anywhere else.

So to the extent out of the three groups that Maria mentioned that we have to make the cut, I think that the language that was there before this proposed change, the cut is made accurately, so that you're only

1	dealing with that instance where someone is fully
2	compensated. And if they're compensated at any level
3	under the program, then this ought to apply.
4	MS. PERLE: I would suggest that you explain a
5	little bit in the commentary what you mean by
6	compensation.
7	MS. BATTLE: Yes, we can.
8	MS. PERLE: Because there's some questions
9	that have arisen as to if a person gets reimbursed for
10	expenses, is that compensation? The answer should be
11	no but
12	MS. BATTLE: We're talking about people
13	getting paid to do legal services work.
14	MS. MERCADO: An hourly fee or whatever.
15	MS. BATTLE: All right. Are there
16	MR. McCALPIN: So basically what we're going
17	to do is eliminate the new proposal and go back to the
18	old one?
19	MS. BATTLE: That's right. Go back to what
20	was 1636.4 before our change.
21	Anything else in 1636?
22	MS. GLASOW: Yes.

1	MS. BATTLE: All light. What else do we have
2	in 1636?
3	MS. GLASOW: Something we just didn't discuss
4	is the multiple plaintiffs, multiple counsel. We made
5	a change to the bottom of page 5. We just want to
6	clarify that if there's a co-counseling situation going
7	on with one of the counsel being a private attorney and
8	there are different plaintiffs that this requirement
9	only goes to the plaintiff that the recipient
10	represents.
11	MS. BATTLE: You say that's the bottom of page
12	5?
13	MS. GLASOW: The bottom of page 5, number 1,
14	(a)(1), "it represents."
15	MR. McCALPIN: Let's explore that a minute.
16	What you're saying is that if there are multiple
17	plaintiffs and all the plaintiffs are represented by
18	the program and co-counsel, then all the plaintiffs
19	have to be identified.
20	But if you have a case with multiple
21	plaintiffs, some of whom are represented by the program
22	and others of whom are represented by other attorneys,

then you only have to identify the plaintiffs represented by the attorney for the program.

MS. GLASOW: That's correct.

MS. PERLE: I think, in reading over the comments where this issue was raised, now maybe there are different comments that said different things but I know I had one telephone conversation with someone who talked about a situation where there was a group of clients; some were undocumented workers. The legal services program clearly could not represent those people. A group of people -- not CLASP -- a group of people all had the same problems. The program was representing some and co-counsel was representing some of the others.

There was concern that if the defendant got client statements from only some and not those that were represented by the co-counsel, that that would show that there was something wrong, that there was a reason why they were being represented by one and not the other and it would reveal their immigration status, or at least raise suspicions about it.

I think that was one of the reasons that the

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1 comment was made, and I'm not sure that this actually 2 addresses the concern that was raised by the comment. MS. BATTLE: But I don't think there's any 3 other way we can address it. In other words, that 4 concern which stems from the nature of that litigation 5 is one that, in trial strategy and in developing that 6 case, may have to be worked with as between co-counsel. But I don't think that to extend the client identity 8 statement to non-clients of the program would be fair 9 and we cannot exclude them just because of the nature 10 of that litigation. 11 So I think that the cut that has been proposed 12 by the staff is the right cut and I don't know that 13 there's any way to resolve it. 14 15 MS. PERLE: I don't disagree with that. I'm just saying that I'm not sure that this really 16 addresses the concerns. 17 18 Now, I think maybe the way to address the concern is by co-counsels all agreeing that they're 19 going to also submit the statement or something like 20 21 that.

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MS. BATTLE: They could do that but that would

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1	be voluntary on behalf of the co-counsel.
2	Are there other issues in 1636?
3	MS. GLASOW: Did we do the access?
4	MR. McCALPIN: What did you finally decide
5	about the applicable rules of professional
6	responsibility?
7	MS. BATTLE: We're going to respond in the
8	comments to that one comment about it.
9	We're down to access to written statements?
10	MS. GLASOW: Yes. On page 7, the language
11	clarifying who has access to these statements. It
12	says, "This part does not give any party other than
13	those listed in 1636.4(a) any right of access to the
14	plaintiff's written statements of facts, either in the
15	lawsuit or through any other procedure."
16	MR. McCALPIN: What are you reading?
17	MS. BATTLE: Paragraph B to 1636.3 on page 7.
18	We've stricken "does not take" did we take "any" out
19	or is "any" in? "Does not give any party, other than
20	those listed in 1636.4(a)"
21	MS. GLASOW: "Any right of access to the
22	plaintiff's written statement of facts."
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1	MS. BATTLE: There is no 1636.4(a).
2	MS. GLASOW: We may have revised that.
3	MS. PERLE: Also, are these parties? Is it
4	appropriate to use what I'm saying is that you might
5	not want to say party because that suggests they're
6	parties to the lawsuit.
7	MS. GLASOW: Any person?
8	MS. PERLE: Person or entity.
9	MS. GLASOW: Comments raised that there are
10	other things besides discovery rules we need to reach
11	and so we added "by applicable law."
12	MR. McCALPIN: You know, there was at least
13	one comment that said that these statements ought to be
14	subject to the confidentiality of privileged
15	communication, attorney-client communication. I don't
16	think that we can create that. I suppose that the
17	reference to applicable law does that, assuming yes,
18	I'm sure that that does that, although applicable law
19	in this instance certainly has to include attorney-
20	client communications.
21	MR. TULL: We had originally proposed language
22	which said client confidentiality and the privilege,

1	stated more artfully than I just said it, and the
2	inspector general's office suggested this language,
3	pointing out that there may be other this may have
4	to do with funds with other agencies, where other
5	auditors may have laws that govern this and therefore
6	we should expand it to this language, which would
7	encompass others, but it was understanding that it
8	included, as you just said, both the rules of
9	confidentiality, as well as
10	MR. McCALPIN: The law of attorney privilege.
11	MS. BATTLE: Anything else?
12	MS. GLASOW: I think we need to go back to the
13	word "party."
14	MS. PERLE: I think it should be "person or
15	party" because it does refer to the party. It's
16	another party in the lawsuit.
17	MS. BATTLE: Person or party? Person,
18	prelitigation, party after litigation. Person or
19	party.
20	MS. PERLE: Person or party, yes.
21	MS. BATTLE: Anything else? Anything else in
22	1636 whatsoever?

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1	(No response.)
2	MS. BATTLE: Okay. Do people need a break?
3	Let's take five minutes.
4	First, does someone want to make a motion to
5	approve this one, the changes we just made?
6	MOTION
7	MR. McCALPIN: Motion that Part 1636, as
8	modified at this meeting, be transmitted to the board
9	with the recommendation that it be adopted as a final
10	regulation.
11	MS. WATLINGTON: Second.
12	MS. BATTLE: It's been properly moved and
13	seconded. All in favor?
14	(Chorus of ayes.)
15	MS. BATTLE: All opposed?
16	(No response.)
17	MS. BATTLE: The motion carries.
18	(Recess.)
19	CONSIDER AND ACT ON A DRAFT INTERIM REGULATION
20	(TO BE CODIFIED AS 45 C.F.R. PART 1637) RESTRICTING
21	GRANTEES' PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION ON PRISONERS
22	MS. BATTLE: We're going to resume the meeting

1	and begin our discussion of Part 1637, which is the
2	regulation on representation of prisoners.
3	MR. McCALPIN: We could get through this in a
4	hurry if you just take the ABA's recommendation.
5	MS. GLASOW: Page what?
6	MR. McCALPIN: 141. They say it's
7	unconstitutional; don't issue it.
8	MS. GLASOW: That's not the ABA that says it,
9	is it?
10	MR. McCALPIN: It's not?
11	MS. GLASOW: Oh, it is. The ABA said it's
12	questionable, I believe.
13	MR. McCALPIN: At the bottom of page 145.
14	MS. BATTLE: That was to brighten the
15	afternoon.
16	MS. MERCADO: "We do not believe that the law
17	or the regulations drafted will withstand a
18	constitutional challenge by the ABA." They're asking
19	us to seek further clarification from Congress before
20	we actually adopt the regulation. That's what the ABA
21	says.
22	MS. BATTLE: Let's back into the ABA comments

to start with, the issue which pertains to the 1 2 application of this particular regulation beyond penal institutions, which I think was raised by several of 3 the comments, particularly those who deal with people 4 who have been confined because of mental illness. 5 So, Suzanne, can you tell us about those 6 commenters' concerns and what your recommendation is? 7 MS. GLASOW: Yes. We were surprised at the 8 number of comments and strength of the comments on this 9 issue and they really were responding to discussion in 10 the commentary rather than the rule itself. 11 commentary interpreted the rule as applying to persons 12 incarcerated in mental health facilities if they had 13 been arrested for or convicted of a crime. As a matter 14 of fact, I expected a speaker or two here today but no 15 one seems to be here. 16 We agreed. We looked at the statutory 17 language of the provision and we think clearly that 18 Congress was intending to direct this restriction to 19 persons incarcerated in penal institutions. 20

Other recent legislation passed by Congress,

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basically revised the rule to do that.

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which has been to provide protections for persons with mental illnesses, just a lot of factors convince us that Congress is not concerned with mental health issues in this rule. They're concerned with criminals and they don't want LSC funds to be used for those who are incarcerated in penal institutions.

So we added the word "penal" to make that clear, that that is what this rule is reaching. We also made a few changes to clarify the definitions.

One comment said that they were circular and redundant.

Because the prohibition uses both the words
"incarcerated" and "federal, state or local prison," we
decided that we didn't need to refer to "facility,"
which would mean by federal, state or local prison, in
the definition of the word "incarcerated" because it's
in the prohibition itself.

What we need to do is define the word

"incarcerated" for the prohibition, which means
involuntary physical restraint of a person who has been
arrested for or convicted of a crime. And then

"federal, state or local prison" means any penal
facility maintained under governmental authority.

And then the prohibition, using both those terms, you have to meet all the requirements of the prohibition, so "A recipient may not participate in any civil litigation on behalf of a person who is incarcerated in a federal, state or local prison." And it goes on.

So we made those changes in the definitions more to reduce redundancy and circularity, but we did add "penal" for the very purpose of making clear that we're not talking about mental health facilities.

MS. BATTLE: Okay, are there any comments from any of the board members about the proposed changes to 1637, particularly the definition section?

MS. GLASOW: One other small change in the purpose section. We added the word "civil" before "litigation" just to clarify that what the restriction is doing is restricting civil litigation because, except for a couple of tiny little areas, our recipients can't be involved in criminal litigation.

MR. McCALPIN: What about administrative matters within a prison dealing with confinement to solitary, withdrawal of privileges, that sort of thing?

1	Is that civil litigation?
2	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
3	MR. McCALPIN: I'm not sure it is.
4	MS. GLASOW: We restricted that in our rule.
5	As a matter of fact, the board went beyond the
6	appropriation act restriction by adding prohibiting
7	MR. McCALPIN: Administrative proceeding and
8	challenging the conditions of incarceration.
9	MS. GLASOW: Right.
10	MS. BATTLE: We wanted to get at that and I
11	had a conversation with Suzanne about it because it was
12	our view that Congress really was concerned about these
13	actions challenging the conditions of incarceration.
14	So by being explicit in the rule, we're making it clear
15	that this is prohibited.
16	MS. PERLE: I have a question as to whether
17	anybody thinks there needs to be any kind of definition
18	of "penal." Is it clear to everybody what that means?
19	MS. GLASOW: Yes, and that's what the comments
20	suggested we use.
21	MS. WATLINGTON: Also, local prison means
22	you've got to explain it.

MS. BATTLE: Okay, anything else for 1637.2 or 1 2 1637.3? Tom? I'm sorry. I apologize for 3 MR. SMEGAL: interjecting so late but in 1637.3, I'm rereading it 4 5 now and I realize without a comma it misreads. you need a comma after "incarcerated person" in the 6 next to the last line? Because the way it reads now, 7 you've got two different things there, it seems to me, 8 the first part of which is "civil litigation on behalf 9 It sounds like any civil litigation. of a person." 10 And the second part is you can't represent them on 11 12 behalf of an incarcerated person in an administrative 13 proceeding. You need a comma after "such an incarcerated 14 15 person" so that the first part of it also is modified 16 by "in an administrative proceeding challenging the 17 conditions of incarceration, " don't you? MS. PERLE: Because it's any civil litigation. 18 In other words, you --19 20 MR. SMEGAL: Well, that isn't what 504(a)(15) 21 is, the way I read your remarks up in front. "The rule

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prohibits any recipient involved in litigation or

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1	administrative proceedings challenging the conditions
2	of incarceration." Isn't that what it is? That's what
3	it says, right on your first page.
4	MS. PERLE: Are you talking about the
5	commentary?
6	MS. GLASOW: In the commentary.
7	MR. SMEGAL: Second sentence.
8	MS. GLASOW: Yes, the commentary is incorrect,
9	sorry.
10	MS. PERLE: I thought you were talking about
11	the rule.
12	MR. SMEGAL: Somewhere we need a comma.
13	MS. BATTLE: This is not going to be
14	published. This is to explain to us in short, summary
15	form what we already have read.
16	MS. GLASOW: And I summarized it too briefly.
17	MS. BATTLE: Summarized it after we'd read all
18	the actual comments.
19	MR. SMEGAL: Oh, thank you.
20	MS. BATTLE: Anything else? That takes care
21	of 1637.3. What about 1637.4, change in circumstances?
22	We had quite some discussion as a board about this

provision. What was remarkable to me was the fact that there wasn't a lot of comment about this. We certainly had spirited debate as a board about this but not much commentary.

There was some mention that we needed to make clear that while that person, even if it is a brief time that they are incarcerated, that no new matters should be undertaken during the incarceration by the lawyer, that if you've got a pending matter that needs to be completed and it appears that the litigation itself is going to continue and the period of incarceration is brief, that you can continue that but you can't take on any new matters while that person is incarcerated.

Anything else on that? We've spent some time as a board, I think, discussing that. And the final, 1636.5 is our usual recordkeeping. Any changes to that?

Any other comments in any other areas?

Okay, we can now move from --

MS. GLASOW: Do you want a resolution on that?

MS. BATTLE: Yeah, I'll take a resolution.

1	MR. McCALPIN: It's Ernestine's turn.
2	MOTION
3	MS. WATLINGTON: I so move.
4	MR. McCALPIN: Second.
5	MS. BATTLE: Okay, that took care of it. All
6	in favor?
7	(Chorus of ayes.)
8	MS. BATTLE: All opposed?
9	(No response.)
10	MS. BATTLE: The motion carries.
11	MS. PERLE: May I ask a question? We're going
12	to do solicitation now. Do you think we will get to
13	the welfare reform provisions after that?
14	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
15	MS. PERLE: I'm going to go out and call Alan
16	and tell him that he should come by.
17	CONSIDER AND ACT ON A DRAFT INTERIM REGULATION
18	/mo pe donteren ac 45 C E n Dang 1639)
	(TO BE CODIFIED AS 45 C.F.R. PART 1638)
19	RESTRICTING SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS BY GRANTEES
19 20	
	RESTRICTING SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS BY GRANTEES

4	MR. SMEGAL: I was going to suggest the fact
5	that I'm here today caused you to move quickly because
6	I've heard in my absence you don't move this quickly.
7	I don't know that that's true, though.
8	MS. MERCADO: Tom, what you don't realize is
9	that we've already gone over these rules in at least
10	two or three other Ops and Regs meetings.
11	MR. SMEGAL: I see.
12	MS. GLASOW: There was only one issue on this
13	rule and those were based on comments by recipients who
14	had grants or contracts for ombudsman programs.
15	MR. TULL: Ombudspersons.
16	MS. BATTLE: Ombudspersons, that's right.
17	MS. GLASOW: These are situations where, under
18	federal or state law, recipients are given grants to
19	deal with situations that are often either mental
20	health facilities or nursing homes, in situations where
21	you have a population of people who are somewhat
22	vulnerable and Congress recognized this.

MR. ASKEW: When you're not here we move

few rules.

quickly.

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So under these programs, recipients engage in a variety of activities. They are to go in and investigate. They are to offer legal assistance. They are to negotiate. But they're acting in several capacities, so if they go in and investigate and then they turn around and provide legal assistance, they could come in conflict with our solicitation rule.

We felt that Congress in the solicitation restriction was basically saying we don't want you to go out there and solicit clients who otherwise would come to you on their own because these are vulnerable populations who cannot do that and they're also programs that federal government has established, so therefore they favor these programs.

We decided that there should be an exception for ombudsman programs, although it's not really an exception. We're just saying basically this part is not applicable for those, and that is in Section 4(c) on page 4, which reads, "This part does not prohibit representation or referral of clients pursuant to a federal or state statutory ombudsman program."

MR. McCALPIN: Quickly reviewing again the

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1	comments at page 60 and page 150 these are the New
2	York comments I don't find that they use the word
3	"ombudsman" and I'm not sure whether they would
4	characterize the New York program as an ombudsman
5	program. So I'm not sure that this proposed change
6	which you're making covers the New York situation.
7	MS. MERCADO: But New York, the examples they
8	use mention disability
9	MS. GLASOW: Do they mention the programs that
10	are in the footnote on the bottom of page 1 here?
11	MS. MERCADO: They mention the mental
12	retardation, the developmental disabilities. They
13	mention protection and advocacy of individuals with
14	mental illness.
15	MR. McCALPIN: Are those necessarily
16	characterized as ombudsman programs?
17	MS. MERCADO: I don't know how New York funds
18	them.
19	MS. GLASOW: It depends on whether they're
20	under a federal or state statute.
21	MR. McCALPIN: I'm just
22	MS. BATTLE: Are you saying you want to use

1	something that defines "ombudsman" rather than the term
2	"ombudsman"?
3	MR. McCALPIN: I'm just suggesting that the
4	use of the word "ombudsman" may be unnecessarily
5	limiting what we're trying to do, that there may be
6	similar programs which do the same thing which are not
7	characterized that way. I don't object to an ombudsmar
8	program but I think it may not go far enough.
9	MS. PERLE: Are you objecting to the
10	limitation to statutory programs, as well?
11	MR. McCALPIN: Pardon?
12	MS. PERLE: This also limits it to statutory
13	programs. Is that a problem?
14	MR. McCALPIN: Yeah. I don't know why. You
15	know, most of the nursing care homes that I know of
16	have ombudsmen. I'm not sure that they are all
17	necessarily pursuant to statute.
18	MS. MERCADO: There are also special programs
19	that deal with mentally ill, especially mentally ill
20	children, and they don't necessarily have any kind of
21	state or federal funding; they're totally foundation-
22	funded or corporation-funded. They still have a client

1	population that has that character of having
2	individuals who ~- what's the term you used?
3	MS. BATTLE: Mental illness or developmental
4	disabilities.
5 .	What about, "This part does not provide
6	representation or referral to clients pursuant to a
7	federal or state program which provides for protection
8	and advocacy for persons with mental illnesses"?
9	MR. McCALPIN: What about even a private
10	program?
11	MS. MERCADO: It's not just mental illness.
12	You're talking about elderly people, people who are
13	maybe it was in the comments that I saw it.
14	MS. GLASOW: We could say a federal or state
15	statutory ombudsman or similar program, and then
16	provide a definition for the type of program that we're
17	talking about. We'd have to come back to you with a
18	definition, I think, that we all agree on.
19	MS. BATTLE: I guess the concern that I hear
20	Bill raising and María raising is that the exemption
21	that we're talking about is broader than programs that
22	are statutory, that are term "ombudsman," that we

1	really are going to have to go back and look at this,
2	not just in light of the specific comments that we got
3	but the entire category, and come up with a definition
4	that is inclusive of that full category.
5	MS. MERCADO: Vulnerable populations is what
6	they talk about. That's the word I was looking for.
7	So if somehow in the rules we have that, the vulnerable
8	populations, then it does take it away from solely just
9	ombudsmen.
10	MS. BATTLE: But all of our clients are
11	vulnerable. We'd have to come up with some term of art
12	of
13	MS. PERLE: It's really not just vulnerable.
14	It's that they're incapacitated. They don't have the
15	ability to advocate for themselves.
16	MS. BATTLE: And it's really more a capacity
17	issue, actually. That's why the advocacy is done this
18	way, because the people
19	MS. MERCADO: They're retarded or
20	MS. PERLE: They're elderly, frail.
21	MS. GLASOW: He's getting me a dictionary. I
22	remember reading the definition of "ombudsman." It may

1	provide the kind of framework that we're looking for.
2	MS. PERLE: It could be "This part does
3	prohibit representation or referral of clients pursuant
4	to a federal or state statutory ombudsman program or
5	other similar program designed to provide services for
6	vulnerable, elderly or incapacitated," something like
7	that, "clients," something of that nature. You want to
8	make it a little bit broader.
9	MR. McCALPIN: I think we need to make this a
10	good deal broader than it is.
11	MS. BATTLE: We need to send this particular
12	issue back with the staff and come up with language and
13	to look at it more broadly. Why don't we do that?
14	MR. TULL: This is a very inadequate
15	dictionary. I apologize.
16	MS. BATTLE: Let's get a dictionary definition
17	of "ombudsman."
18	MR. McCALPIN: You've got to get it in
19	Swedish.
20	MR. TULL: "Ombudsman: a governmental
21	official, as in Sweden or New Zealand, appointed to
22	receive and investigate complaints made by individuals

1	against abuses or capricious acts of public officials."
2	That's the first definition. Or two, "one that
3	investigates reported complaints as from students or
4	consumers, reports findings and helps achieve equitable
5	settlements."
6	MS. GLASOW: We don't want the part about
7	suing government.
8	MR. McCALPIN: The problem is I think that
9	that definition is not so well known, as evidenced by
10	the fact that you had to go get a dictionary to find
11	out what it means.
12	MS. MERCADO: And that in effect, most
13	ombudsmen I know the ombudsmen in our state
14	they're the troubleshooter and it is complaints against
15	state agencies and the state government, which is one
16	of the biggies on this welfare reform stuff, suing the
17	government.
18	MS. GLASOW: So we don't want to put that in
19	the rule.
20	MS. MERCADO: So I think there has to be
21	another terminology. We know we mean to be able to
22	help people who cannot help themselves because of their

1	mental or physical incapacity.
2	MS. BATTLE: Can we work on that?
3	MS. GLASOW: We can work on better wording for
4	this, to achieve the same results.
5	MS. BATTLE: We've provided the framework for
6	you. We may need to send this particular rule back for
7	proper wording that really broadens the scope of this
8	exemption to cover everything in that category.
9	MR. McCALPIN: We may be able to do this on
10	January 5.
11	MS. BATTLE: Yes, it's just one issue.
12	MR. ASKEW: Isn't the key here, John, that the
13	program is being specifically funded to provide this
14	service?
15	MR. TULL: I think that is. I think the term
16	actually may be a term of art. It certainly is, I
17	think, in Title III in the Older Americans Act and it
18	may well be in states, as well. It does have the
19	derivation that comes from Sweden, and now we know New
20	Zealand, which we didn't know before, but I think it
21	has been, as a term, it's become a statutory term that

refers to specific programs.

22

1	MS. MERCADO: One of the things that we talk
2	about I think you weren't in the room yet is the
3	fact that there are a lot of programs that are run for
4	these particular vulnerable populations that may not
5	have any kind of federal or state funding there's
6	foundation funding or corporate funding for whom we
7	would still wish to be able to have representation of
8	those people who needed to have it.
9	MR. McCALPIN: We would not want this limited
10	to governmental programs.
11	MS. MERCADO: Right.
12	MS. PERLE: I think there are probably
13	hospitals and nursing home associations that give
14	grants to do these because they want to be viewed as
15	good citizens.
16	MR. TULL: This is only an issue if the
17	program itself is functioning as the ombudsman.
18	MS. PERLE: Right.
19	MR. TULL: It's not a referral from an
20	ombudsman in a hospital.
21	MS. PERLE: But I think that programs might be
22	hired, given a contract to provide those services.

MR. McCALPIN: I think that's what the New York comments say, that they are hired to do that. Basically what you're saying is that if the program investigates, it can also take the case. Clearly if somebody else investigates and refers, they always can take the case.

MS. PERLE: Right. And it's also the notion that if they find out there's a problem and then want to sue on behalf of a person who is incapacitated, that it's not solicitation for them to say to that person, "You have a legal problem; I'd like to help you."

MS. BATTLE: We can, as our next rule -- Tom?

MR. SMEGAL: I have a question on 1638(4)(a),

the last phrase, "giving presentations to groups that

request it." Those are permissible activities, down to

and including those words.

But what about the situation where a Legal
Service recipient goes and makes a presentation to a
group, whether it's a group of people in a nursing home
or just a group of people with the same kind of
concerns? It seems to me that that permissible
activity is, in fact, impermissible if you read the

definitions of 1638.2(a) and (b), the way they're written.

First off, it's a room full of people. "In person" means face to face encounter, so you've got a face to face encounter. You're in a room with a bunch of people. B says "Unsolicited advice means advice to obtain counsel or take legal action given by a recipient or its employee to an individual who did not seek the advice or with whom the. . ."

You've got a question and answer period.

Somebody stands up and asks you a question. You give them advice. It's face to face. It's advice.

MS. PERLE: But it's not unsolicited.

MR. TULL: It's solicited.

MS. PERLE: They ask you a question.

MR. SMEGAL: Look what it says here. Read "unsolicited" the way it's defined. "Unsolicited means advice to obtain counsel or to take legal action given by a recipient or its employee to an individual" -- now, appreciating that there's an "or" coming up, "to an individual," skipping the next part, "to an individual with whom the recipient does not have an

1	attorney-client relationship." That's prohibited.
2	MS. MERCADO: But it's an "or."
3	MR. SMEGAL: So the first part drops out.
4	MS. MERCADO: "Not seek the advice or."
5	MR. SMEGAL: It should be "and."
6	MS. MERCADO: No, because then you're really
7	going to further restrict it.
8	MR. SMEGAL: Then it reads either way. You're
9	either talking about an individual with whom the
10	recipient does not have an attorney-client relationship
11	or another individual who did not seek the advice.
12	It's not the same person. It's two different
13	circumstances.
14	MR. TULL: That's correct.
15	MS. MERCADO: That's true.
16	MR. SMEGAL: So you don't have, it seems to me
17	the last few words should be prohibited, because of the
18	way you've defined "unsolicited advice."
19	MS. PERLE: It should be "and." He's right.
20	It's a negative.
21	MS. MERCADO: Yes, because we're defining
22	"unsolicited advice."

1	MS. PERLE: In other words, if you'd read it
2	sort of in a positive rather than a negative way, it's
3	not unsolicited if the person seeks the advice or the
4	person is someone with whom you've had an attorney-
5	client relationship. You're absolutely right. Just
6	grammatically, you're absolutely right.
7	MS. MERCADO: I get it now.
8	MR. McCALPIN: So what are you changing?
9	MR. SMEGAL: "Or" to "and."
10	MS. MERCADO: This should be just up your
11	alley, Bill.
12	MS. PERLE: I know I thought about this issue
13	before and I thought we discussed it.
14	MS. GLASOW: We had intended to put "and" in
15	there earlier.
16	MS. BATTLE: Okay, we've got the "and" now.
17	We've got the "and" but we are going to defer 1638.
18	1638, we will hear from you at our next meeting on
19	this.
20	Anything else on 1638?
21	Why don't we do this. We've got two more that
22	we need to cover and I know Alan is on his way. Let's

1	move on to 1640.
2	CONSIDER AND ACT ON A DRAFT INTERIM REGULATION
3	(TO BE CODIFIED AS 45 C.F.R. PART 1640) APPLYING
4	FEDERAL WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE LAW TO LSC FUNDS
5	MS. BATTLE: We'll move on to 1640,
6	application of federal law to LSC recipients, and that
7	will give Alan time to get here.
8	MS. GLASOW: I anticipate that this rule will
9	take a long time and Alan is on his way.
10	MS. BATTLE: Alan is on his way and we'll take
11	up welfare reform when he gets here.
12	MS. PERLE: He might have some comments on
13	this, also.
14	MS. BATTLE: Let's get started on 1640.
15	MS. PERLE: This is one he has special
16	concerns about, too.
17	MS. BATTLE: Well, we could start on welfare
18	reform.
19	MR. TULL: No, I think you're correct.
20	MS. BATTLE: This one is going to take some
21	time, so let's get started on it. Let's do 1640 first
22	and we'll take up Alan's concerns when he gets here.

MS. PERLE: I may be able to articulate some of them but he's better at these issues than I am.

MS. BATTLE: I raised a concern about 1640, just as a preliminary matter, because I felt that we were about to, as a board, pass a regulation which would require all directors to read, understand and know the application of 13 federal laws pertaining to fraud, waste and abuse that I've never seen, that I've never seen a review of, that I have no knowledge of what the implications are.

I just think that I had some concern about making sure that the scope and breadth of these particular identified laws are the appropriate ones and that we had some knowledge of what it is that we're passing on here.

I didn't know whether or not anyone on the staff has done a review of what these laws are, what they say, what they mean, how they apply to our specific funds or if they apply to our specific funds, what the legislative history was that came to mean that these were the particular laws that were identified as those that pertain to the proper use of LSC funds as

federal funds.

And so, just as a preliminary matter before we get into discussing what some of the other comments are, I'd like for the staff to address that initial concern because just as all of our board members and recipients and directors will have to become knowledgeable because they will have a two-day notice requirement to the inspector general of all of these things, I think it makes sense for us to get some sense for what all these are all about, or where they came from.

MR. SMEGAL: Let me ask a preliminary question. Was this concern raised by anyone? I don't see it in any of the comments.

MS. GLASOW: No.

MR. SMEGAL: The reason I'm asking the question is why is that not of concern to our recipients, to have to, as LaVeeda has pointed out, be intimately familiar with all of these regulations? Why do not they have that threshold concern?

MS. PERLE: I can't answer that. I can say that probably because there were so many rules and

1	everybody was so overwhelmed by sort of having to deal
2	with so many things at one time that people, I guess,
3	made the assumption that the Corporation would present
4	them with copies of these laws and some explanation of
5	what is required under them. And maybe we ought to
6	have an appendix to these.
7	MR. McCALPIN: To what extent are these
8	explained or mentioned at all in the audit guide?
9	MS. GLASOW: I don't believe they are.
10	MR. McCALPIN: They're going to be auditing
11	with respect to these things, aren't they?
12	MR. TULL: No, because these are statutes that
13	set forth criminal
14	MR. McCALPIN: Handling federal fund.
15	MR. TULL: But they set out crimes for various
16	misuse of federal funds.
17	MR. McCALPIN: Aren't financial audits
18	supposed to turn up evidence of crime and the misuse of
19	federal funds if they exist?
20	MR. TULL: No.
21	MR. McCALPIN: Of course they are. There's a
22	special requirement in the IG act that the IG must

immediately report to the attorney general.

MR. TULL: Oh, they are supposed to do that but I think the standard language in any audit is, in the boilerplate, to say precisely that it is not designed to uncover evidence of crime because it's on a random basis -- that is, they select files -- and that they don't want to be held to a standard that they are supposed to find crimes. If they do --

MR. McCALPIN: They aren't selecting files when they do financial audits, are they?

MR. TULL: Sure. Of course. They look in vendor files. They don't look at every transaction. They look at a selection of transactions, including the vendor files -- one vendor file, to see if the invoices are all properly stamped and taken care of.

I remember being aware of the boilerplate language the first time I ever did an audit as a project director and being aware of the fact that they're very careful about saying what they don't do, and that that's one of the things that they will say they don't do, because they don't want to be held liable if --

1 MS. BATTLE: Held liable if they don't find 2 it. 3 MR. TULL: Yes. MR. McCALPIN: Laurie, is that your 4 understanding, that they don't look for these things? 5 MS. TARANTOWICZ: I believe that that's true. 6 I must confess I'm not very knowledgeable about this 7 aspect of what our office does. I know that if 8 something is identified when the auditor is on site, if 9 10 they see something that indicates something, of course it's not going to be hidden, but they're not actively 11 going out to look for a violation of these criminal 12 13 laws. Well, I guess the concern that I MS. BATTLE: 14 raised, I still would like to see addressed. 15 MS. GLASOW: We see this as a technical 16 And, as we discussed with you this 17 assistance problem. morning, these laws are new to us, too but the federal 18 government agencies are very familiar with these laws 19 because these are laws that apply to the use of federal 20 funds by federal agencies. 21 22 MR. McCALPIN: Our programs aren't.

MS. GLASOW: No, our programs aren't. So what we suggested that we should do is go back and first see what the federal government has available -- the GAO and federal appropriations law I know refers to these statutes. Rather than reinvent the wheel, find out what's out there. There may be some very good federal summaries on these laws. At the least, we should certainly send texts of the laws to the grantees.

But we need to go back and do our homework, in essence, to find out what kind of technical assistance we can provide to the field on this.

MS. BATTLE: Yes. The reason I raised this question was this. I don't know the genesis of where this list comes from. It's a lengthy list. And what I don't know is, for example, is it that when a state gets funds from the federal government that one, two and three apply to that one and when a county welfare program gets funds, then four, five and six apply to that? And now our Legal Services list is a laundry list of 18 of these statutes. I don't know.

MS. GLASOW: I suspect that most of these apply to any person or grantee or anybody that gets the

1	federal funds. They're bound by these laws. I think
2	it's pretty broadly written.
3	MS. WATLINGTON: And I'm concerned because,
4	like you say, I agree with her that I really didn't
5	notice this. Also, your board members have to be with
6	this and how many board members actually know what
7	those laws are? They can be held liable.
8	We've really got to give this a lot more
9	thought.
10	MS. GLASOW: These are the laws that were
11	listed in the legislative history of these provisions.
12	We went back and looked and we're all in agreement that
13	this is what Congress was trying to reach.
14	MR. SMEGAL: Before we complete building this
15	mountain out of this molehill, let me suggest to you
16	that all 13 of these are individual sections of laws
17	and it's conceivable they fit on two pages.
18	MS. BATTLE: It's a crime to murder somebody.
19	It's a crime to
20	MR. SMEGAL: 286, 287, 1001, 1002, 3730, 3731,
21	3729, all in a row. These things may be two pages
22	long, the total of all 13 of them.

2	attention span of our board chair, let's find out
3	what's there.
4	MS. BATTLE: I can read two pages.
5	MR. SMEGAL: That's why I said that.
6	MR. McCALPIN: Let me, though, raise a
7	question here that's comparable to one that was raised
8	in connection with the alien thing and that is if the
9	law changes or if there is a new federal provision
10	making a crime out of some aspect of federal funds and
11	we've put this in the regulation, are we not better off
12	to put it in an appendix, as they are proposing to do
13	with evidence of citizenship, as I recall?
14	MS. PERLE: I think that those things change
15	much more frequently. They change at the whim of the
16	INS whereas this at least Congress has to pass a new
17	statute to change these. I don't see an objection to
18	doing it that way if you wish to.
19	MS. BATTLE: You could just use the words
20	"federal law includes," and then put this list. That
21	way if there's a new law out there
22	MS. PERLE: I don't think you want to do that

So before we get too worried about the

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because then --1 MS. GLASOW: A lot of work went into --2 3 because the language is so broad in the restriction, we 4 worked to get agreement that this is the law that it covers and an appendix makes it seem more fluid than I 5 think it should be. 6 MS. BATTLE: And we have agreed this is what 7 it is? 8 MS. GLASOW: Yes. And some of these laws have 9 10 been long-standing. I mean, it's just always been a crime to steal federal funds or to misuse them or to 11 present false claims, so it's not like this is fluid 12 13 law. 14 MR. ASKEW: Have our grantees always been 15 subject to these laws, or only now? MS. GLASOW: They probably are if they have 16 17 other federal grants from other federal agencies but our funds weren't considered to be federal funds. 18 it wasn't through our grants. It was through -- for 19 20 instance, if they got another federal grant, they might 21 be.

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MS. PERLE: But there was a general counsel's

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1	opinion some years ago when Tim Shay was general
2	counsel that said that made the argument and
3	concluded that at least with respect to some of these,
4	that programs, LSC funds were subject to these.
5	MR. ASKEW: In the False Claims Act they
6	MS. PERLE: Some of these laws are specified
7	in the McCollum Stenholm Act and the False Claims Act
8	was specified in that, in the Kassebaum bill, and this
9	exception was in there.
10	So I don't know whether all of these, but a
11	number of these were specified in some of the
12	reauthorization proposals.
13	MS. BATTLE: We have a law library. We can
14	pull down the code Section 18
15	MS. PERLE: It's in a box.
16	MS. BATTLE: Well, to her credit, Suzanne
17	mentioned this morning to me that this list was
18	compiled from a review of our legislative history on
19	the act and on appropriations and on other things. So
20	it was her view that these laws weren't just laws out
21	there that all of a sudden "Oh, the words 'fraud,
22	waste and abuse of federal funds' is in there; let's

apply it." There is some congressional history around
the issues.

MS. PERLE: And the IG also.

MS. BATTLE: My concern is, and I think maybe
Tom has cut this mountain down to a small hill, I just

Tom has cut this mountain down to a small hill, I just think at this point, before we pass this, we need to look at it and see what those things say and be aware of what it is that we're doing so that we can do it with the full knowledge of what the requirements will soon be on our board members, recipients, directors and employees.

MS. PERLE: And I think the Corporation has an obligation to make sure that everybody out there knows where these things are.

MR. SMEGAL: For example, Madam Chair, I am familiar with 18 United States Code Section 1001. It's less than 50 words and it has to do with filing a false oath and being subject to imprisonment. It happens to be part of the declaration that an inventor signs when he files a patent application. It's very short. It's 50 words, max.

So I'm concerned that there's not much here.

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1	Any of us could read them in a relatively short period.
2	MS. GLASOW: We'll provide you with a summary
3	of what the law is and the text of the law.
4	MR. TULL: Or just the law, if Tom's correct
5	that it's only one paragraph long.
6	MS. BATTLE: Just give me the law. I think I
7	can read it.
8	MS. PERLE: You might want to put a couple of
9	paragraphs about what it means and how it's been used.
10	MS. BATTLE: There were three basic issue
11	areas, as I recall from our discussion, that were
12	highlighted by management as areas where there were
13	comments on the application of federal law to LSC
14	recipients.
15	The first has to do with this notice
16	requirement wherein a recipient is required to give
17	notice within two days of a violation of any of this
18	list to the inspector general of the Corporation. I
19	think there was some discussion and concern about how
20	that two days play out.
21	I know that there have been some negotiations

back and forth about whether it ought to be two or five

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days and we've come out with the two days. Is that --

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MR. TULL: The two-day requirement really raises many of the same issues that are involved in the next issue, which is the standard for what then needs to be referred to the inspector general.

The inspector general's office probably can speak to this issue better than I. Our conversations with them, we initially suggested five working days and their concern is to get, as quickly as possible, information about any possible violation so that they can -- and this goes also to the question of the standard which invokes the need to do the reporting -that their interest is in making certain that first of all, that they can, as quickly as possible, be in contact with the program and particularly with regard to what the program does when a director or someone in the program has reason to believe that there may be a violation, that these are criminal statutes, that the mere notification of the fact that there's a belief that there may be a possible violation is not a charge by a program as to any employee nor an admission.

It is simply notifying the IG so that the IG

can then be in communication with the program so that, among other things, the program does not inadvertently undertake some action which might later subvert or undermine a possible prosecution or further investigation.

They've had experience in the past apparently where there was embezzlement in a program or there appeared to have been embezzlement and the program got engaged in investigating itself and attempting to sort of identify what the problem was and was so involved in the evidence that later was necessary or would have been necessary to prosecute that that the evidence was tainted and couldn't be used and it subverted what both the program and the inspector general, in carrying out his responsibilities, felt would have been appropriate.

So their concern with it being soon and being based on a standard which involves really a mere suspicion is largely to address those two problems. We suggested a different standard and they expressed, in very strong terms, their belief that that was inappropriate, given what I just described, and we agreed therefore to change this back.

This is also -- I guess the other thing I would say is that two days and the standard, "any information that indicates that the recipient or any of its employees or board members have taken any actions which may violate," that the two-day notice time and that standard are both currently part of a grant condition with programs as to other kinds of --

MS. BATTLE: So we're codifying the grant assurances.

MR. TULL: It covers slightly different issues because the grant assurance covers acts of theft and embezzlement against the program. If someone breaks into a program, a burglar off the street, and steals a typewriter, then there's a requirement that there be notification of that. And the inspector general's office has been, I think, very quick and very unintrusive in its investigation of those.

It's not created a problem in terms of the fact that they get notice of it and then there's some massive response. It really gives them an opportunity to call up and inquire as to the facts and to interact with the directors as to what's appropriate.

MS. BATTLE: I have a couple of questions and maybe I should address them to Laurie because they really have to do with the experience. Certainly these provisions regarding crimes are provisions which inspector generals have some experience with with other federal agencies that dispense federal funds.

So my question has to do with what the experience is and how this works in other instances for inspector generals and how they relate to their departments in conducting the work around these issues.

MS. TARANTOWICZ: Unfortunately, I can't give you any actual information regarding the experience of the OIG but I should preface any remarks by saying that I think John has adequately described the OIG's position on this reg and in this matter.

I should also say that because this is something -- the investigation of potential violations of criminal laws is something that falls squarely within the OIG's operating responsibilities, this is something that the inspector general feels very strongly about.

The standard is a broad standard because, as

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John said, the OIG needs to get involved as soon as possible, especially because if programs are, as you were talking about earlier, not exactly clear what would constitute a violation, the OIG has the expertise in this area and will sometimes say, "This is not a problem, don't worry about it," sometimes ask for further information and direct the program to what information exactly needs to be gained and in what manner. So early involvement is really crucial.

MS. BATTLE: I would like to know, before I venture on this particular issue, a little bit more about that experience as to how it's done. I've got some concern about paragraph 2 in the standard of if the recipient has any information that indicates that any of its employees or board members may have taken actions that might violate, because anybody can start a rumor. Anybody can come to the director and say, "Did you know So-and-so cashed that check that belongs to this person?"

Now, that's information. Now, the director may have absolutely no belief that this person has done this, and it may take two days for him, before he comes

back in off the road, to say, "So-and-so said you cashed this check. Did you?" "Oh, no, I've still got it. It's here. I haven't cashed the check." And it's over.

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But if information is the standard, as opposed to reason to believe, then you get a lot of mountains out of molehills here. If the standard is that the recipient knows what the law is and has reason to believe it's being violated and needs some help on that investigation, to me, that gets the issue to the inspector general for proper handling.

So I'd like to know -- that's why I asked the question about experience and level of involvement of inspector generals in other agencies where they have the same oversight responsibility, and at what point are other agencies required to make that reporting to the inspector general? Is it when they have information or is it when they have reason to believe that there's been a violation?

I just raise that because information is such a low standard. I mean, information is somebody just says something.

I agree with you. Is a rumor, MR. McCALPIN: 1 an unsubstantiated rumor information? 2 I think it is information. MS. BATTLE: 3 MS. TARANTOWICZ: I'm not necessarily 4 convinced that it is. I think that this is not 5 something that --6 MS. GLASOW: Any information. 7 MR. TULL: How about credible information? 8 MS. TARANTOWICZ: I'd have to go back. 9 don't have the authority to agree to the change. 10 MS. BATTLE: I guess what I'm saying is I'd 11 like for the inspector general to come forward with 12 These are not brand new laws. 13 some history. history about the experience of how these laws are 14 given oversight by other agencies, as well, so that we 15 know. 16 Before I can agree to this very light 17 standard, I could have a comfort level about how others 18 who receive federal funds out there are required to 19 report when there is potentially some violation of all 20 21 of this, and that's just to make it consistent. 22 not asking for more or less. I'm just saying I think

it needs to be consistent with reporting requirements for misuse of federal funds, wherever there are federal funds.

MR. McCALPIN: Let me say also I'm concerned about the black mark that relaying a suspicion of this kind puts on the character of the person who is the subject of it. You know, you relay a suspicion that somebody has done something wrong. If it turns out that that's not credible, it's a long time before that suspicion goes away from the individual.

I think you have to be very careful about putting that black mark on the character of an individual.

MS. BATTLE: Yes. The reason to believe standard, to me, at least was a level where this recipient felt substantiated enough. It's almost like a probable cause standard to take some sort of action.

MS. TARANTOWICZ: It's just that that's the whole problem here. We don't want recipients investigating to find probable cause. It is the inspector general's function to find out if there are reasonable grounds to believe and to forward that to

the appropriate prosecutorial authorities. We do not want the recipients engaging in these investigations without the inspector general's involvement. It defeats the purpose here.

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And I might add that this is not about making a formal charge of misconduct or illegal conduct. This is about relaying information regarding a suspicion.

MR. McCALPIN: The damage is done before the formal charge is made.

MS. BATTLE: Even suspicion is greater than just information. This says information. Suspicion, it seems to me, is even greater than just information.

MS. TARANTOWICZ: Well, you can have a suspicion based on no information.

MS. PERLE: I don't understand why -- you know, when the interim reg was put together, which had the reason to believe standard, the IG was satisfied with that at that time, I thought. And it's only when someone suggested that the two-day notice is too short a time that sort of gave them an opportunity to reopen the whole thing. I think that they're now sort of backing down from where they'd agreed before.

MR. TULL: We had actually proposed language which is not reflected here in response to the comment in the letter which said that a recipient has made a determination that, and that is what invoked the concern by the IG, that making a determination implies an investigation and requirement of an investigation.

MS. TARANTOWICZ: Well, in addition to that, I can talk to what prompted our concerns. The comments that came in, we read the comments that came in that led us to the conclusion that the standard "reason to believe" that was in the reg was causing confusion because that's not what we intended it to mean. It is a probable cause standard. That's exactly what we wanted to avoid.

MS. BATTLE: I guess I need more information.

This is a change that I think is substantial. We've got grave consequences. Your funds, if you don't do these things, can be voided. There are grave consequences that flow from this and I think that before we implement a rule, we need to have some real clarity around what the requirements are, real clarity around what the laws are that apply, so that we can, at

the appropriate time, inform all of our recipients of their responsibilities and all the board members of their responsibilities around this.

Alan?

MR. HOUSEMAN: My only point was I think there is also a difference between a federal program, where there's an inspector general and staff who are employees of the federal program, and a grant program, which is what we are running. And I'm not sure that the inspector general in those grant program views it as his or her responsibility to investigate all possible problems of the grantee, as opposed to employees of the agency.

I mean, the inspector general has a role to make sure about fraud and all that. That's not what I'm arguing. I'm saying that there's a difference between investigating, in the first instance, within an agency where there's a potential problem of fraud or embezzlement, and a grantee of federal funds, an independent entity out here whose staff and board are independent of the entity that gives them the money.

There's clearly a responsibility on the

inspector general's part to be involved with problems, 1 2 but it's not so clear to me that the role is to come in and do the investigation. I think there's an 3 4 independent responsibility on the part of a recipient 5 to do the investigation, and nothing in this act 6 changes that. I mean, nonprofit corporation laws require them to do certain things in the states. 7 So the statement that it's the inspector 8 general's role to come in from the outset and do all 9 the investigation and the program do nothing is what 10 sort of came out and seems to me to be completely 11

wrong, in terms of looking at the relationship between the grantee, its own board and staff, governing body, state law that governs it and the grantor, the Legal Services Corporation.

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MR. McCALPIN: I don't think I agree with you, I think the IG has to follow the federal funds wherever they go.

MR. HOUSEMAN: Oh, I agree with that. That's not what I'm saying.

MR. McCALPIN: I think he has to investigate any misuse of federal funds, wherever they may --

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1	MR. HOUSEMAN: I agree with that completely.
2	That's not what she said. She said the recipient
3	that they would come in and do the investigation, not
4	the recipient. I think there's a responsibility on the
5	part of the recipient to investigate any information
6	that there's fraud or embezzlement.
7	MR. McCALPIN: I think the OIG has a superior
8	responsibility.
9	MR. TULL: To do the investigation?
10	MR. McCALPIN: Yes.
11	MS. BATTLE: From the onset? Are we talking
12	notice of any information? Are we talking
13	investigation when there's probable cause for an
14	investigation? I mean, there's a whole continuum at
15	which we've got to determine at what point is something
16	at the level that it triggers the kind of activity that
17	this Section 1640 envisions.
18	The concern I have is that we started out with
19	a continuum of reason to believe, which says this is
20	something serious; I need to get the inspector general
21	down here to deal with it, and we've gone to

information, which is, to me, a much, much lighter

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standard.

I know that there are federal funds going to a lot of different places and I just think that we need to know what the standards are for other federal grantees about when they have to get their inspector generals involved, and I'd like to know what that is.

And I'm sure that there are lots of different standards, but it certainly would help us in fashioning this standard to err on the side of making sure that we've done what we're supposed to do and what's consistent with how these particular laws are implemented in the majority of the places where they fall.

MR. McCALPIN: It seems to me one of the problems with this is the program may have to report the information even if the program doesn't believe the information.

MS. BATTLE: Yes, that's what I'm saying. If someone comes to me and says that my secretary has absconded with \$100,000 and I know that's not true, this says that's information I've received; I've got to report it.

spite accusations. 2 MS. BATTLE: The rumors. 3 MR. McCALPIN: People have a falling out 4 within the program so, in order to get even, somebody 5 makes an accusation. That's information. Do you have 6 to pass it on? Even though you know the background of 7 it and the likely basis of it, you still have to pass 8 it on. 9 MS. BATTLE: Laurie? 10 MS. TARANTOWICZ: Just as a point of 11 information, I'll let you know that this is the 12 standard, as John said, that has been in the grant 13 assurance for two years now and, in our opinion, it's 14 worked very well. I don't have any information --15 16 MS. PERLE: But it says information that 17 indicates a recipient has been the victim of theft or That's a lot more concrete, isn't it? something. It's 18 not that they may have taken any action which may 19 violate. 20 Let me just give you eight words 21 MR. SMEGAL: 22 and let you think about it. You don't have to write

MR. McCALPIN: I'm also worried about the

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1	them down. Change "any" to "sufficient" so it reads
2	MR. McCALPIN: Where are you?
3	MR. SMEGAL: I'm on 2, page 7. Where it says
4	"any," "it has sufficient information," and then go
5	back to the old language but before getting there put
6	in "to substantiate a reason to believe."
7	So you're got "sufficient" and substantiate."
8	You've got a couple of checks and balances that, it
9	seems to me, gets rid of this rumor that LaVeeda made
10	reference to.
11	MS. PERLE: That may go further than the IG is
12	willing to accept. I think "has sufficient information
13	to indicate that the recipient has taken action." In
14	other words, the information is sufficient to really
15	make some kind of concrete indication that there's a
16	problem.
17	MS. GLASOW: LaVeeda, I have the grant
1.8	assurance.
19	MS. BATTLE: Let's hear from the grant
20	assurance so we can se where this language has been
21	used.
22	MS. GLASOW: "It," the recipient, "will give

1	telephonic or other actual notice to the LSC Office of
2	Inspector General within two working days of the
3	discovery of any information that indicates the
4	applicant may have been the victim of misappropriation,
5	theft, embezzlement or the like of any funds LSC
6	funds, non-LSC funds used for the provision of legal
7	assistance and eligible client escrow funds, or theft
8	of any property, regardless of whether the funds or
9	property are recovered. This notice shall be followed
10	by written notice within 10 calendar days."
11	So we've got victim of misappropriation,
12	theft, embezzlement or the like. So they're the
13	victim.
14	MR. McCALPIN: Does it say "have information"?
15	Is that the way it starts?
16	MS. GLASOW: "Discovery of any information."
17	MR. TULL: "That indicates."
18	MS. GLASOW: "May have been the victim."
19	MR. SMEGAL: But that's a victim. This is a
20	different word. There's "violate" here.
21	MS. GLASOW: Here they're the criminals and
22	not the victims.

1	MR. McCALPIN: That's totally different.
2	MR. SMEGAL: That's 180 degrees.
3	MR. TULL: Except for embezzlement.
4	Embezzlement is the one in the grant assurance which is
5	similar to what is in here.
6	MS. BATTLE: I just think this one needs a
7	little bit more work. I think we need to find out the
8	history of how these laws are how it's done by
9	inspector generals in other places.
10	We do want to put together a regulation that
11	speaks to this issue directly and clearly, informs
12	recipients and directors as to what their obligation
13	is, but I'd like to see some more work on this.
14	MS. GLASOW: Okay.
15	MS. BATTLE: Are there any other issues?
16	MR. HOUSEMAN: There was one which I don't
17	know if we need to resolve.
18	MS. BATTLE: Is that hearing rights?
19	MR. HOUSEMAN: Yes, which we raised in our
20	comment. Let me just speak briefly to it. Again, this
21	is not some overarching issue of great, huge moment.
22	The question is on a hearing, we all agree

that there's got to be some kind of a hearing before the recipient can be found liable for the actions of its employees if the employee violated one of these provisions, when it's the employee that's been found guilty and not the recipient.

Obviously, if the recipient itself is found guilty by a court, it's null and void and it's over with. Nobody disputes that. But in a situation where an employee is found to have violated one of these provisions and then the charge is that the recipient knowingly -- you know, gross negligence -- allowed this to occur, that kind of a question -- we all agree there should be some kind of a hearing.

I'm not convinced by reading the statute that the statute, on this question -- first of all, I don't think the statute even addresses this question directly. But I don't think the statute, on its face, overrules the hearing rights that exist in Section 1011 of the LSC act.

And when they wanted to overrule those hearing rights, they knew how to do it. In the competition section of the appropriation rider, they say that

competition shall be held and the rights under Section 1011 don't apply. They didn't say anything like that here. They used the words "null and void;" that's true.

But the question isn't whether once there's a finding that the recipient acted with gross negligence or with intent, once there's a finding of that, that's true; it's over with. But the question is how do you determine that finding?

So I think if you read Section 1011, you read the statute, I don't think that, on its face, the appropriation act trumps Section 1011, so to speak. I think you can read Section 1011 consistent with the statute on this issue. Therefore, I think if we're going to have a hearing, it ought to be a Section 1011 hearing.

If the Corporation wants to revise 1606, fine.

I don't need to reference 1606. But I think the

hearing that's held in this narrow circumstance that

may never come up ought to be a Section 1011 hearing,

however that's interpreted.

So that's the point of our comment and that's

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1 | the point I would make.

MR. McCALPIN: Are you referring only to the subparagraph B and not A?

MR. HOUSEMAN: Yes, only to subparagraph B.

Actually, if a court finds the recipient guilty, that's it. It's done with. They've had their rights.

They've been in court, period. They've been before somebody independent and they've lost. I don't have any --

MR. TULL: If we can speak to that because we went around this circle ourselves and actually had proposed, at one point, that 1011 rights be -- that there be a specific invocation of 1011 rights. The inspector general's office questioned that and, in discussing the issue with them, we became convinced that, in fact, the 1011 rights probably don't apply and for the reason that what we're talking about is given what's provided now in the regulation, which is there is a right to a hearing, by not invoking 1011 rights, what is left out is the right to a hearing with an independent hearing officer, which is specifically mentioned in 1011.

The reason that we felt that 1011 doesn't apply is that this provision is 504(a)(19) and it does not use the words "termination of funds." What it says is that "Unless the person or entity enters into a contractual agreement to be subject to all provisions of federal law relating to the proper use of federal funds, the violation of which shall render any contractual agreement to provide funding null and void."

Now, the general counsel's office, in interpreting the language "null and void" discovered what we've reported to you when this was originally discussed, which is that is a legal concept that doesn't make sense in this context. But it appears to me to be a clear indication that what they're saying is we don't want to mess around with hearings in the event of a violation of this; we expect at that point it to be immediate and -- Alex isn't here so I can say self-executing.

And I think Alan is correct that as a matter of due process and fairness, that the question of whether or not there has been gross negligence is

clearly a finding of fact and one which is very subjective and that there needs to be some opportunity for a program, in the event that that's what is being invoked, to say, "These are the facts; this is what we did," and the Corporation needs to be put to its proof that, in fact, it does rise to that standard.

And I think the board properly provided for a hearing for that narrow question, but to require an independent hearing officer, I think, flies straight in the face of what Congress must have meant when it said "null and void."

MR. McCALPIN: You read 19 as referring only to the program and a violation by the program. "Enters into a contractual agreement" -- "Unless a person or entity enters into a contractual agreement to be subject to all the provisions of federal law, violation of which represents the agreement to provide funding null and void."

You could read that as being limited to a violation by the program. You may not even need

(b)(2). If the violation is by an employee of the program, the contract may not be null and void. If the

sole violation is by an employee and not by the program, the contract or grant may not be null and void.

MS. BATTLE: I have some concern about an employee's conduct being able to nullify the entire recipient's funding. I just think that that --

MS. GLASOW: It doesn't. We have to impute that guilt to the recipient after a hearing, saying there's been gross negligence.

MS. BATTLE: But the whole imputation process is what -- obviously, because that imputation process could take place at that state court level, as well. I mean, in other words, if the violation of the law by this employee is that grave, then the prosecutor could have gone after the recipient, as well as the employee.

And if there's a decision made to go after the employee and not the recipient for it, we come behind that and say, "Aha, but you knew about it and you didn't do anything about it and we're going to take your funds for it." That adds, beyond what I'm hearing Bill said the statute actually provides. It adds another whole circle and it adds a circle where, at

least with regard to that employee, there's been a 1 state court hearing; there's due process; there's 2 everything; there are all the constitutional rights. 3 Then you get to the recipient and you're 4 attaching something to that recipient that goes outside 5 of that scope, for now. I've got some concern about 6 what are we doing here and where does our authority to 7 make this leap come from? 8 MS. GLASOW: Without B, if we just follow the 9 10

statutory language, then we would have to impute guilt automatically to a recipient if there's a violation of this law by an employee or person there. basically --

> Why would you? MR. McCALPIN:

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MS. GLASOW: Because unless such person or entity enters into a contractual agreement, a violation of which would make the contractual agreement null and void.

If a person or entity has not MR. McCALPIN: violated the agreement but only an employee has --

MR. TULL: No, the federal law says an employee of a federal agency shall not file a false

claim on behalf of that agency in order to gain funds.

If that employee is convicted, they have violated the federal law relating to the proper use of federal funds.

MR. McCALPIN: Yes, but the employee has, not the agency.

MR. TULL: No, to be subject to all provisions of the federal law. And the federal law says that an employee of a federal agency shall not do the following act. It doesn't say the federal agency shall not do the following act. It says an employee shall not do the following act.

We're back to our initial conversation, which is we don't know the precise language of all of these statutes, so without that, precisely how they may, in fact, be implemented under (a)(19) or under 1640.4, we don't know. But I would be surprised if we found that all of these statutes only go to an agency as an entity and only provide for convictions of them, and those are the federal laws which relate to the proper use of federal funds.

MR. SMEGAL: But 18.1001 is to an affidavit or

declaration under penalty of perjury signed by an individual. How can you hold a grantee or a recipient liable for an act of someone who makes a false oath, just because it's in the conduct of his or her employment?

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MS. GLASOW: Actually, there is some law on this law we're citing that deals with that issue. I'd have to go back and refresh my memory, but we did look at that.

MS. BATTLE: This obviously needs some work. There are grave consequences that will flow from the implementation of these two provisions. They're extremely critical, key. The interplay between these provisions and all of those various laws is extremely important and I just think the knowledge level for this committee, before we could make a decision, has got to be greater on all of this.

You know, if, as Tom says, some of these laws relate to acts by individuals, then are we tagging the recipient -- you say, "Go do this case." This person does this case in a way in which they sign off on some oath that violates this law. Then are we going to take

the recipient's funding for that?

MS. GLASOW: Well, if the recipient knew one of its attorneys was engaging in violation of some of these federal laws and let them do it, I'm not sure that we wouldn't have a great concern about that. They were making false claims to the government for funds that they, in truth, did not earn.

MS. BATTLE: When did you find out? Did you find out afterwards? And when you found out afterwards, what did you do about it? Did you know in advance? I mean, those are all of the issues that you'd have to resolve before you determined if it's sufficient for this recipient to lose all of their funding and to have to get out of the business.

It seems to me that when the recipient engages in conduct that is a violation, it's a real clear situation. When an employee engages in conduct, the recipient may know about it, may not know about it, may find out about it after the fact, you know, may mishandle it after the fact.

How do we make the determination as to when the conduct by the recipient rises to the equal level

of a criminal violation? Because really what you're saying is "I'm holding this recipient co-equally liable for violating a criminal statute."

MR. TULL: The structure in the regulation is an effort to protect against an abuse of the problem you just described. A recipient has to act through its individuals. A recipient does not sign a document. It is the director. It is the comptroller. It's the chair of the board or someone.

So invariably, a violation of these acts is going to involve an individual. And the question will be precisely what you said. Did the person do it with the blessing of the board or of the management or did it do it knowingly or was it ratified by the recipient in some way?

What I think we have tried to do, notwithstanding the language which says "null and void," is we have tried to build in a protection against that automatic imputation of that by saying that you do have to look at that and you have to make a judgment as to whether or not, in fact, the person was acting solely on their own, in violation of

instructions and rules and procedures and that it was an individual act only by that individual or if the recipient itself is somehow culpable, and the culpability is what is stated in B, which is knowingly and gross negligence, a very high standard.

So I think this conversation points out the

risks of, by attaching 1011 rights to B and thereby saying that it's really outside of the scope of (a)(19), we may, in fact, lead to a result which is precisely the opposite of what the board tried to do, which is to build in protections against the ax automatically falling in the circumstances which are described in A.

MS. PERLE: I followed you up to about the last 30 seconds. It strikes me that --

MR. TULL: I got lost about a minute ago.

MS. PERLE: Something like 1011 rights, which means that the determination is made by an independent factfinder, provides the additional protection that you need.

Maybe 1011 rights is not the right thing because 1011 rights do deal with a termination hearing,

but maybe what it needs to be is something that says an opportunity to be heard before an independent hearing officer.

I can remember at the Corporation in the days when the Corporation staff asserted that termination hearings did not have to be heard by an independent officer, they could be done by -- I believe it was the general counsel who was going to be the hearing officer and there was a hew and cry and Congress changed it because they felt that that was an action that couldn't be taken within the context of people who were very involved in making the initial decisions about whether they were going to bring a termination proceeding in the first instances.

And I think that there's something to be said for that here. You don't want it to be this sort of incestuous process.

MR. McCALPIN: Don't I recall that we have generally considered that a procedure under 1011 falls within the Administrative Procedure Act, with all the subsequent possibilities, whereas I would assume that what's written here would not?

1	MS. BATTLE: Yes. So there needs to be
2	some
3	MR. HOUSEMAN: It doesn't, actually.
4	MS. PERLE: There's a whole series of
5	regulations that talk about the conduct of these
6	hearings. They're not under the Administrative
7	Procedures Act.
8	MR. HOUSEMAN: You have a reg, 1606, that
9	makes some reference on occasion to parts of the
10	Administrative Procedure Act, just as a guide, but it
11	doesn't incorporate the Administrative Procedure Act.
12	MR. McCALPIN: 1011, at the end of a 1011
13	proceeding, an aggrieved party doesn't have the right
14	to petition the court for a review?
15	MS. PERLE: Oh, yes.
16	MS. GLASOW: But that doesn't come out of the
17	APA.
18	MR. HOUSEMAN: They would have that here, too.
19	MR. McCALPIN: They would?
20	MR. HOUSEMAN: Sure. The funds might be cut
21	off, which is true there, too. You don't have a right
22	to keep the funding going. If you lose a 1011 hearing,

the funds get cut off. They can go to court to try to

stop it. They could go to court here to try and stop

it.

MS. BATTLE: There's no mention of hearing

right now at all in here.

MS. PERLE: Well, it says notice and an

MS. PERLE: Well, it says notice and an opportunity to be heard, but that could be --

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MS. BATTLE: To be heard means "Tell me, do you think this is true or not?" I mean, that doesn't necessarily say hearing, independent hearing officer or any structure to it, as far as I'm concerned.

MR. TULL: If I can revisit the last 15 seconds or 30 seconds of what I said before where Linda said she fell off, the reason I think it's important not to say that as a matter of right under 1011, you have a right to an independent hearing officer is that as soon as we say that, then we're saying that as to those issues, they're not issues which arise under 504(a)(19) if the "null and void" language means something, which I think it has to mean you're not entitled to the full panoply of rights under 1011.

That does not keep the board, when it adopts

its procedures under 1640.4(b), from adopting a set of 1 procedures, which has not been done yet, which provide 2 whatever protections you deem are appropriate to make 3 certain that this is not used arbitrarily. 4 5 MS. PERLE: That was my point. MR. TULL: I think we need to be careful about б not saying this is a matter of the application of the 7 statute as a matter of right under 1011 because that 8 has implications as to how we interpret this. 9 I agree with that. I think Alan MS. PERLE: 10 agrees with that, as well. 11 12 MR. HOUSEMAN: Right. MS. PERLE: The notion, though, is that it has 13 to be some degree of protection where there's some 14 15 independent fact-finder who's making this determination and it's not just the Corporation staff or somebody in 16 the IG's office. 1.7 MS. BATTLE: Can we take this one back and 18 19 revisit these issues? I agree. I think we're moving 20 MR. HOUSEMAN: 21 closer to a resolution. MS. BATTLE: Let's try to do that. 22

1	MR. McCALPIN: Could I ask another one of
2	those apparently self-answering questions? If funds
3	are embezzled from a program by an employee of the
4	program and the employee is convicted of that
5	embezzlement, is that a violation which would render
6	the program's grant null and void?
7	MS. PERLE: Only if the recipient knowingly or
8	through gross negligence
9	MR. McCALPIN: I'm sorry?
10	MS. PERLE: Only if the recipient knowingly or
11	through gross negligence allowed it to happen.
12	MR. TULL: And they were convicted under one
13	of these statutes. State statute
14	MR. McCALPIN: I may have used embezzlement
15	wrong but made away with federal funds, one way or
16	another, okay.
17	MS. BATTLE: The example that I suggested
18	didn't get on the record. I think we were both
1.9	speaking at the same time. I said is it a recipient if
20	the executive director embezzles but the board knew
21	nothing about it?
22	MS. GLASOW: No.

ı	MS. BATTLE: When is it the recipient? When
2	the board of director knew?
3	MR. TULL: I think it's what it says here.
4	It's when it's knowingly or through gross negligence.
5	They have reason to believe that the director has, in
6	fact, been not reason to believe they know that
7	the director has been embezzling funds or they have had
8	significant indication of that and have grossly
9	neglected any appropriate response to investigate that
10	and take steps to address it. Then the second section
11	would be invoked.
12	MR. McCALPIN: But suppose that both the
13	program and the president are charged with the misuse
14	of program funds and both are convicted.
15	MS. PERLE: Then the recipient has violated
16	MS. GLASOW: Then that falls under A.
17	MR. HOUSEMAN: Then that's clear, it seems to
18	me. It's over with.
19	MS. GLASOW: The contract's over.
20	MR. McCALPIN: But if only the president is
21	prosecuted, then you have to go through the further
22	proceeding.

1	MS. GLASOW: Right.
2	MS. BATTLE: It's further proceedings for
3	everybody unless it comes under Bill's suggestion about
4	both the board and the directors.
5	MS. PERLE: So unless a court finds that it is
6	the recipient that has violated.
7	MS. GLASOW: And we've had administrative
8	hearings in our past, an instance where funds were
9	misused or stolen or embezzled, and we looked into it
10	and even had an administrative hearing and decided that
11	the recipient was not held responsible. It was an
12	individual action and we could not impute that to the
13	recipient because when they found out, they did
14	everything they were supposed to do to take care of the
15	issue.
16	MR. TULL: For the record, I'm not sure that
17	the answer to the question you just asked, if both the
18	president of the board and the director are convicted,
19	would
20	MS. PERLE: I said the president of the board
21	and the recipient itself.
22	MR. HOUSEMAN: He said the recipient itself.

1	MR. McCALPIN: I said the recipient and the
2	president.
3	MR. TULL: Oh, I'm sorry.
4	MR. McCALPIN: Are charged.
5	MS. PERLE: If the president of the board and
6	the director are in cahoots
7	MS. BATTLE: We don't even know if these
8	statutes will allow you to charge entities, as opposed
9	to individuals.
10	MS. PERLE: Right.
11	MS. BATTLE: So I don't even know if that can
12	be envisioned from these statutes, so we need to look.
13	I mean
14	MR. HOUSEMAN: Some of them do, I think, but
15	we need to look.
16	MS. BATTLE: We need to look and see.
17	MR. HOUSEMAN: And the False Claims Act is
18	another it's complicated. It's a civil violation
19	and turning it into a criminal violation.
20	CONSIDER AND ACT ON A DRAFT INTERIM REGULATION
21	(TO BE CODIFIED AS 45 C.F.R. PART 1639)
22	PROSCRIBING GRANTEES' INVOLVEMENT IN CHALLENGES

## TO WELFARE REFORM

MS. BATTLE: All right, I'm ready to move on to 1639, which is the last one we'll do today.

Welfare reform. There are essentially no changes proposed to the welfare reform statute by our staff. There is a proposal by CLASP that we amend one particular section to further clarify what is existing law. When I tried to make this argument, it becomes very circuitous for me, so I'm going to allow Suzanne and Alan --

MR. HOUSEMAN: We have been talking about this. We haven't reached an agreement because we really haven't had time but let me throw this out. My problem would be solved, without fooling around with what we've proposed or existing law, by changing the title of 1639.4 to be something like -- it's now "permissible representation of eligible clients." If you changed it to say "permissible representation of eligible clients in welfare reform cases," that solves all of my problems.

MS. BATTLE: That's pretty easy.

MR. McCALPIN: You can't say that because you

can't participate in a welfare reform case. 1 MR. HOUSEMAN: Except under this provision. 2 MR. McCALPIN: Well, but you put that in black 3 letter and you've got the Congress all over you saying, 4 "You're doing exactly what we told you not to do. 5 are representing eligible clients in welfare reform 6 cases." 7 MS. BATTLE: What about welfare cases? 8 9 MS. PERLE: That doesn't help. MR. HOUSEMAN: Let me go back. This, as I 10 read this statute, it has a prohibition and an 11 exception to the prohibition. The prohibition is you 12 can't do something in a welfare reform case. We agree 13 14 on that. Then it says except that you can represent an 15 individual client who is seeking specific relief from a 16 17 welfare agency if such relief does not involve an effort, and the legislative history clearly said that 18 that's what you could do in a welfare reform case. 19 20 MS. BATTLE: But isn't the second part of that

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actually the reform piece? If the relief doesn't

involve reform, so you're really talking about

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1	representation of individual clients in welfare cases
2	under new welfare law.
3	MR. HOUSEMAN: That's right. I don't have any
4	problem with that.
5	MS. BATTLE: And I understand Bill's point.
6	When you use welfare reform, you're saying
7	MR. HOUSEMAN: That's not going to solve the
8	confusion problem that exists here, so I'm not sure.
9	MR. McCALPIN: Politically, you can't say
10	that.
11	MS. BATTLE: An individual
12	MR. ASKEW: "Of eligible clients in welfare
13	cases under new welfare laws."
14	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
15	MR. HOUSEMAN: Oh, that's fine.
16	MR. ASKEW: "Under new welfare laws."
17	MR. HOUSEMAN: That's fine. That's my only
18	point.
19	MS. BATTLE: It's "permissible representation
20	of eligible clients in welfare cases under new welfare
21	laws."
22	MR. ASKEW: "Pursuant to new welfare laws."

1	MS. BATTLE: "Pursuant to."
2	MR. HOUSEMAN: Then we can leave the statutory
3	language alone. We don't have to worry about this.
4	MS. BATTLE: All right, I think that works.
5	MR. McCALPIN: Say this again.
6	MS. BATTLE: It's "permissible representation
7	of eligible clients in welfare cases pursuant to new
8	welfare law."
9	MR. McCALPIN: Do you have to put all that in
10	the title?
11	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
12	MS. GLASOW: I'm sorry; what are we doing?
13	MR. HOUSEMAN: It's just the title.
14	MS. BATTLE: The title change is all.
15	MS. GLASOW: "Permissible representation of
16	eligible clients" what?
17	MS. BATTLE: "In welfare cases pursuant to new
18	welfare laws."
19	Are there any other concerns in welfare
20	reform? We had four comments, four timely comments.
21	MR. McCALPIN: Wait just a minute. You talk
22	about new welfare laws in your caption and you talk

1	about existing law in the body of the regulation. Is
2	that consistent?
3	MS. BATTLE: Yes. As I understand it, the
4	existing law, if you're trying to change existing law,
5	then you're participating in reform.
6	MR. McCALPIN: Well, are new laws and existing
7	laws the same thing?
8	MS. BATTLE: New laws is what comes after your
9	reform.
10	MR. McCALPIN: I don't think so.
11	MS. PERLE: I think that the suggested
12	language does what it should do but people are not
13	willing to do that. In other words, the language that
14	says, after "existing law," "enacted as part of a
15	reform of federal or state welfare systems," I think
16	that should be added there.
17	Is there objection to doing it the way it was
18	recommended, other than by the staff?
19	MR. McCALPIN: I can't hear you, Linda.
20	MS. PERLE: Is there an objection to
21	incorporating what's on the first page of the comment,
22	on the bottom, is there an objection to that?

I haven't had a chance to read MR. McCALPIN: 1 this document. I got up this morning and we've been 2 3 here all day. MS. PERLE: Our recommendation was in that 4 section on existing law, on 1639.4, after the second 5 line which says "otherwise challenge existing law," put 6 a comma and then say "enacted as part of a reform of 7 the state welfare system that is in effect on the date 8 9 of the initiation of the representation." It's simply 10 to make it clear that the exception is only an exception to the restriction. Otherwise, there's 11 confusion in the community about what that means. 12 13 MR. McCALPIN: Well, what does the last clause, "that is in effect" add to the word "existing," 14 which is just before --15 MS. PERLE: It doesn't add anything but it's 16 17 in the statute. MR. HOUSEMAN: Yes, it's in the statute. 18 We're tracking the statutory language here. 19 20 MS. PERLE: And what this does is just makes 21 clear what we think the statutory language was intended 22 to mean.

1	MR. McCALPIN: "May represent an individual
2	eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a
3	welfare agency if the representation does not seek to
4	amend or otherwise challenge existing law enacted as
5	part of a reform of a federal or state welfare system."
6	MS. BATTLE: That does not bother me. I mean,
7	this language
8	MS. GLASOW: We're not opposing it. We're
9	just not taking a stand. We're making no
10	recommendation.
11	MR. TULL: There may be a staff member here
12	who, having had a conversation recently with a member
13	of Congress or their staff, feels differently about
14	that.
15	MR. McCALPIN: You're mumbling.
16	MS. PERLE: He's doing that on purpose.
17	MR. TULL: I'm mumbling back to Martha.
18	MS. BERGMARK: Would you just read the phrase
19	again, Linda?
20	MS. PERLE: It's on the front page.
21	MS. BATTLE: I'll read it out loud.
22	"Recipients may represent an individual eligible client

who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if 1 2 the representation does not seek to amend or otherwise challenge existing law enacted as part of a reform of a 3 federal or state welfare system that is in effect on 4 the date of the initiation of the representation." 5 MR. McCALPIN: What's wrong with that? 6 7 MR. SMEGAL: What was wrong with it the way it was? 8

MS. BERGMARK: That it's permissible to challenge a law that is part of welfare reform?

MS. BATTLE: No. This says "does not seek to amend or otherwise challenge."

MS. BERGMARK: Okay.

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MR. TULL: So it limits it to those. In other words, the question is whether or not -- the prohibition is against welfare reform and the exception, saying you can represent individual persons except for challenging existing law where the existing law, because it is a prohibition and an exception to that, necessarily is defined as what is said here, which is "enacted as a part of reform of a welfare system."

The board had this conversation last time we talked about it and felt uncomfortable with that. I think we do have -- we didn't frame it precisely this way and we do have one set of facts which is different now, which is we have welfare reform. Congress has acted. There's an act which is referred to as the Welfare Reform Act. It does draw boundaries now that we didn't know of before.

We were writing -- the board was writing a regulation in the context of future action by the Congress and lots of action by states under waivers and various other procedures and trying to fit frankly very poorly drafted legislation into that matrix of uncertainty.

I think the degree to which we now know what welfare reform is, at least at the federal level and we have some notion of what that may mean at the state level, it may be that the change in the language should -- addressing this issue and treating it as I think it properly -- I think it is correct that it would be a better statutory construction to say that if you state a prohibition, that an exception that is

listed there has got to be an exception to the prohibition, not an exception which swallows the prohibition, is broader than it, just as a matter of logic within statutes.

There was a concern before that doing that, when it wasn't clear what welfare reform meant, somehow --

MS. PERLE: I don't think it swallowed the prohibition. I think it broadened the prohibition.

MR. TULL: Correct. I'm sorry, that it broadened the prohibition.

MS. PERLE: That suggested things were prohibited beyond what was -- that individual representation challenging a law that was not part of welfare reform.

MR. TULL: And we have had some indication apparently in conversations with folks on the Hill who have looked at this who feel that it would be appropriate to reference the federal legislation, that given the fact that that is their concern, that that should be referenced. That's not something that's done here now.

1	MS. BATTLE: So that's what's done here, isn't
2	it, in this proposal?
3	MR. TULL: That is not done. No, I mean to
4	specifically reference it.
5	MR. SMEGAL: By number?
6	MS. BERGMARK: Including but not limited to.
7	When we were considering this back last summer, there
8	was not yet an enacted federal statute on this but
9	there now is.
10	So the suggestion is yes, you can talk all
11	around this if you want but certainly we mean that. I
12	have explained that there was no intention not to
13	include that; it just wasn't the law at the time we
14	adopted the interim reg.
15	So the suggestion is to incorporate a
16	reference to the federal statute somewhere.
17	MR. McCALPIN: If we were to adopt what's at
18	the bottom of the first page, I don't think we need the
19	added language to the caption of 1639.4.
20	MS. BATTLE: It's one or the other.
21	MR. HOUSEMAN: No, no. I was trying to figure
22	out a way this is better.

1.	MS. BATTLE: Would the reference to the law
2	come in the purpose? I mean, would we cite out
3	front
4	MS. PERLE: In the commentary.
5	MR. McCALPIN: They're suggesting that this
6	becomes
7	MS. BATTLE: It was in the commentary before.
8	MR. McCALPIN: This would be 1639.4.
9	MR. HOUSEMAN: No, you're talking about this
10	other point that Martha made.
11	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
12	MS. PERLE: Well, we could actually put it in
13	the definitions in 1639.2(a)(1).
14	MS. GLASOW: Martha would like to reference it
15	in the text of the rule.
16	MS. PERLE: We could put it in 1632.2(a)(1).
17	It now talks about federal and state AFDC programs and
18	they've been repealed.
19	MR. TULL: There's a definition of "reform" in
20	B.
21	MR. SMEGAL: What do we need to put in the
22	definitions if it's already there?

1	MR. HOUSEMAN: New programs enacted
2	MR. SMEGAL: Oh, that part. You're not
3	talking about substituting this for 4.
4	MS. BATTLE: Why don't I do this? For at
5	least the board members, are we comfortable with the
6	proposed language that we have on the bottom of the
7	management proposal?
8	MR. McCALPIN: Yes.
9	MS. BATTLE: Then we have resolved the issue
10	regarding .4.
11	MR. SMEGAL: But you appreciate there are
12	changes from the existing 4 to the one on the front, in
13	addition to the bold-faced words.
14	MS. BATTLE: Yes.
15	MR. McCALPIN: Are there?
16	MR. SMEGAL: Yes.
17	MS. GLASOW: You could put it in the
18	definition of existing law.
19	MR. HOUSEMAN: That's fine. To solve Martha's
20	problem we could define "existing law means Title I of
21	the Personal Responsibility Act or other federal or
22	state statutory -~

MS. BATTLE: Title what now? 1 Title I of the Personal 2 MR. HOUSEMAN: Responsibility Act. What I suggest is why don't we 3 think about where we put this because actually I'm not 4 sure -- I don't have a problem there but I'm not sure 5 it does what she wants it to do. 6 MS. GLASOW: Maybe we can have an agreement 7 that we will reference it here somewhere and come back 8 9 to you. MR. TULL: It seems like this obviously, 10 because of the complexity of this statute and the 11 12 regulations, which we discovered last time and we're 13 now rediscovering, perhaps what we ought to do is see, and by "see" I mean have some staff work on thinking 14 15 through to report back to you what the impact would be 16 of putting the specific reference to federal welfare 17 reform, which is whatever you just said, Personal Responsibility --18 19 MR. HOUSEMAN: Title I of the Personal 20 Responsibility Act. 21 MR. TULL: -- as a part of existing law, so 22 that existing law, as used in this part, means --

1	MS. BATTLE: That plus whatever
2	MR. TULL: That, plus, and then we have to
3	have some plus that encompasses state, unless it I
4	think we have to think that through
5	MS. BATTLE: Other law, because they may amend
6	that next year.
7	MR. HOUSEMAN: Yes, they may amend it,
8	although probably not Title I. Oh, they actually are
9	going to amend Title I.
10	MS. PERLE: Also it means state laws that are
11	passed pursuant to that.
12	MR. HOUSEMAN: I'm not sure it goes in
13	existing
14	MS. BERGMARK: You could put it under reform.
15	The specific request was to make sure that an
16	example of reform is the now-enacted welfare law and
17	you can say something like, in B, reform of blah, blah,
18	blah, blah, including laws and regulations that
19	implement the changes in Title I blah, blah, blah or
20	including but not limited to Title I.
21	MR. HOUSEMAN: Right, that's fine.
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MS. BERGMARK: Put it in B under reform, but I 1. would concur with John's suggestion that staff take a 2 look at that. 3 MS. BATTLE: Can you do that and bring this 4 particular one back? I think that this is one, if we 5 got it back tomorrow, we could pass this one. We've 6 7 got some that are going to have to be revisited. I think, if we don't have any other issues in welfare 8 reform, that we can put this in the package. 9 MR. HOUSEMAN: This is just a matter of 10 11 figuring it out. MS. BATTLE: The meeting tomorrow morning will 12 not be until 10:00. You will have some time, first 13 thing in the morning, to look at something like that. 14 MS. PERLE: 10:00 here? 15 MS. BATTLE: Here. 16 I was trying not to come back. MR. HOUSEMAN: 17 18 MS. BATTLE: No, we're not going to let you 19 get away. We've got three more regs that we've got to do tomorrow, the easiest ones in the bunch, as Bucky 20 21 has said. 1609 on fee-generating cases, 1626 dealing 22 with aliens, and 1642 addressing attorneys' fees are

the three that we have left.

I'm hoping we can close down by about 3:30 or 4:00 for flight purposes. I don't know what everybody else's flight schedules are like but we should be able, it seems to me, to get through those three tomorrow.

MS. GLASOW: We are going to give you a copy of 1626 to take with you but we're still polishing a couple of items that we're negotiating with, but it'll give you a general idea of where we're going.

MS. BATTLE: Good. We'd like to take that with us tonight as bedtime reading.

We are now in recess until 10:00 tomorrow morning. I'd like to thank the staff and our friends for the diligent help and for our friends coming up to be with us to help us with leadership issues and the inspector general's office for all of the hard work of getting us to where we are today. I appreciate it.

(Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the meeting recessed, to reconvene at 10:00 a.m. the next day.)